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There is still a chance against all the odds, if we fight, that some of it will 
turn out well.
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Foreword: strategies for a global city
Ken Livingstone
After leaving school I had a job in the research laboratories of the Royal 
Marsden Hospital and for eight years I worked with a series of brilliant 
people, people who were driven by a curiosity for the truth and by facts, 
not by ideology. This was a lesson that I took into politics when I joined 
the Labour Party in the late 1960s. I was fortunate that this was at a time 
when local councils were powerful agents of government, institutions 
with powers and resources to change people’s lives for the better. As a 
councillor in Lambeth I had responsibility for housing programmes. 
Providing decent housing for all sections of society was universally seen 
as one of the cornerstones of a decent society. Councils did things and 
politicians were judged accordingly. One of my early political influences 
had been Herbert Morrison, Leader of the London County Council in 
the 1930s. Morrison brought about real structural change in London: he 
unified transport under a single authority, created the metropolitan 
green belt and built council housing. His influence endures today. The 
progressive weakening of local authorities has been a sad trend that has 
continued from the Thatcher period to the present day. Most of today’s 
politicians no longer work their way up through local government and as 
a consequence they have no experience of the business of running major 
public bodies. Ideology has replaced the practicalities of delivering 
change on the ground, where politics are applied with a high degree of 
pragmatism in order to build alliances and get things done. The body 
politic is the poorer for it.
I was elected to the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1973 and 
became leader in 1981. Many of the issues facing London were the same 
as those of today: how to provide decent housing, how to deliver efficient 
public transport, how to ensure a healthy environment and how to make 
sure that economic benefits reach all of the population. Other issues, 
though, are different. In the 1980s the UK economy was being forcibly 
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restructured by the Thatcher government, with consequent catastrophic 
reductions in manufacturing. Climate change was still a theoretical 
concept and globalisation was in its infancy. There were still debates to 
be won in favour of the city as a sustainable place to live, against the car 
as the primary form of transport and about regeneration (as opposed 
to redevelopment) of poorer and more vulnerable communities. At the 
GLC we introduced the notion of ‘community areas’, where we combined 
spatial planning with social and economic programmes that were based 
on an inclusive dialogue with the people living in these areas. We also 
introduced the Fares Fair policy to ensure that public transport was 
accessible to all.1 The GLC was still a major service delivery body running 
housing, education and transport. It was trying to deal with the real 
issues faced by Londoners struggling for a better life. It was completely 
at odds with the agenda of the Thatcher government, who abolished it in 
1986 as an act of political spite, with disastrous consequences for London.
After 1986, in the absence of a democratically elected body for 
London (the only major city in a Western democracy without one), London 
had no voice, no one to make a case for investment and no mechanisms 
to tackle the pressing problems of growth, housing, transport and the 
quality of the physical environment. This was a barren time for London. 
During this time I was a Labour MP and campaigned on London issues. 
I also edited the Socialist Economic Bulletin with John Ross and learnt a 
fundamental lesson of city politics: if you want to bring forward positive 
change then you have to bring in investment. In this respect I have been 
more influenced by Keynes than by Marx. Political change can best be 
brought about through interventions to redress market imperfections 
and failures, and this requires public and private investment.
The re-establishment of a Greater London Authority (GLA) in 
2000, under a mayor, was a major turning point in the city’s fortunes. 
At this time the world had changed and so had London. The economy 
was dominated by the service sector, inequality had increased and there 
had been over a decade of underinvestment in transport and housing. 
Moreover, London had slipped behind other European cities in terms 
of its environmental quality and liveability. The GLA, though, was funda-
mentally different from the GLC. It was deliberately strategic and the 
legislation that reconstituted London government specifically excluded 
any responsibility for housing, social services or education. It did, 
however, focus significant power into the office of the mayor and I no 
longer had to manage internal party politics but could concentrate on 
setting in place the foundations for London to re-emerge as a global city. 
It was clear at this time that London had to attract investment and 
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footloose talent, and was in direct competition with cities such as New 
York, Tokyo and Paris, as well as cities like Shanghai and Mumbai in the 
new emerging economies of Asia. To prosper (and therefore create 
the resources for redistribution to benefit all in society), London needed 
a strong economy, efficient public transport, a skilled workforce, good 
housing for all sectors of society and a broad cultural offer, and it 
needed to be attractive and comfortable to live in. It was also becoming 
increasingly clear that cities needed to be environmentally responsible 
and resilient.
To create these conditions, I prioritised a number of key actions. 
The first was to change Transport for London from a highway authority 
to a transportation authority. I brought in Bob Kiley from New York as 
transport commissioner and we set about investing in the tube, renewing 
the bus fleet, integrating ticketing and creating conditions to encourage 
walking and cycling. We invested £1.3 billion in the overground and 
introduced another 8,000 buses. Today, ridership is 100 per cent up 
from the year 2000. The next move was to rethink planning policy and 
produce a new London Plan. I can see no purpose in arbitrary planning 
restrictions such as on height or density. Higher density means that you 
get more good things in the same space. There are limits, of course, but 
the UK planning system does allow developments to be judged on their 
merits, and in my view good internal housing standards, restrictions on 
the private car and good design are far more important than random 
planning requirements. A case in point is Renzo Piano’s Shard at London 
Bridge. This could not have been ‘planned’, but it has transformed the 
area. I would have been happy to see a higher building had it not been for 
restrictions to flightpaths coming into London City Airport.
I also brought in Richard Rogers as my architectural and urbanism 
advisor and supported his proposals to set up the Architecture and 
Urbanism Unit and then Design for London. I was interested in learning 
from Barcelona as well as New York, and Richard’s philosophy that was 
to be embedded in Design for London was sympathetic to my own vision 
for London: namely, a city designed on a human scale, with efficient 
public transport, diverse and mixed neighbourhoods and decent housing 
for all. Public spaces and living streets are one of the cornerstones of a 
civilised city, where everyone should be only a short walk away from 
a park. In all of this vision, architects are important players. If you have 
good architecture, you are likely to have an inspirational city. But 
architecture needs to reflect the culture and history of your own city. 
As much as I admire parts of New York, I would never have allowed 
London to end up looking like parts of central Manhattan that are simply 
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horrible. Personally, I prefer San Francisco with its lively streets, cafes 
and human scale.
If you are going to achieve anything as a mayor, then you have to 
get on top of economics. You have to create an environment where the 
economy can grow and people will invest. The decision to bid for the 
2012 Olympics was driven by a realisation that without a major project 
that could capture the imagination (and financial support) of central 
government, the deeply entrenched social and economic problems 
of east London would never be tackled. The Olympics locked in the 
government to invest in the area, to help us acquire over 100 hectares 
of land, to decontaminate it, put in the infrastructure and improve 
transport in the area. It was also part of a wider strategy to promote 
London as the global capital, a place that was welcoming and open to 
anyone who wanted to come and achieve their ambitions.
Had I had a third term as mayor, then one of the top priorities would 
have been housing. I had obtained a commitment from the chancellor, 
Gordon Brown, to remove restrictions on the GLA building new housing, 
along with a pledge of £5 billion for public housing programmes. I would 
also have prioritised public health issues, in particular measures to 
improve air quality, and extended both the congestion charge zone and 
the low emission zone, possibly to the Greater London boundary. The 
partial dismantling of congestion charging and the lack of policy to tackle 
air quality (it is estimated that 9,500 Londoners a year die prematurely 
due to poor air quality) are in my view significant failures of the Boris 
Johnson mayoralty.
Good mayors backed by good advisors and teams of talented 
professionals can make a difference to cities. The issues facing our 
cities have not diminished – in fact some, such as inequality, shortage 
of affordable housing and climate change, have become significantly 
worse since I was mayor. Policies concerning health, public transport, 
housing and the creation of high-tech jobs to match a skilled and highly 
productive labour force would still be top of any mayoral agenda in 
almost any major city in the world. The design agenda has broadened to 
embrace environmental criteria. The link between the construction and 
refurbishment of buildings and measures to reduce carbon emissions 
and create new jobs must now be at the centre of urban policy. In this 
respect the green agenda is the next big project that could transform 
London – the ‘next Olympics’. City governments must also be prepared 
to regulate and this applies as much to their economies and financial 
sectors as to their streets and buildings. Appropriate regulation is the 
hallmark of a good society. All of these ideas can be framed by city 
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strategies that imagine what a good city might look like, how it might 
function and how the conditions for civic life might be enhanced.
When I set up Design for London, I challenged the team to ‘think 
about London, what qualities made London unique as a city and how we 
could make it better’. I gave them licence to think, to question, to imagine 
and to challenge. All cities need people who can do this.
February 2020
Ken Livingstone was Mayor of London from 2000 to 2008.
Note
1 The Fares Fair programme was a manifesto commitment and reduced fares on London 
Transport by 32 per cent. It was successfully challenged in the courts by the (Conservative) 
London borough of Bromley. 
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Foreword: London, a city of beauty,  
a city for its citizens
richard rogers
I came to London as a six-year-old refugee, fleeing fascist Italy with my 
parents in 1939. While Florence, my birthplace, is a city that I love to visit 
again and again, I will always treasure London as my adopted home.
But for many years, apart from its wonderful parks, London was a 
grey and colourless place, the smogs that swirled through its streets 
matched by an introverted and segregated social life, where men spent 
their time in pubs and clubs, and women stayed home. London had great 
modern architects – many, like Lubetkin, also refugees – but the city of 
the mid twentieth century seemed suspicious of modernism in general, 
and modern architecture in particular.
I had studied near New York in the early 1960s and worked in Paris 
through the 1970s. I had read Jane Jacobs, Michael Young and Lewis 
Mumford – writers who brought cities, their physical structure and social 
networks to life. These places and these writers helped me to see a better 
future for our cities, an aspiration that urban planning had sought to 
avoid through much of the twentieth century.
When I came back to the UK and became more directly engaged in 
politics, it felt as though London was losing out. The gradual revival 
in urban living that was taking place in other big cities was slow to take 
off. UK government was intensely centralised – even more so when the 
Greater London Council and other metropolitan councils were abolished 
in the 1980s – and the quality of urban design, planning and architecture 
seemed very poor compared to cities like Barcelona, Rotterdam, Curitiba 
and Copenhagen.
The Reith Lectures that I delivered in 1995, and which formed the 
basis of Cities for a Small Planet,1 looked at the role of cities through 
the lens of mounting concern about climate change following the 1992 
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Rio Earth Summit. I argued that cities – long seen as the source of all 
ills – would be the only sustainable way to accommodate a growing 
population. Only socially just cities, with the density that supports 
services and vitality, the transport services that can take cars off the 
road, and the quality of urban and architectural design to move the spirit, 
could answer the challenges posed by climate change.
The election of a Labour government in 1997 gave me the 
opportunity, as Chair of the Urban Task Force, to develop these ideas and 
explore how they could be implemented. The recommendations of our 
report, Towards an Urban Renaissance,2 looked at governance and social 
justice, as well as planning and architecture. This changed the tone of 
debate about cities and led to the setting up of new organisations such as 
the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE).
Tony Blair’s election also enabled the election of a Mayor of 
London, a major step in London’s revival. Ken Livingstone won – despite 
Tony’s best efforts to prevent it – and called me in to ask me to make a test 
case for Towards an Urban Renaissance. I had been working as an advisor 
to Pasqual Maragall, the Mayor of Barcelona, and first discussed a role 
as ‘City Architect’ overseeing the capital’s planning and regeneration 
programmes. This suggestion clearly cut across too many established 
professional hierarchies, so I settled on a different approach – a small 
team, which would work alongside the existing structures but have a 
direct line to the mayor.
Joined by Ricky Burdett, who had been pivotal in the Urban Task 
Force, I set about assembling a team. We took on Richard Brown to 
manage the team and programme, and Mark Brearley to lead the design 
work. The Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) initially focused on 
four main work areas. Internally, we worked with the mayor’s planners 
to make sure that the London Plan reflected the principles of the Urban 
Task Force report (but, to avoid conflicts of interest, we agreed I would 
play no formal part in taking planning decisions). We also worked with 
Transport for London (TfL) and the London Development Agency (LDA) 
to make sure that their schemes were well designed, mainly through 
pushing them to use design competitions and other open approaches that 
would give a new generation of architects the opportunity to shape the 
city’s infrastructure and regeneration schemes.
Outside the mayor’s organisations, the team began to work with 
local authorities and partnerships to develop a masterplan-led approach 
to urban change – particularly in east London, where piecemeal 
development and ill-considered schemes risked throwing away London’s 
biggest opportunity for growth. We also launched a 100 Public Spaces 
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programme, modelled on the programme that Barcelona ran around the 
time of the 1992 Olympics.
Some elements of the programme were more successful than 
others. Ken Livingstone’s London Plan, which has set the template for his 
successors, made a powerful commitment to compact city planning. 
It linked density and public transport, strengthened a commitment to use 
brownfield rather than greenfield land and included specific policies on 
design quality. Our masterplanning and urban strategy work in east 
London began to stitch together a framework for ‘City East’ – a new ‘city 
within the city’ that could accommodate 400,000 new homes and form 
one of the foundation stones for the London 2012 Olympic bid.
The public spaces programme had some successes – in Brixton, 
Bankside, Dalston and Acton, for example. But it was hard to maintain 
momentum behind some of our more radical proposals, particularly 
when there was a change of mayor in 2008. The biggest challenge, 
however, was probably in changing behaviour in TfL and the LDA, both of 
which were nominally under the mayor’s control, but had a significant 
degree of independence and were used to doing things their way.
After several difficult debates, Livingstone proposed merging the 
A+UU (by then comprising around 10 people) with the design teams 
from TfL and the LDA, so that we all operated under unified direction as 
Design for London (DfL). Richard Brown left to lead the team setting up 
the London 2012 Olympic delivery organisations, and Peter Bishop, who 
had been leading the planning of King’s Cross at the London Borough of 
Camden, took over as director.
DfL focused on town centres, on housing and public realm design 
guidance and on regional landscape strategies such as the East London 
Green Grid. It also continued the A+UU’s focus on east London (Ricky 
Burdett became an advisor to the Olympic Delivery Authority) and the 
100 Public Spaces programme. With 25 people in the team, we managed 
to accelerate and extend our reach, but Boris Johnson’s election as mayor 
in 2008 meant a change in my role. Initially, Johnson was effusively 
enthusiastic about our work, but he soon started pulling the plug on 
schemes such as the pedestrianisation of Parliament Square (one of the 
100 Public Spaces). He made me deputy chair of his design advisory 
group, but I am not good at sitting on committees; I prefer to work with 
a team on actual projects. I resigned in 2009, and DfL was shut down 
(as part of the LDA) in 2013.
DfL and the A+UU operated at the margins of London government, 
pushing for better practice in a city where the mayor’s powers are heavily 
limited, as are those of the 33 boroughs. The team achieved some great 
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projects, including some in previously neglected places like Barking town 
centre. It created drawings and ideas that changed the way we think 
about London – from the City East masterplan to the East London Green 
Grid and the mapping of London’s high streets and neighbourhoods. 
And it brought a highly talented team of architects, planners and urban 
designers together. many of whom are continuing to work, as if deep under 
cover, in the Greater London Authority, TfL, the mayoral development 
corporations and the boroughs.
I still feel conscious of how much more needs to be done to make 
London a more civilised and humane city, but the work of the A+UU and 
DfL pushed design issues from the periphery of urban governance to 
somewhere near the centre, where they have stayed ever since. Sadiq 
Khan’s Good Growth by Design programme and the Mayor’s Design 
Advocates can be seen as legacies of the programmes that we operated. 
This book is a valuable record both of our achievements and of our 
frustrations. In its pages, the architects and designers who worked with 
me at City Hall set out the scope and significance of our experiment, its 
roots in urban design theory, and the contribution that it can make to the 
continuing debate about how we shape cities to be great places to live in.
November 2018
Richard Rogers was architecture and urbanism advisor to the 
Mayor of London from 2000 to 2009.
Notes
1 Richard Rogers, Cities for a Small Planet, London: Faber and Faber, 1995.
2 Urban Task Force, Towards an Urban Renaissance, London: HMSO, 1999.
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Introduction: urban interventions  
in a time of rapid global change
Peter Bishop
In 2008 Design for London held an exhibition at Somerset House called 
London: Open City. This was a tangential look at how cities might be 
influenced and shaped through design strategies. One of the images 
(Figure 0.1) was entitled Who Designs London? This was not meant to 
explain the process of design, but instead sought to show the complex 
relationships between all the agencies that are involved in designing one 
piece of public space in London.
The drawing was intended to show how design is achieved through 
the brokerage of deals between agencies with the powers to change the 
Figure 0.1 Who Designs London? Source: DfL/GLA.
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city. In this respect, the designer is a navigator and guide. Sometimes, just 
sometimes, if the right agencies can be aligned then opportunities might 
be identified, and change might take place. And if you work hard enough, 
the outcome might be good. In many ways this diagram summarises the 
purpose of this book, which is to reflect on how it is possible to shape a city 
as complex as London through a series of brokered initiatives and oblique 
strategies. But first of all, it is important to understand the context within 
which designers work in the fluid city of the twenty-first century.
Over the past 30 years we have seen the collapse of communism as 
an ideological and geopolitical force,1 progressive shifts of economic 
and political power to Asia, the development of the internet and mobile 
communications, and the realisation that climate change is a very 
real global threat. The demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
presaged a global economic crash and events such as the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, the ‘Arab Spring’ and the emergence of global terrorism. 
At the time of writing2 a global pandemic is causing city regions to be 
put into quarantine with restrictions on travel and major reductions in 
economic activity. All of these events have challenged any lingering 
notion of a stable world. At the urban scale, economic liberalisation, 
transnational conglomerates, global flows of capital, new and ‘smart’ 
technologies and the splintering of political allegiances have fundamen-
tally altered the role and nature of city government. Constant change and 
uncertainty now prevail and seem likely to persist.
This has confronted us with a radical set of challenges. Social forms 
and institutions no longer have the time to solidify and act as potential 
models from which to extrapolate plans for an increasingly uncertain 
future. A different set of strategies is required for both the individual 
and the organisation. These involve a tactical approach, splicing together 
a series of short-term projects instead of formal long-term plans – 
strategies of constant adaptation. What is trustworthy and works today 
may be obsolete by tomorrow. Tactics are formulated, tested, utilised and 
abandoned as opportunities open up and close down. Success depends 
on a high degree of adaptability and resilience, and in consequence state 
and city governments need to be, above all else, agile.
Successful cities are responding with adaptive strategies where 
agility and resilience are seen as the new hallmarks of stability. The 
politics of persuasion are replacing the politics of direction and this poses 
significant structural challenges for city government. The new issues 
facing cities are also less tangible and discrete and far more intercon-
nected. Economic restructuring, crime, inequality and social marginali-
sation, disparities in health and demographic change now dominate 
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the agenda. Ageing and ethnically diverse populations pose far more 
complex questions than governments have hitherto had to deal with. So 
does a young and often excluded generation that has access to social 
media. While bureaucracies may, at times, be efficient at delivering 
services, they are seldom suited to dealing with the so-called ‘wicked’ 
issues – those involving great social complexity. These require completely 
new solutions that rely on interdisciplinary working, alliance building, 
brokerage and engagement.
The broadening of the urban agenda raises significant questions 
around the definition and scope of design in the built environment. 
Previous generations inevitably worked on a far narrower scope than 
today’s practitioners. The definition of design as being primarily concerned 
with architectural aesthetics has widened to include social and economic 
issues, the regeneration of urban neighbourhoods, public health and 
environmental sustainability. Nevertheless design, what a place looks like 
and how it functions, is still vitally important. Few people would willingly 
opt for poor design, but most are hard pressed to define what good design 
looks like and, critically, how this might be achieved. At the same time the 
design of buildings has (rightly) embraced issues of performance and 
lifetime costs. Environmental impact and resilience are now recognised 
as central components in any design debate. The design debate sits at the 
heart of urban management and therefore urban politics.
The global economy rests increasingly on the interrelationships 
between cities that trade and exchange knowledge. These cities are in 
competition with one another as they vie to attract mobile capital and 
human talent. In a world where people and businesses have choices 
over location, the design of the places where people live and work matters 
as never before. With the urban agenda moving into areas of new 
complexity around health, learning, social resilience and environmental 
impact, there is a growing need to coordinate and reconcile spatial 
policy across numerous different areas and priorities. Within the city 
there are multiple clients and therefore any activity of designing at 
the metropolitan scale is inevitably a political act, requiring complex 
trade-offs that may tip the balance of benefit from one group to another. 
Many cities are still defined by their historic political boundaries, but 
their impact now reaches far beyond these. The relationship between 
cities and their hinterlands in terms of transport, commuting, supply 
chains and environmental management (especially water and energy 
management) is now raising significant new policy issues that are 
calling for new thinking and new alliances. Arguably, the metropolis 
of London now extends across most of south-east and central England, 
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and indeed some European cities are amalgamating across national 
boundaries.
Across the developed (democratic) world the traditional 
mechanisms of city government have come into question. The rise of 
the global neoliberal economy (and restrictions in public funding) 
have pushed governments to adopt alternative forms of partnership, 
procurement and service delivery (frequently involving contractual 
partnerships with the private and community sectors). City authorities 
are moving away from being service providers to becoming strategic 
enablers and commissioning agencies, and this is leading to new forms 
of governance. If the role of the state has changed then it is not surprising 
that the role of the professional architect and planner within government 
has changed as well. Design agencies, as a consequence, have had to 
develop new approaches and methodologies. A definition of agency is 
‘an action or intervention producing a particular effect’. Implicit in the 
notion of agency is the facilitation of (positive) change. Increasingly, 
governments are moving away from specific projects towards creating 
the conditions for change – in other words, towards enabling. Design 
agency is less about planning the city region and more about how it can 
be shaped through sophisticated practices and interventions. It is 
increasingly about the creation of the conditions under which positive 
change may take place.
Design strategies can take a number of different forms within 
government. They might be concerned with the creation of a suitable 
policy framework that can set the rules and the parameters for urban living. 
‘Good’ city life does require a degree of regulation; policy frameworks set 
appropriate standards that will shape the growth of the city and the quality 
of the urban experience. The creation of good policy frameworks makes it 
possible to ensure better housing, protect open space and raise environ-
mental standards. These in themselves are fundamental in establishing 
the foundations for the quality of life in the city. Design agency, though, 
builds on regulatory planning to add the power of imagination and 
produce clear visions of a better future. In today’s pluralistic world, any 
policy needs to be based on an open and realistic dialogue between equals 
– government, other public and private bodies and the communities within 
which any project or initiative will sit. Design in itself is an interdiscipli-
nary, alliance building, brokering and engaging tool that is required in 
order to continually respond to our changing world.
Regulatory frameworks might form a foundation for urban living 
but do not of themselves set a clear vision of a future state, articulate 
outcomes or map a process to get there. Design strategies that translate 
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into projects and programmes can provide a dynamic for change. This 
requires a sophisticated understanding of the role of government vis-à-vis 
other stakeholders, of finance and of process. Design agencies can work 
within government to generate a wider debate and raise aspirations. In 
this respect agency might act through education, advocacy, consultancy 
or advice. City governments are still major landowners, funders and 
commissioners of services and projects. Here the role of agency is to 
improve the effectiveness of government as an informed and competent 
agent and client. Part of this role involves helping government to raise 
and broaden its aspirations to areas outside its core operational remit.
Another role for design strategies can be facilitating, advising and 
assisting external agencies and organisations. There is a legitimate role 
for design agencies within government to assist with advice that leads 
to a greater public good, especially in areas where design expertise might 
be lacking. There is also a role for a design agency to challenge existing 
practices through research into best practice, through strengthening 
the range of client competencies and through constructive criticism, for 
example through design review. All of these areas fit into the category of 
capacity building.
A final area is for design agencies to coordinate an exchange of 
ideas within government. Government is inevitably structured on a 
departmental basis into policy or delivery silos. Effective design agency 
can cut across these and facilitate broader debates outside day-to-day 
operational concerns; it can corral competencies and can bring together 
commonalities at the local level. This might resolve conflicting policies 
or ensure that local projects sit within a clear contextual framework 
and are more than the sum of their constituent parts. In executing this 
role, an agency can often reframe critical questions, find compromise 
solutions and help politicians make difficult decisions by finding 
alternative options.
Design agency is open-ended. Cities are always a work in progress – 
never finished, they are constantly adapting and evolving. Embedding 
design excellence is largely about making cultural changes in the way 
an organisation thinks. This is likely to be a gradual process. Effective 
agency should be concerned with opening up future opportunities, 
rather than closing them down. Well-established government design 
agencies have the advantage of cumulative experience, continuity of 
knowledge and the maturity of long experience. All too often these 
important attributes have been discarded for short-term political goals. 
A degree of long-term certainty is a prerequisite for an agency to be 
effective, as many projects may take years to come to fruition.
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A key role of design agency is one of ‘thought-leadership’: that is, to 
ask the big questions such as ‘How do we want to live in the future?’ and 
then to engage government departments and the public in this debate. 
A design agency can create a ‘space for thinking’ within the heart of 
government. As politicians wrestle with the truly ‘wicked’ issues, a design 
agency has a key role in questioning, thinking and debating, and through 
this process it might possibly create new solutions to politically sensitive 
issues. Effective urban design is often about reframing the design debate 
within the broader concerns of government.
Design for London (DfL) was a design agency that was part of 
London government but had no formal reporting lines. The team’s close 
relationship with Richard Rogers, who had direct access to the mayor, 
gave them considerable influence. Other chapters of this book describe 
the advantages (and problems) of this unique model within the public 
sector. There are other models. Most other UK cities employ architects 
and urban designers, but these are generally embedded in planning 
or regeneration departments. The closest analogy to DfL was the City of 
Leeds, whose ‘civic architect’, John Thorp, had an advisory role within 
Leeds government for close to 25 years. He operated with a small staff 
and acted as the city’s design conscience and memory. He could develop 
long-term strategies and ensure policy continuity. Over the period of 
his work he was able to shape the city through subtle and long-term 
strategies.
Like the UK, many European countries have been wrestling with 
the problems of urban decline, structural economic change and shifts 
in urban transportation. The difference, though, was that in the 1990s 
other European governments were not experimenting with neoliberal-
ism on the same scale as in the UK. The traditions of strong local 
government with mayors, city architect departments and locally derived 
tax revenues allowed cities such as Barcelona, Lyon, Turin and Bilbao 
to invest in their areas and reap the rewards (where these strategies 
were successful). Architecture and urban design were generally seen as 
positive drivers of change and powerful forms of expression allowing 
cities to promote themselves. City government was a powerful design 
patron and this created a market that allowed architectural practices 
to develop and experiment with new approaches to masterplanning, 
housing and public space.
Many European cities, such as Berlin, Aarhus and Dublin, continue 
to demonstrate design leadership through the role of a formal city 
architect with overall responsibility for achieving design quality for 
large-scale plans and projects. They and their teams work strategically 
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across individual project boundaries to ensure there is coherency and 
consistency in how the city is developed. Paris has a long track record 
of promoting architectural projects, from the Centre Pompidou in 1977 
(Rogers and Piano), to the Parc de la Villette of 1984–7 (Tschumi), the 
Louvre Pyramid in 1989 (Pei) and the Parc de Bercy in 1997 (Huet, 
Ferrand, Feugas and Leroy). These grands projets were championed by 
the city mayor, Jacques Chirac, and President François Mitterrand. They 
recognised that cultural institutions and architectural design could 
be key components in defining and celebrating the city and promoting 
it on the international stage. This tradition of design-led regeneration 
continues in Paris today. Dominique Alba, previously the director of the 
Pavillon de l’Arsenal, is the special advisor to the current mayor of Paris, 
Anne Hidalgo.
Barcelona under Mayor Pasqual Maragall was hugely influential 
as a model for DfL. In the 1980s the city embarked on an ambitious 
programme to renew its urban infrastructure, and in 1986 it was 
nominated as host city for the 1992 Olympic Games. Barcelona used this 
not just as an excuse for a series of grands projets, but as an opportunity 
to restructure key parts of the city – to reconnect the historic core to 
the waterfront and to create new public spaces within its dense core. 
Barcelona, of course, had a long tradition of innovative architecture 
and urbanism stretching back to Cerdà’s 1856 plan for the city and 
continuing through to the establishment of the Laboratorio de Urbanismo 
de Barcelona in 1968. From the 1970s, Manuel de Solà-Morales and 
practices like MBM and Rafael Moneo began to experiment with new 
approaches to architecture at an urban scale. This agenda was further 
developed by Oriol Bohigas.3 When he became head of urbanism in 
the city in the early 1980s, he sponsored an ambitious series of public 
realm improvements and new boulevards. His programmes were 
maintained through the 1990s by Josep Acebillo and extended to include 
parks and public housing. To support this urban renaissance, the city 
established a design studio, the Twelve Golden Pens, staffed by some of 
the most promising architect graduates. They also created a strategic 
architectural panel.
The drivers behind the restructuring of Barcelona were rooted 
deep in the traditions of the European city: human scale, the primacy of 
the urban block, civic and local public spaces and the street as a place 
rather than a transport corridor. Projects in different parts of the city 
were promoted through Beauty Commissions, and major architectural 
commissions were procured, particularly in the urban realm. Both Richard 
Rogers and Ricky Burdett were closely involved with Barcelona at this 
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time, and its influence, especially in the use of internal design teams, can 
be seen in the decision to set up the Architecture and Urbanism Unit.
Copenhagen, under the influence of architect Jan Gehl, was 
transformed from a car-based to a pedestrian- and cycle-orientated city. 
His first major publication, Life Between Buildings: Using public space 
(1971),4 was in many ways a reaction to modernism’s emphasis on 
the city as a machine, whereby the citizen became subservient to the 
large-scale intervention of the architect, planner and traffic engineer 
(and the subsequent domination of the automobile). Gehl’s theories and 
approach explicitly reference the influence of Jane Jacobs and represent 
an important train of urban thinking that focuses on the relationships 
between urban form and human behaviour. Gehl’s work subsequently 
influenced many cities, including New York and Melbourne. In London it 
was to influence the public space programmes of the Architecture and 
Urbanism Unit and DfL.
A theme of London government under Ken Livingstone was its 
relationship with New York. The two cities saw each other as competitors 
but they probably had more in common with each other than with many 
cities in their own countries. New York had had mayoral government 
long before London, and the mayor appoints a set of commissioners 
who oversee departments in City Hall. Alex Washburn was Head of 
Urban Design in New York between 2007 and 2013 and reported to the 
planning commissioner, Amanda Burden. An architect, he had been a 
congressional advisor in Washington and had well-developed political 
and organisational skills. He established a small design team which 
exploited the opportunities that Burden could create through her role 
as planning commissioner. There are strong parallels between the 
approach that Washburn and his team developed and the work of DfL. 
Both teams were agile and opportunist and both were headed up by 
individuals who were able to operate in an overtly political environment. 
Washburn described his role as ‘protecting the team from political turmoil 
so they could just get on and do their work’.5 Both teams believed in the 
power of doing the drawings: ‘we drew and drew and drew’.6 Both teams 
also believed in following the opportunities as they appeared (and 
were prepared to gear their work programmes accordingly): ‘when the 
window of urban design opens then you take it’.7 Both teams looked 
at ideas emerging from other cities and then tailored their responses to 
the circumstances of their own cities. A key common element was the 
way in which both teams were prepared to work from the city scale to 
the design of the park bench. Both also believed that being open and 
reasonable helped to secure a place at the negotiating table.
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Mayor Bloomberg of New York visited London and learnt of DfL. He 
then established his own team, the Office for Long-Term Planning and 
Sustainability (OLTPS). The existence of this team was written into the 
New York City Charter, which means that, unless the charter is changed, 
it must always exist regardless of political changes. The roles of the urban 
design group and the OLTPS continue in New York under the present 
mayor, Bill de Blasio.
Perhaps the closest agency to DfL is the Government Architect for 
New South Wales (GANSW). This strategic agency sits within government 
and has a brief to develop design policies and strategies for the state. 
It also advises on procurement, carries out area-based design studies 
and runs design reviews. The GANSW has been very effective in raising 
the quality of design in the Sydney metropolitan area and is generally 
respected within government. Unlike DfL, it is a formal part of the 
machinery of government. While this has the advantage of defining its 
role clearly, it does limit its role in campaigning and advocacy.
The DfL model has been influential in Albania through Edi Rama, 
who was Mayor of Tirana, the capital, from 2000 to 2013. In 2010 Rama 
met DfL’s head, Mark Brearley, at the Rotterdam biennale and was 
interested to hear more about the work of DfL. In a visit to London in 
2011, he made a point of meeting the DfL team, which presented its 
methodology of design strategies based on strong ideas and conviction. 
Rama had already established a reputation as a progressive mayor who 
was interested in using architecture and design to reshape his city. He left 
DfL armed with multiple copies of its strategies and publications, and 
established a similar model in Tirana. Underpinning the model was the 
establishment of a school that provided the training for those working in 
Tirana city government. When Rama became Prime Minister of Albania 
in 2013, he brought this model with him to national government, and in 
2014 he established a new office called Atelier Albania. This is integrated 
into the Albanian Ministry of Urban Development’s National Planning 
Office (AKPT) and directly advises the Albanian government. The office 
was created to be a tool and incubator to enable design-based methods 
to be applied to urban policy and development at a national scale. It still 
exists within government today, providing the space ‘to think’ and 
supporting regional city teams and city mayors with spatial thinking 
and urban strategies.
Although design agencies may exist in more traditional forms of 
city government, the office of mayor can (if the mayor is interested) give 
them greater weight and influence. Indeed, in some cases it is the mayor’s 
office that is the de facto design agency. This might be the mayor and a 
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small group of close advisors operating above the city administration or 
it might entail the establishment of a design studio through which the 
mayor might work. In Colombia’s capital, Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa 
(mayor 1998–2001 and 2016–19) instituted major programmes to 
restructure the city through the construction of a network of cycleways 
and to extend the city’s parks, largely through the use of unorthodox 
strategies. He did, however, finish his term with the highest approval 
ratings of any mayor in Bogotá’s history, and his thinking has influenced 
a number of other cities across the world. In 1989 the architect and 
urban planner Jaime Lerner was beginning his third (non-consecutive) 
term as Mayor of Curitiba in Brazil and established the Urban Planning 
and Research Institute (IPPUC). The idea of ‘urban acupuncture’8 
that was first developed in Curitiba illustrates his belief in cities as 
complex organisms. Small-scale interventions at crucial points can have 
a positive ripple effect that benefits the city as a whole. In parallel, the 
city government delivered large projects focusing on the environment, 
transportation and civic inclusion. It also pioneered ‘shared responsibility’, 
involving citizens in the environmental management of the city. These 
governance strategies continue to be applied today and Curitiba is 
frequently cited as an international paradigm.9
In Asian countries the rapid pace of urbanisation is beginning to 
pose significant challenges that stretch beyond the limited remit of 
formal land use planning. Where a city’s infrastructures have to be 
adapted and retrofitted, more subtle forms of design agency are required. 
The growth imperative that could be accommodated through urban 
planning is now being replaced by agendas concerning urban quality, 
resilience, social equitability and environmental sustainability. Seoul’s 
mayor, Park Won-soon, appointed Seung H-Sang as city architect in 2014 
in a move to re-establish the city’s ‘architectural identity’ after decades 
of unchecked development.10 The Seoul city architect oversees a team 
of architects, planners and urbanists who oversee the planning and 
bidding process for all public projects, as well as influencing the approval 
process and design criteria for private buildings. The appointment and 
structure of the office were modelled on European and North American 
cities. Seung, when interviewed on his appointment,11 described his 
role as follows: ‘I wish to establish Seoul’s architectural identity (and) 
what public interest values architecture should embody.’ Prior to this 
appointment, Seoul, a city of over ten million people, treated design 
as a branch of civil engineering. Although the city was engaged in many 
large architecture projects, responsibility was uncoordinated and it 
lacked any plan that could revive its identity. At the core of Seung’s 
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design philosophy are the importance of rooting urban strategies in the 
culture and morphology of place, the treatment of narrative as more 
important than image, and the celebration of ‘ordinariness’ – all themes 
that resonate with experiments in ‘Western’ urban thinking in the past 
30 years.
Seoul is unusual and represents the experience of a maturing 
city, one that is beginning to address the difficulties of consolidating 
rapid growth. Tokyo and other Japanese cities have long traditions 
of urban planning but do not have any centralised roles regarding city 
architecture at either a political or technical level. Large-scale urban 
transformation projects such as the Tokyo Olympics are dealt with by 
special development vehicles. In Hong Kong the Architectural Services 
Department exists in government, but this is more of a traditional works 
department than a strategic design agency. The Urban Redevelopment 
Authority in Singapore has a broad remit around development and 
urban design, but is very much a government department. In Chinese 
cities, regeneration programmes are becoming increasingly important to 
address urban obsolescence from the first wave of urbanisation, but 
although government agencies such as the Beijing Institute of Architecture 
and Design may play a role in procuring or undertaking large-scale 
projects, there are, as yet, no examples of emerging agile and strategic 
design agencies in individual cities. Indeed, it is possible that this model 
of enquiry, debate and speculation would sit uncomfortably within the 
present systems of urban governance in China.
Taipei has made significant progress in addressing the problems 
of growth through major regeneration and transportation programmes 
but has not developed a specific design agency for the city. It has, however, 
established the Smart City Living Lab, a project office within the urban 
administration that looks to broker partnerships between organisations 
wishing to develop smart technologies at the scale of the urban region. 
This might be a variation on the idea of design agency that is uniquely 
suited to the Asian situation. Elsewhere a number of cities, including 
Zhuhai (China), Goyang (South Korea) and Riyadh (the capital of Saudi 
Arabia), have set up design advisory panels that report directly to the mayor 
or a government agency with a role of distilling ‘big picture’ strategies and 
advising on new projects. This represents an extension of the importance 
of urban design and might be the beginning of a new movement as cities 
in Asia and the developing world address post-growth urban issues that 
include identity, renewal, conservation and sustainability.
When DfL was set up, it was able to benefit from all the thinking 
and urban practice that had gone before – a cross-fertilisation of ideas 
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from other cities. New team members also brought their own ideas into 
DfL. Some of these key ideas are examined briefly in the first chapter 
of this book, which looks at the theories that DfL drew on and the 
methodologies that were developed to exploit the opportunities of the 
moment. As a team we were driven by a belief that we might make 
the city better. At the heart of this is London itself, that wonderful 
anarchic, pragmatic, mysterious and constantly surprising city. We hope 
this book will illustrate some ideas and lessons for the next generation of 
city strategists and designers in London and other cities.
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London, the unique city:  
the establishment of the  
Architecture and Urbanism Unit
Peter Bishop, Lara Kinneir and mark Brearley
This chapter examines the circumstances that led to the re-establishment 
of London government in 2000 and the formation of the Architecture 
and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) by the mayor, Ken Livingstone, and his 
architecture and urbanism advisor, Richard Rogers. It reviews the 
work and methodologies of the A+UU, which provided an important 
platform for the later establishment of Design for London (DfL).
Context: London, the unique city
Although London shares many of the characteristics of other European 
cities – neighbourhoods, parks, civic buildings and the street (as both 
public space and public thoroughfare) – it has some important differences. 
It is generally less compact and therefore less ‘urban’ than many 
European cities. It has always been a city focused on trade and commerce 
and therefore one open to new ideas and people – cosmopolitan and 
mercantile. London has also been fortunate throughout most of its 
history. It was able to dismantle its city walls much earlier than other 
European cities and thus could expand outwards, ‘capturing’ existing 
settlements. This has given it a different, less dense urban morphology 
and considerable physical diversity between its neighbourhoods.
Power in London has never been concentrated into the hands of 
an individual or small ruling clique, but has instead been dispersed and 
shared between corporations, businesses and individuals. The early 
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introduction of freeholds produced a class of landowners and a model 
of growth and development that was reliant on private capital. The 
separation of government (Westminster) from commerce and trade 
(the City) ensured that no single all-powerful individual was able to 
stamp their image on the city through personal grands projets. When 
London started its first major outwards expansion at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, development was largely financed by private 
landowners. This created not only the ‘great estates’ that still exist today, 
but also a pattern of fragmented development and fine-grained urban 
form that has been able to adapt and renew itself while accommodating 
significant changes in social organisation and technology. Finally, 
London’s great period of expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries made it both polycentric and diverse – as was so elegantly 
captured in the diagram in the 1943 Abercrombie Plan (Figure 1.1). 
Significantly, this growth largely preceded the automobile and was based 
on the creation of comprehensive rail and tram routes.
The growth of London to become the largest metropolis in the 
world challenged notions of governance and administration. The 
Municipal Corporation Act 1835 started to regularise the chaos of new 
and largely ungoverned districts; the Metropolis Management Act 1855 
Figure 1.1 London, a city of neighbourhoods, by Abercrombie, 1943. 
Source: Patrick Abercrombie and John Forshaw, Greater London Plan, 
1944.
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tackled the need for coordinated investment in infrastructure; and the 
Local Government Act 1888 established the London County Council. 
Subsequent Local Government Acts, in 1894 and 1900, established a 
lower tier of government – the London boroughs. While this produced 
a local tier of democratic accountability and service delivery, it also 
dispersed power within London, a situation that was consolidated 
in 1965 when boroughs were amalgamated into larger units – the 
33 boroughs that exist today. This form of administrative organisation 
was well suited to the conditions of the twentieth century where powerful 
state agencies were accepted as necessary in order to tackle issues of 
urban growth, urban renewal, postwar reconstruction, slum clearance, 
urban transportation and welfare provision.
By the beginning of the 1970s, the role of the state started to be 
questioned and was then severely shaken by the policies of the Thatcher 
governments from 1979 onwards. A weak national economy placed 
significant strains on public funding for transport, housing and urban 
renewal, and successive funding reductions weakened local authorities. 
Even before the 1979 election, the powerful technical departments that 
had driven large-scale urban restructuring were being dismantled. The 
end of the 1970s effectively spelt the end of the powerful and proactive 
public sector as the major participant in urban development.
The idea of a reduced state presence was manifest in reduced 
funding and powers for local government. This ushered in a period of 
protracted opposition to central government from a number of left-wing 
inner London boroughs. Central government prevailed and one of the 
casualties was the Greater London Council (GLC), which was abolished 
in 1986.1 The abolition of the GLC meant that central government took 
direct control of London government, in effect depriving London of an 
independent voice. While often portrayed as an act of political spite, 
the abolition of the GLC was part of the trend of centralisation of 
political power into Westminster, at the expense of cities and the regions. 
Of direct benefit to London, however, was a change in UK regional 
policy. Postwar programmes had sought to direct investment away from 
London and the South East in favour of the depressed former industrial 
areas. This policy was abandoned in the 1980s in favour of allowing 
market forces to decide regional investment priorities. This change and 
the financial deregulation of the City meant that investment began to 
flow back into London.
For London, the 1990s was a period of transition. Stripped of its 
elected strategic level of government, it was administered by central 
government and a series of non-elected advisory bodies. Consequently, 
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at a time of globalisation there was no governing body to promote the 
interests of the city as a whole or to develop projects or strategies on 
the scale of Paris, New York or Berlin (where German reunification 
was driving major urban change). There were, however, changes taking 
place. First, London’s population, in line with many major cities across 
the world, was beginning to grow again. The population of London had 
been in decline2 since the end of the Second World War due to industrial 
restructuring and the impact of housing renewal programmes that 
had displaced populations beyond the city fringe to the New Towns and 
elsewhere. This decline had left large areas of land derelict, particularly 
in east London, and had created severe pockets of unemployment and 
social deprivation in many other parts of the city. The government 
had responded by setting up the London Docklands Development 
Corporation, tasked with bringing forward regeneration in the east of 
the city. Meanwhile, the financial deregulation (the Big Bang) of the 
1980s had led to a series of new commercial developments such as 
Broadgate and Canary Wharf.
As London emerged from the economic slump of the early 1990s, 
new money was injected into the economy, much of it from overseas. At 
this time, a new generation of architects was emerging who had been 
influenced by Josef Paul Kleihues’ 1987 International Building Exhibition 
Berlin.3 This was a seminal moment when architects and urban thinkers, 
including Aldo Rossi, Léon Krier and James Stirling, refashioned an 
urbanism based on the principles of the European city – the street, 
the perimeter block and the public space. This inspired architectural 
practice in cities like Barcelona and Paris. Cheap airfares to these and 
other European destinations had produced a small but influential class 
of ‘city consumers’. Their visits to cities such as Lyon, Turin and Bilbao 
fuelled demands for more investment in their own cities and public 
spaces. The National Lottery, set up in 1994, provided new funding 
for heritage and ‘millennium projects’. It triggered architecture-led 
interventions including the Tate Modern at Bankside (Herzog & de 
Meuron), the Great Court at the British Museum (Foster), the Millennium 
Bridge (Foster), the Greenwich Dome (Rogers) and the London Eye 
(Marks Barfield). These captured the public imagination and were 
undoubtedly popular. In parallel, the new confidence in the City of 
London stimulated a new generation of tall buildings like Foster’s 
Swiss Re Tower. Initially derided by the Prince of Wales as ‘the Gherkin’, 
it was generally acclaimed by the public and soon became a symbol of 
London’s new-found confidence. Slowly, London was reclaiming its 
urbanity, and architecture was becoming a talking point.
London, thE uniquE C ity:  thE EstaBLishmEnt of thE a+uu 17
By the late 1990s, the Conservative governments of Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major were running out of steam and the Labour 
Party under Tony Blair was preparing a transformative agenda for 
government. This agenda was forward-looking and saw technology and 
design as some of the key strengths of ‘Cool Britannia’.4 Architecture 
was part of this agenda. The spirit of the time was captured by the 
Architecture Foundation. Established in 1991 to examine contemporary 
issues in architectural design and theory (and with Richard Rogers, 
Norman Foster, James Stirling, Alan Yentob and Nick Serota on its board), 
it organised a series of debates, roadshows and exhibitions to stimulate 
public interest in architecture and urbanism. The most influential of 
these were monthly debates in a packed Westminster Central Hall. One 
of these, in 1996, debated the future governance of London. It provided 
the forum for the newly elected leader of the opposition, Tony Blair, 
to formally pledge to re-establish London government in the event of a 
Labour election victory.
Tony Blair won a landslide victory in May 1997, and in April 1998 
Richard Rogers was asked to set up and chair the Urban Task Force to 
rethink urban policy. John Prescott, the deputy prime minister, set out 
the need for this rethinking:
Over the past few decades many of our urban areas have suffered 
neglect and decline with an exodus from the inner cities, driven 
by a lack of confidence in schools, fear of crime, an unhealthy 
environment, and poor housing. This is bad for our people, bad for 
quality of life, bad for our economy and bad for our society.5
The Urban Task Force brought together leading practitioners, represent-
atives of government institutions, academia and the development sector, 
and gathered evidence from many experts in fields from architecture to 
engineering to environmental sustainability. It looked at examples of 
best practice in the UK, the rest of Europe and America, and from these 
it derived the concept of the city as a sustainable place to live, a city built 
on a human scale and a city built around the individual citizen. The 
subsequent report, Towards an Urban Renaissance,6 set out a framework 
for urban thinking that included concepts like the compact city, the reuse 
of ‘brownfield land’, the city based on walking and cycling and the city 
that recognises the importance of public spaces. It set the foundations 
for planning and design in London when Ken Livingstone was elected 
mayor in 2000. It celebrated the role of the city in human culture and 
marked a major shift in thinking and practice in urban policy. It led to 
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the production and publication of the government’s Urban White Paper 
in 20007 and, in 2005, to an updated report of the Urban Task Force’s 
research, Towards a Strong Urban Renaissance.8
Mayoral government in London: in the court  
of the Medicis
The new Labour government held a referendum on the principle of 
re-establishing metropolitan government in London presided over by 
an elected mayor. Subsequently, the 1999 London Government Act 
paved the way for the establishment of the Greater London Authority 
(GLA). Its principal purpose was to promote the economic and social 
development and the environmental improvement of Greater London. 
Ken Livingstone, the last leader of the GLC, was elected as London’s 
first mayor in 2000.9 Livingstone’s agenda was both strategic and 
pragmatic. Despite his left-wing reputation, he recognised that 
London’s future would depend on being a major player on the world 
stage and that a strong economy and inward investment were vital 
in order to support programmes around public transport, improved 
housing and environmental quality. While still an important global city, 
London had slipped well behind New York in terms of its economic 
power, cultural offer and influence. With the arrival of the new century, 
London looked outwards again and redefined itself as the major trading 
centre in the global economy.
Livingstone’s advisor on planning, Nicky Gavron, fully embraced 
the ideas in the Urban Task Force report and was keen to incorporate 
these into a new London Plan. For Livingstone they resonated with his 
vision of a global city that could outperform New York economically, 
be environmentally responsible and socially equitable, and create the 
conditions of urban life that would attract both global investment and 
footloose global talent. Underpinning this vision was a city that was 
diverse, cosmopolitan, confident and open. In retrospect, this vision does 
not appear to be radical, but at the time it articulated London’s role in the 
emerging global liberal economy in a way that had not been done before. 
This vision still provides the basis of London’s urban policies and has 
survived subsequent changes in political leadership.
The ideas of the Urban Task Force were translated into planning 
policies through a new London Plan. These included the idea of the 
compact city (dense rather than sprawling), the reuse of brownfield 
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land (rather than building on green space) and development focused 
on public transport (involving restraint on private car use). Transport for 
London (TfL) was transformed from a highway agency into a transport 
authority, and budgets were redirected towards public transport, walking 
and cycling. Tall buildings were encouraged, partly to densify the city 
but also partly to symbolise London’s new confidence. The regeneration 
of east London was prioritised (ultimately leading to the successful 
bid for the 2012 Olympics) and the London Development Agency (LDA) 
was tasked with land acquisition and decontamination. Critically 
development, responsibly controlled, was seen as a source of growth 
and future prosperity rather than a threat to communities. In parallel, 
programmes were established to channel funds into employment 
and training schemes to facilitate the wider distribution of London’s 
new wealth.
The restoration of London government under an elected mayor 
produced an entirely new form of political administration – one without 
precedent or established practices. The mayor was supposed to exercise 
executive power under the scrutiny of a number of committees that 
theoretically could hold him to account. In practice they were weak and 
their role was constrained. That said, the London Government Act of 
1999 had deliberately sought to limit the GLA to a strategic remit. The 
Blair government did not want a return to the days of the GLC where 
strategic control and service delivery sat alongside one another in a large 
and unwieldy body.
The new mayor did take over control of transport (through TfL) 
and economic development (through the LDA). These two bodies came 
with significant powers and money as well as traditions of organisational 
independence. London government had been re-established, but it 
was organised in silos and the only point of intersection was the office 
of the mayor. Livingstone worked through close political allies who 
became portfolio holders and advisors – in effect a non-elected cabinet. 
This modus operandi clearly suited Livingstone, whose skills combined 
strategic thinking with attention to detail and a highly developed political 
acumen. The GLA was young, unfettered by institutional history and in 
campaigning mode to wrest greater powers and money from central 
government. The fluidity of the structure, combined with an absence of 
service delivery responsibilities (apart from running TfL), was perfectly 
set up for an experienced political operator like Livingstone. Early in its 
establishment, Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron described it enthusiastically 
as being ‘like working in the court of the Medicis’.10
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The creation of the Architecture and  
Urbanism Unit (A+UU)
Ken Livingstone asked Richard Rogers to investigate how London could 
deliver on the recommendations in the Urban Task Force report. The 
structure of city government in London lacked the role of a city architect, 
a position that many European cities had established. The role was 
offered to Richard Rogers on a part-time basis at a considerable salary. 
Rogers accepted on condition that he would be an advisor (not city 
architect) and that the salary would be reduced to one pound with the 
balance being used to build a design team to support him. This led to 
the creation of the Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU).
The A+UU was set up within the GLA. Initially, it included a 
seconded member of the mayor’s private office (Richard Brown) 
alongside Richard Rogers in his role as chief advisor to the mayor.11 
They reviewed the existing regeneration services within the mayor’s 
family of organisations – the GLA, the LDA and TfL – to consider how 
existing resources could be restructured in light of the Urban Task Force’s 
recommendations. This review established new connections between 
people and projects across the different organisations and set the 
foundation for collaboration on regeneration projects across the GLA. 
Mark Brearley, a partner at the architecture practice East, was appointed 
as the first head of the unit. By the end of 2002 the team employed five 
staff members: a unit manager from the mayor’s private office, an urban 
design manager, a public space project manager, an architectural 
assistant and an administrator. Architecturally trained professionals 
held two of these positions.12
 
The creation of the A+UU was a key step in 
developing new design thinking on London. Its focus on contemporary 
urban theory was an important innovation introduced by Rogers and 
his close collaborator Professor Ricky Burdett from the London School 
of Economics.
Although the A+UU sat alongside the GLA planning teams, its 
reporting lines were ambiguous. Initially, it reported to the mayor 
through Richard Rogers and it had no formal statutory role in London 
government. This was both a strength and a weakness. Without formal 
power or spending budgets, the team could be strategic and agile – 
and could think outside the constraints that often limit government 
employees. The success of this arrangement relied heavily on the use of 
‘soft power’ and political influence. This works as long as the mayor is in 
power and is willing to support the arrangement. If the mayor or the 
relationship changes, then life can become uncomfortable very quickly. 
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This theme recurs in the next chapter concerning the A+UU’s successor 
body Design for London (DfL).
The A+UU and its influences
The A+UU had the rare privilege of being able to fashion a new work 
approach that was tailored specifically to London. Its thinking was 
shaped by a wide range of influences that were then central to European 
urbanism. These included the importance of mixed-use neighbourhoods 
and the primary position of the street as civic space – ideas that stretched 
back to Jane Jacobs and the Internationale Bauausstellung (IBA Berlin), 
which first brought forward the concept of ‘careful urban renewal’. The 
concept of mixed zones is now well established in UK and European 
planning. Single-use zones might be efficient in terms of industrial-style 
economies of scale but are ill-suited to the new economy which is based 
on intense exchange of ideas. Here proximity and interconnectivity are 
the keys. The idea of an urban paradigm based on synergies and a degree 
of tolerated disorder sits comfortably with the concept of ‘everyday 
urbanism’ introduced by John Chase, Margaret Crawford and John 
Kaliski in 1999.13 Influenced by the thinking of Lefebvre, it explicitly 
rejects the aesthetics of ‘new urbanism’ in favour of an empirical approach 
of studying and recording the activities of everyday life. Inherent in this 
approach is an appreciation of the fine grain of the city. ‘Everyday spaces’ 
are defined by Crawford as ‘a diffuse landscape of banal, repetitive and 
“non-design” locations’14 – a city’s public spaces, markets and streets.
This approach also begins to develop thinking about the temporal 
nature of the city where changes such as the appropriation of space for 
different activities and by different groups is part of the urban dynamic. 
This in turn opens the door to new forms of urbanism that develop from 
activism to embrace a shift in power towards active community 
participation. Here the architect becomes a ‘player’ and design moves 
beyond mere speculation on form to become involved in the realisation, 
curation and management of urban space. As a result, the city can be 
viewed as a series of temporary events and this contributes a new 
dynamic to urban planning and design, a perspective that extends urban 
thinking further into the field of experience. This is explored by Bishop 
and Williams in their book The Temporary City.15
Brearley had been influenced by the thinking of British urbanists 
and architects, most notably Alison and Peter Smithson, and the anarchist 
social observer Colin Ward. He drew on a peculiarly British strand of 
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urban thinking that recognised and celebrated all the ‘stuff’ of cities – a 
wider range of elements than the conventional building blocks of many 
mainstream European urban theorists. These included components as 
disparate as industrial areas, housing estates, motorways, derelict land, 
retail sheds, football pitches and cemeteries, together with what goes on 
in such settings. Brearley recognised the primacy of the street and the 
significance of both formal and informal urban spaces, and took close 
interest in the ‘found’ elements of the urban fabric and the activity it 
hosted, which the city shaper could choose to work with rather than 
obliterate. Deeply embedded in this thinking was an antithesis towards 
planning as a mechanism for pursuing ‘neatness’.
At Cambridge, Brearley’s contact with Peter Salter (ex-Smithsons) 
and Peter Carl had reinforced the idea of the value of first-hand experience 
and the power of urban narratives. He also encountered Josep Lluís 
Mateo’s work through Quaderns and Hans Kollhoff (who had worked 
with Oswald Ungers and Wim Wenders on the concept of the ‘green 
archipelago’ in Berlin).16 Before joining the A+UU, Brearley had been a 
partner with Julian Lewis in the architecture firm East. Their work was 
propositional and challenging. For instance, the River Places project 
considered the area around Rainham village and the marshes on either 
side of the Thames and reimagined them as a part-wild pleasure garden 
that spanned the river. Harnessed to this was a particular form of British 
activism which challenged conventional planning strategies from within 
the process. Earlier in his career Brearley had been involved with a 
People’s Plan for the Royal Docks and was an advisor to one of the more 
successful City Challenge programmes in Stratford. This experience 
brought with it a deep scepticism of conventional planning and a desire 
to shape new ways of working.
The resulting approach to urbanism was grounded in a careful 
examination of the ways in which the city functions. It stressed the 
importance of survey, mapping and documentation as well as a thorough 
understanding of urban form and function. From this emerged an 
urbanism based on small adjustments rather than grand interventions. 
These interventions were to be framed by the structure of the city, by 
its big roads and its high streets, its suburbs and its infrastructures. 
This was perhaps the essential element that UK thinking brought to 
the understanding of cities and urban form. This was an urbanism of 
negotiation, of understanding that process was a key part of design 
and that the perfect plan was always likely to be sidelined by the reality 
of the situation. It was not incompatible with European mainstream 
thinking at the time, but it did add a dose of healthy pragmatism.
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The development of a methodology
The approach of the A+UU owed much to the thinking emerging 
from places such as the Architecture Association (AA). Brearley’s time 
at the AA in the 1990s had brought him into contact with like-minded 
practitioners such as Tony Fretton and Peter St John. Their thinking 
explored the gaps in the planning system that might be filled with new 
design strategies – to create a ‘culture of the ordinary’.17 A number of 
practitioners had come together at the AA in the 90s and these contacts 
would be a strong thread through the work of both the A+UU and DfL. 
These people, who included Peter Beard, Liza Fior and Julian Lewis, were 
to form a London network of practices that blended design agency with 
conviction. In particular, the notion of ‘bottom-up’ urbanism would 
be developed into an operational methodology that would fuse design 
with activism. Underlying this was a deep-seated belief that urban 
design was about the ‘carefulness of urban change’ and about the 
designer being an agent of change in the city. Design was not a matter 
of neutrality or a debate about the aesthetics of architecture. As a group 
they were interested in the potential of urban planning as a vehicle for 
radical change.
This background gave the A+UU a sense of curiosity, but one based 
on serious empirical research. The city might be open to new forms of 
experimentation, but these should not be frivolous. In this there was a 
fundamental difference in approach from that of the Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment. Design was not about being a 
commentator, it was about active involvement; and while design review 
might make a scheme better, it would never act as a powerful change 
agent in the city. The designer should be prepared to take a position. In 
Mark Brearley’s words, ‘Design is where you make drawings to work out 
what you are going to do before you do it.’18
As a new team, the A+UU had the advantage of starting from a 
clean slate. Without any specific powers or funding, they used their 
knowledge of London to grow a portfolio of regeneration projects 
developed in cooperation with TfL and the LDA. These mayoral bodies 
both owned land and had the budgets for urban infrastructure that 
the A+UU lacked. This ‘catch and steer’ approach was opportunistic. 
It relied on the fact that there was so much happening in London that 
any form of comprehensive involvement would be impossible. In any 
event, the team did not have any powers or control. Collaboration, on the 
other hand, allowed the team to influence projects and to deflect them 
into better outcomes.
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Richard Rogers had highlighted this cross-organisational, collabo-
rative, site-specific and evidence-based approach as the key missing 
ingredient in the implementation of regeneration frameworks. However, 
the A+UU’s involvement was not statutory and was reliant on good 
working relationships with the various clients, stakeholders, landowners 
and funders. This was challenging since the role and value of design 
was frequently questioned by other stakeholders who often held contra-
dictory views on value within the regeneration context. While the A+UU 
sometimes met with hostility, it could offer strategic knowledge-gathering, 
an overview of initiatives across London government and fresh ideas. As 
a result, it gained credibility and some of the decision-makers started to 
appreciate the benefits of well-designed regeneration and were willing 
to give the team a role at the table.
The A+UU identified and addressed London-wide strategic issues 
such as the lack of good civic spaces and the role of strategic landscapes. 
From this thinking emerged a public space programme: 100 Public 
Spaces and the East London Green Grid. The team also began working in 
challenging areas for regeneration, such as Barking, Dagenham and the 
wider Thames Gateway. Here the mayor owned significant areas of land, 
and strategic design thinking was much needed. These localities had 
been largely neglected by planning, and the A+UU’s involvement in the 
place-shaping process was more readily accepted by the boroughs 
and the LDA. These were also places where new ideas could be piloted. 
The team’s approach of research, local knowledge-gathering and 
collaborative working and its appreciation of the intrinsic value of 
‘found’ assets resulted in its methods being trusted and understood. 
In almost all collaborations with the boroughs, additional projects were 
subsequently developed and, with these, long-term associations with 
the places.
This methodology encouraged new conversations between the 
mayor’s separate regeneration teams, especially in the more deprived 
areas of the city. Achieving tangible change on the ground in these areas 
was entirely consistent with the mayor’s desire to address social 
deprivation in the capital. The A+UU’s most significant work was 
delivered through ‘conceptual masterplanning’. The City East project 
(see below) was an enquiry into the nature of London’s future growth 
into the Thames Gateway and posed questions as to why growth and 
investment were not happening in an area with available land, proximity 
to the central area and good transport infrastructure. This work focused 
on the brand and identity of City East and the need for collective dialogue 
across the mayor’s family of organisations and with other stakeholders. 
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This approach was later developed by DfL into the Green Enterprise 
District (see Chapter 2) and the Royal Docks Regeneration Strategy 
(see Chapter 6).
This deliberately pragmatic and opportunistic approach had both 
negative and positive results. The loose and ad hoc nature of the A+UU’s 
involvement and the services and skills it offered allowed for tactical 
targeting of projects. But for the outsider, a lack of clarity on its role, 
combined with a lack of understanding of its approach, created mistrust 
and tension. Its perceived ‘special relationship’ with the mayor through 
Richard Rogers also caused a degree of envy and mistrust.
The approach developed by the A+UU is summarised below under 
a series of subheadings.19
‘Big ideas – small actions’
The A+UU recognised that it had to operate strategically and seek to 
influence rather than dictate. Consequently, a series of programmes were 
put together that could operate on a metropolitan scale, capturing the 
imagination of Londoners, but would also allow incremental implemen-
tation (Figure 1.2). Implementation was often opportunistic through a 
series of small-scale projects. These might be funded and managed by 
different public and private agencies and could be implemented in almost 
any sequence as funding became available. Individually they had little 
impact, but collectively they could transform places and lives.
Figure 1.2 Big ideas – small actions: analysis of opportunities for 




‘Catch and steer’ linked the idea of making small adjustments to the 
city to the political reality of a relatively weak institution of London 
government. Too many different agencies, all of them considerably more 
powerful than the A+UU, were involved in projects. It would have been 
impossible to influence more than a fraction of the projects generated 
within London government. It was also considered somewhat futile to 
produce an objective matrix of criteria that might assess which projects 
were or were not worth consideration. Government was not that logical 
and in any case the A+UU did not have the power automatically to 
intervene, especially as many agencies jealously guarded their turf. 
‘Catch and steer’ was essentially opportunistic. The team would pick up 
projects and try and mould them into more effective configurations. 
To achieve this, it focused on building working relationships with 
organisations and individuals that were sympathetic to its aims and 
wanted to cooperate with it. ‘Catch and steer’ can be traced back to 
East’s contribution to the 1996 Future Southwark exhibition20 and 
was succinctly described by Brearley as ‘defining selective strategies for 
change, making the difficult jumps between desire to save and willingness 
to erase, and embracing the diversity of what determines place’.21
‘mapping and understanding’
Some of the early conceptual plans produced by the A+UU set out its 
approach to spatial thinking on a metropolitan scale (Figure 1.3). This 
was clearly influenced by new public spaces in Barcelona, as well as Jan 
Gehl’s thinking about the public realm. It also recognised the London 
context of streets as places rather than simply connectors. The dual 
focus on places and streets was a theme that carried through into the 
work of DfL. It fused Continental European and British thinking on 
the nature of place, but the projects that flowed from this idea also 
illustrate the divergence of British and European urban thinking. 
Inherent in this thinking is the important idea that the city is essentially a 
‘messy place’. This reflected the ideas of Christopher Alexander: that the 
‘natural’ city does not conform to formal geometries or constructs 
but comprises a rich mix of different but essentially organic elements.22 
The approach fitted both the urban condition of London and its 





















































the messy realities of roads, industrial areas, wastelands and suburbs. 
Design interventions were also fashioned around the social condition 
of neighbourhoods to address poverty and deprivation. To be relevant, 
urbanism had to engage.
‘do the drawings, win the argument’
The A+UU’s work was strategic, deliberately propositional and backed 
by research and analysis. It could change scale from the metropolis to 
the neighbourhood, from the conceptual to the design of the street block 
or the quality of finish of street paving. The common element was the use 
of drawings (Figure 1.4) and ‘minted phrases’ to communicate ideas, 
capture imagination and garner support. In this respect its work was the 
very opposite of the norm for a public agency.
Continuity through relationships
From the start there was a clear realisation that the A+UU’s work would 
be time-limited. Urban change on the scale that was required would only 
be possible by working through others, agencies that would almost 
certainly outlast the team itself. Partnerships were based on building 
trust. What the A+UU could offer was knowledge of London, the ability 
to make connections and the luxury of being able to think, research and 
develop new perspectives. This was a fragile opportunity, but influence 
was possible if the team could embed itself in organisations and 
communities and ‘become the locals’.
Figure 1.4 Woolwich town centre masterplan. Source: A+UU/GLA/
Witherford Watson Mann.
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Working within political structures
The A+UU’s approach was specifically shaped by the political realities of 
working in Livingstone’s ‘court of the Medicis’. The power rested with the 
mayor. There was no formal relationship between the mayor and his 
advisors, and business therefore had to be conducted through informal 
conversations, social networks and ad hoc meetings. This worked well 
enough for advisors who were prepared to spend time in the mayoral 
suite of offices on the top floor of City Hall, but it posed difficulties for 
Rogers, who as a part-time specialist advisor was also running a major 
architectural practice. Although he had the respect of the mayor, he was 
not part of the inner circle of advisors or policy-makers. Initially, within 
such a young and evolving government institution, this did not matter 
too much. Rogers and the team had regular meetings with the mayor and 
decisions were made to develop ideas and programmes. There was no 
formal process for these decisions to be put into practice other than 
the fact that the mayor had agreed them. In the early days this was an 
advantage as the team was developing ideas and the mayor’s backing 
was sufficient to make other agencies cooperate. But later the mayoral 
advisors entrenched their positions and protected their turf and the 
mayoral agencies developed their own programmes and funding streams. 
The A+UU worked within this environment by influencing and shaping 
but was always aware of the political and organisational tensions. In 
order to avoid creating a threatening profile, it eschewed any notion of 
authorship or ownership of ideas. Instead, it sought to seed ideas in other 
organisations such as TfL and the boroughs, allowing others to lead. Its 
prevailing strategy was to be seen as a responder rather than an initiator. 
Others could take the credit as long as the project was developed.
On the whole Livingstone was interested in the ideas that the 
A+UU generated but would intervene where necessary to ensure that 
they were in accordance with his political agenda. His agenda moved 
from the global to the local. He knew London intimately and could read 
plans and drawings. From his pivotal position at the centre of London 
government, he knew how to exercise control and if necessary play 
parts of the organisation off against each other. Inevitably within this 
environment the A+UU, while strategic, had to operate tactically. It did 
the drawings and coined the phrases that framed an important set of new 
initiatives that it carefully inserted into parts of the organisation that 
were open to its approach. Ultimately, these had a significant impact on 




Initially, the A+UU decided to concentrate on engaging with a small 
number of locations that were experiencing major change and where 
it could have a significant impact. The first places that were selected 
included Bishopsgate Goods Yard and the Thames Gateway. Bishopsgate 
Goods Yard had a long and complex planning and development history 
and was a highly contentious site. It soon became apparent that existing 
stakeholders would not welcome a new (and largely untried) organisation 
to the party. Such places were not suited to a ‘light touch’ approach and 
the experiment was not repeated.
The London Thames Gateway offered better opportunities for 
involvement. Despite the obvious potential in the area, little was actually 
happening and Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott wanted action. A 
key issue was the property market’s perception of the area. The ‘Thames 
Gateway’ was perceived as too vague a concept, too big and frankly 
too difficult. The infrastructure was poor, many of the sites were 
contaminated and low market values deterred risk-taking. There was 
also no single project to catch the imagination. In the early days of the 
A+UU, Tim Williams, Director of the Thames Gateway Partnership 
and a ministerial advisor to the Blair government, counselled the unit to 
‘focus on the east and work in Barking and Havering’. The two boroughs 
were rather ‘off the radar’ for those thinking about London, but they 
were acutely aware of the problems that they were facing and were open 
to assistance.
City East was effectively a simple exercise in branding the area that 
was both vague and precise. The proposition started with a set of bold 
statements that City East might only constitute 3 per cent of the area of 
London but it was set to accommodate 25 per cent of London’s growth 
(Figure 1.5). This conceptual work was based on survey work and a 
detailed knowledge of the area. Each area was considered through a 
set of questions around ‘the consequence of change in each area’. This 
allowed a set of propositions to be discussed with the boroughs through 
a process of ‘negotiated urbanism’. Because the options highlighted the 
consequences of different scenarios, the A+UU were able to assess the 
degree of change that was acceptable to boroughs and agree where plans 
and proposals might be developed further. This form of non-statutory 
plan-making set many of the parameters for the subsequent regeneration 
of east London. It took place before London was awarded the 2012 
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Olympics and considered alternative scenarios for the area that could 
respond to whether London won the Games or not. It also left behind 
strong working relationships that made the A+UU the natural point of 
coordination for cross-borough projects. The A+UU presented the 
concept in a diagrammatic and non-threatening way that demonstrated 
the potential of east London and was designed to build enthusiasm and 
support (Figure 1.6).
While this was an entirely conceptual piece of work, it did refocus 
discussion on London’s eastward growth and underline the area’s 
potential. The LDA responded by redirecting funds into land decontami-
nation and infrastructure improvements. City East also articulated an 
important characteristic of the regeneration of east London. Despite 
being a priority for both national and local government for over a decade, 
Figure 1.5 City East: the centre for London’s growth. Source: A+UU/
Mark Brearley/GLA.
DESIGN FOR LONDON32
progress had never been smooth or easy. Change had occurred, but in a 
series of ‘eastward lurches’ – Canary Wharf, City Airport, the London 
Exhibition Centre (ExCeL London) and the Millennium Dome/Greenwich 
Peninsula. Between each of these ‘lurches’ there had been no continuity. 
Infrastructure had often been put in retrospectively and, while each 
‘move’ was important in its own right, none had provided sufficient 
momentum to trigger the next move. Where there had been development, 
it had been driven by the public rather than private sector. Although 
not attributable to the A+UU and the City East concept, the next big 
‘lurch’ eastward would be the 2012 London Olympics. Arguably, this has 
finally produced the momentum to achieve the long-term regeneration 
of east London.
The City East concept spawned a series of smaller initiatives that 
latched onto mayoral budgets that were allocated within the Thames 
Gateway. These funds were channelled into projects in specific places 
and coherent strategies were written to aid the consolidation of existing 
town centres and growth areas. One such initiative was Barking town 
centre, where a sympathetic borough (Barking and Dagenham) was keen 
to improve one of the poorest places in London. The A+UU set up a 
methodology for town-centre and high-street interventions that were 
later developed by DfL (Figure 1.7). This programme is covered in more 
detail in Chapter 3.
Figure 1.6 City East: analysis of the morphology of the London Thames 
Gateway. Source: A+UU/Mark Brearley/GLA.
London, thE uniquE C ity:  thE EstaBLishmEnt of thE a+uu 33
the mayor’s 100 Public spaces programme
A second initiative, influenced by both Barcelona and Copenhagen, 
drew on the theme of public space improvements and became the 
Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces programme (Figure 1.8). The title of the 
programme reflected the philosophy of ‘Big Ideas’. In fact, there were 
never 100 public spaces in the programme, just a desire to create as many 
as possible. The programme would be design-driven and was specifically 
structured to address the fact that there was no budget and that imple-
mentation would require partnership. The effects of this initiative and its 
evolution into the Mayor’s Great Spaces programme are covered in more 
Figure 1.7 Barking town centre: analysis of form and connections. 
Source: A+UU/GLA/Mark Brearley.
Figure 1.8 The Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces programme. Source: A+UU/
Mark Brearley.
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detail in Chapter 3. The first 10 spaces were identified in 2004, design 
teams were selected and work commenced.23
the East London green grid
The East London Green Grid (ELGG) developed the ideas of public 
space at the metropolitan scale and reimagined London as a regional 
park (Figure 1.9). It was significantly influenced by Florian Beigel’s 
masterplans in Berlin and Leipzig. In Richard Rogers’ words, it aimed to 
create ‘peopled landscapes’.24 The project mapped and recorded east 
London’s neglected and often degraded urban spaces, its terrains vagues 
– landscapes of electricity pylons and wastelands, of commons, heaths, 
marshes and forgotten watercourses. These were neglected urban 
leftovers, but they were rich in potential. The ELGG devised multiple 
interventions to upgrade them, manage them and link them strategically 
into a connected green network. This network would eventually join 
the countryside outside London. The project is covered in more detail 
in Chapter 5.
housing and the Compact City
Housing and the Compact City25 developed ideas from the Urban Task 
Force and applied them to London. London’s population was growing 
but the city was constrained from expanding outwards by the green belt. 
Figure 1.9 London Green Grid. Source: East London Green Grid Primer, 
GLA, 2006.
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The book spelt out a vision for a compact city on a European model, that 
recycled brownfield land and provided new public spaces within well-
designed but high-rise, dense developments. The book explained the 
mayor’s policies on housing density and illustrated them with different 
typologies at different densities. It was part design manual, part policy 
document and part manifesto and it fed into the new London Plan. It was 
the basis for a later involvement in housing policy that led to the 2010 
London Housing Design Guide, covered in more detail in Chapter 4.
streetscape design manual
The final major initiative was the Streetscape Design Manual. This 
stemmed from an early concern with the fundamental importance of 
the street. It reflected a reaction to the orthodoxy of the 1970s and 1980s 
where the segregation of cars and pedestrians had so damaged the 
richness of civic life.
The work of thinkers and practitioners such as Jan Gehl had 
already permeated approaches to street design in the UK. From the 
1990s, the supremacy of the car was being challenged in the UK in favour 
of an improved public realm and the notion that streets could be people-
oriented social spaces. An early practical illustration of these ideas 
may be seen in the series of interventions that improved pedestrian 
routes to the new Tate Modern as part of the extension of London’s 
South Bank, on which Brearley had worked for several years before 
joining the A+UU.26 With the establishment of the GLA and the 
new office of mayor, the Architecture Foundation launched an ideas 
competition that featured the theme of ‘Car Free London’,27 ideas that 
chimed with the findings of the Urban Task Force.
The work on street design was the beginning of an important new 
interface between the A+UU and TfL. TfL was now under the direction of 
the mayor who was transforming it from a highway agency into a 
transport agency. A new commissioner, Bob Kiley, brought in from New 
York, was charged with developing an integrated agency under the 
political control of the mayor. His appointment opened up London to 
new ideas, influences and business practices from America. He also knew 
Richard Rogers, and this gave the A+UU useful access into TfL.
The Streetscape Design Manual was initially a reaction to the poor 
quality of London’s streets. The 1980s and 1990s had been difficult times 
for many of the inner London Labour-controlled boroughs. They had 
resisted the spending cuts of the Thatcher government and had borrowed 
heavily in the expectation of a change of government. When this did not 
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happen a number of boroughs faced serious financial difficulties. Added 
to this was a degree of internal mismanagement. In many cases money 
had been diverted away from highways maintenance to fund other 
programmes such as housing, leisure and community buildings. In 
certain areas London’s streets were literally falling apart. Even where 
this was not happening the boroughs generally lacked long-term plans 
for street maintenance and the result was a hotchpotch of different 
styles and materials. These problems were compounded by the split of 
responsibilities for maintenance between TfL and the boroughs. Although 
TfL had leverage in the form of annual capital grants to the boroughs, 
these were based on traffic flow and safety criteria and there was no 
design control or project sign-off.
The catalyst for a comprehensive streetscape design guide was a 
walk that the A+UU team and Richard Rogers made around Bermondsey 
(actually en route to their Christmas lunch). A file of photos was put 
together documenting the appalling state of street surfaces and this was 
sent to TfL. Kiley responded with an invitation to undertake research 
into best practice and compile a design manual. The principles were 
simple enough:
– Streets were background, not foreground.
– Over-elaborate design was costly, was likely to be difficult to 
maintain and would soon look dated.
– A simple palette of materials, including granite kerbs and large 
block paving slabs, best reflected the existing character of London 
streets.
– Good design was about getting the basics right and this included 
care over construction and finishes (Figure 1.10).
– Excessive street furniture, including guard rails, should be removed 
wherever practical.
– Street lighting should be rationalised and attached to buildings 
wherever possible.
The London Streetscape Design Manual was published in 2006, and 
eventually its use became a condition of TfL funding for capital projects. 
It is still used extensively today. This was the A+UU’s first major success 
in influencing design quality through policy rather than through project 
appraisal. It became a template for the future work of DfL.
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Figure 1.10 Images from the London Streetscape Design Manual showing 
principles and examples of detailing. Source: London Streetscape Design 
Manual, GLA/TfL, 2006.
1  Traditional paving 
extended to kerb
2  Traditional kerbs retained
3  Inspection cover replaced 
with insert cover
4  Concrete bollards replaced
5  Signal head on lighting 
column
6  Footway lighting added
7  Luminaire appropriate for 
urban centre location
8  Traffic bollards replaced by 
‘hoop’ design
9  ‘Heritage’ lighting retained
10  All street furniture 
finished in black 
(excluding central reserve 
barrier)
11  Bus lane surface 
pigmentation corrected to 
end at stop line
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An end and a new beginning
In the 2004 London mayoral election, Ken Livingstone was re-elected. 
With a second political term came the opportunity to prioritise different 
agendas, and Livingstone sought to develop London government’s design 
capacity further by bringing together the different regeneration teams in 
the GLA family to form one team.
While the collaborative nature of the work that the unit initiated 
was widely supported, their style and working methods were being 
questioned by those unfamiliar with a design-led process and there was a 
managerial desire to bring it under closer operational control. In 2006 
the regeneration and urban design teams from the GLA (the A+UU), the 
LDA and TfL joined to form one new design team, renamed Design for 
London (DfL). The professional backgrounds to this agglomeration of 
teams included architects, planners, road engineers, urban designers 
and general office support. The director of this new team, Peter Bishop, 
had previously been the Director of Planning and Environment at the 
London Borough of Camden. He was a planner by training but had 
worked closely with architects and urbanists throughout his career 
and at Camden had overseen the planning of the King’s Cross scheme. He 
was also seen as a government insider who had delivered major projects 
in overtly political environments. This was a strategic move to ‘enable 
design to be understood and communicated to all professions involved in 
city regeneration’.28
Conclusions
The A+UU was a small and innovative unit that survived for five years in 
the formative days of the GLA. It developed a set of powerful ideas for 
London and was successful in inserting these subversively into other 
agencies’ agendas. It established both a design methodology and a 
modus operandi that were later taken up by DfL. This methodology 
signified a return to a debate about urban living and the importance of 
urban form. It was optimistic and at times idealistic, but its work was 
always rigorous and value-based. Such values are often overlooked in the 
day-to-day world of urban government. One of the A+UU’s significant 
contributions was to explore the limits of design and to pilot new ideas, 
thus acting as a bridge between the proposals of the Urban Task Force 
(and the agenda of the Blair government) and the real world. London, 
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with its new confidence and booming economy, was a fertile ground for 
experimentation. It is difficult to assess the A+UU’s long-term success 
and impact. It certainly achieved a ‘niche’ position and a small but 
influential international following, particularly in Germany and the 
Netherlands. Some of its early programmes, such as the 100 Public 
Spaces and East London Green Grid, continue in different forms today. 
Others, like the town-centre work, have had lasting beneficial impacts.
The problems that the unit faced were as much organisational and 
political as anything else. The mayor was interested in architecture 
and design, but it was not central to his agenda. He could see how it fitted 
into his broader political objectives and, all other things being equal, he 
recognised that design had a role to play in his strategies for promoting 
London on the global stage. Richard Rogers, though respected, did not 
have the same degree of influence over the mayor as other, full-time 
advisors. The model of a mayor driving urban change through design, as 
had been the case with Barcelona, was not on the agenda for London. 
In addition, the structure of political advisors based around the mayor in 
City Hall meant that the A+UU was always seen as slightly suspect 
and was kept on the periphery. Its work would be appreciated where it 
coincided with another agenda, but where it did not it was viewed as 
lightweight and at times an irritant. In this context there was no automatic 
mechanism for follow-through on many good ideas, which ultimately 
limited the influence of the team.
The A+UU was made up of young architects, few of whom had had 
any senior experience in the public sector. It was on a steep learning 
curve in an environment dominated by experienced, and at times cynical, 
operators. In embarking on some projects it failed to understand the 
complexity of the problems, particularly on public space programmes 
that entailed working within labyrinthine internal procedures and 
where there were legitimate technical objections to their ideas. That said, 
the A+UU pioneered public realm programmes in a period when the 
emphasis was still biased in favour of vehicles and when public space 
was seen by many in government as a somewhat frivolous luxury.
The impact of the unit also needs to be viewed in the context of the 
re-establishment of the GLA. The boroughs had enjoyed a degree of 
freedom since the abolition of the GLC, and a new metropolitan body, 
although largely welcomed, was not necessarily trusted. This lack of trust 
extended to the new mayor, who was seen by some as trying to carve out 
a role at their expense.29
There was a gradual change in the management of the unit. 
The initial freedom that it enjoyed was slowly curtailed as it became 
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embedded in the bureaucracy of London government. It is possible that 
its freedom and patronage were resented, but it is certain that a free-
thinking and occasionally maverick team was treated with suspicion 
within a management hierarchy which sensed the potential danger of 
initiatives that could not be tightly controlled.
The A+UU operated in a difficult political environment. Much of 
the thinking that it developed in the early years of the GLA around public 
space, streets and landscape is now mainstream, but was not then. It 
benefited from the fluid nature of the newly constituted GLA but lacked 
experience in working in a government bureaucracy that was dominated 
by politically savvy operators. That said, the A+UU did have a significant 
impact on London and many of its initiatives are still apparent today. The 
real strength of the A+UU and possibly its most important legacy was 
its deeply held belief that the condition of the city could be improved, 
and that design was essentially a political activity that could do this. 
It set a foundation of thinking and work without which DfL would have 
struggled to make a mark.
Notes
 1 Initiated by the Thatcher government as a response to political opposition from the left-wing 
Greater London Council. See Department of the Environment 1983 and Local Government 
Act 1985.
 2 The population declined from 8.6 million in 1939 to 6.7 million in 1986. Source: Greater 
London Authority 2017.
 3 Kleihues and Klotz 1986.
 4 Originally coined in 1967 by the Bonzo Dog Doo Dah Band, this ‘brand’ generally embraced 
the emerging club, art, fashion and music scene of the 1990s.
 5 Urban Task Force 1999.
 6 Urban Task Force 1999.
 7 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2000.
 8 Urban Task Force 2005.
 9 Livingstone’s nomination as the Labour candidate was opposed by Tony Blair and the Party. He 
stood as an independent candidate against the Labour candidate Frank Dobson. He was later 
readmitted to the Party.
10 Conversation with Peter Bishop in March 2001.




13 Chase, Crawford and Kaliski 1999.
14 Chase, Crawford and Kaliski 1999.
15 Bishop and Williams 2012.
16 Ungers and Koolhaas 2013.
17 Ward 2011.
18 Interview with Mark Brearley, February 2020.
19 Interview with Mark Brearley, March 2019.
20 https://www.architecturefoundation.org.uk/programme/1996/future-southwark
21 Brearley 1997.
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22 Alexander 1965.
23 The first 10 spaces were Windrush Square (Brixton), Exhibition Road and Sloane Square 
(Kensington & Chelsea), Euston underpass (Camden), Gillett Square (Hackney), Lewisham 
town centre, Lower Marsh (Lambeth), Coulsdon High Street (Croydon), Rainham village 
centre (Havering), Victoria Embankment gardens (Westminster).
24 Scalbert 2013.
25 Greater London Authority 2003.
26 East 1998.
27 Architecture Foundation, September 1998 to February 1999, competition for a car-free 
London.
28 Richard Brown, interviewed by Lara Kinneir, 9 March 2017.
29 For further detail, see Bishop and Williams 2016.
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2
Design for London: an interesting  
but short life
Peter Bishop, Lara Kinneir and mark Brearley
The preceding chapter examined the background to the setting up of 
London government under Mayor Ken Livingstone, the structure of 
its various agencies and the establishment of the Architecture and 
Urbanism Unit (A+UU) under Richard Rogers. It also looked at the 
early work and approach of the A+UU as well as its successes and 
weaknesses. This chapter examines the reasons for the formation of 
Design for London (DfL), which replaced the A+UU, and considers its 
methodology and operational approach.
The first decade of the twenty-first century was a heady time for 
the UK and London. The Labour government under Tony Blair was in 
its second term, the economy was growing rapidly and London was 
emerging as one of the most powerful cities in the global economy. There 
was every sign that this would continue well into the future. Any clouds 
on the horizon were those arising from London’s rapid growth, with 
shortages in affordable housing and the market distortions caused by 
property speculation for short-term returns.
Perhaps the high point was in July 2005 when London was awarded 
the 2012 Olympic Games. Mayor Livingstone was now back in the Labour 
Party and the London bid had been fully supported by the national 
government. The bid centred on the regeneration of Stratford, one of 
the poorer areas of London, and presented the opportunity to realise the 
strategy to push development eastwards into the Thames Gateway at a 
scale that would create long-term momentum for change. The way was 
open for London to emerge as the pre-eminent city in the world.
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The institutions of London government
Ken Livingstone had been re-elected in 2004 without any serious 
challenge and the mechanisms of London government were maturing. 
The creative chaos of the early days of the Greater London Authority 
(GLA) was being replaced with more formalised structures. Critically, 
the two main agencies outside the GLA, Transport for London (TfL) and 
the London Development Agency (LDA), were now under a degree of 
political direction from the mayor’s office. TfL in particular was under 
a new transport commissioner, Peter Hendy, and was continuing to 
transform into a transport agency. Capital funds were shifting from 
highways to buses and the underground. Walking and cycling were 
considered as legitimate transport modes in their own right and, despite 
still being low in the pecking order, were now receiving resources. These 
new programmes were largely uncommitted and offered opportunities 
for new public space projects.
The LDA was still finding its feet. Created as part of a national 
network of regional development agencies, its remit was to intervene in 
areas of market failure in order to stimulate regional economic growth. 
However, in London the market failures did not stem from industrial 
decline but were due to rapid growth and an overheating economy that 
had left behind areas of social and geographical deprivation. In these 
circumstances the measures in the traditional armoury of a regional 
development agency – land acquisition and decontamination, training 
and support for enterprise and incentives for inward investment – were 
not easily applicable.
The LDA’s land portfolio, inherited from English Partnerships, was 
a ragbag of difficult sites and the agency soon became bogged down in a 
series of cumbersome development initiatives that were both costly and 
ineffective. In an overheated economy, the LDA was just getting in the 
way. Other programmes such as training and support for enterprise were 
also yielding mixed results and the agency was constantly firefighting to 
rescue poorly conceived initiatives that had been pursued for overtly 
political objectives. In the absence of well-developed management and 
performance structures, the LDA was operating well below its potential. 
It did, however, play one particular role with alacrity. It picked up specific 
projects that the mayor wanted to pursue but for which no other budgets 
were available. While TfL had a strong internal management structure 
that could act as a counterweight to the mayor, the LDA was malleable 
and compliant.
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Background to the creation of Design for London
Ken Livingstone’s re-election provided the opportunity for more ambitious 
long-term strategies and a chance to consolidate inter-agency working. 
Public interest in architecture and urban design had been stimulated 
by a series of lottery-funded projects, in particular the new Tate Modern, 
housed in the former Bankside power station originally designed by 
Sir Giles Gilbert Scott and converted into a gallery by the architects 
Herzog & de Meuron. Design was suddenly newsworthy, and architects 
were media stars. Following in the footsteps of the Pompidou Centre in 
Paris and the Guggenheim in Bilbao, the creation of Tate Modern brought 
about a significant transformation of London’s South Bank. Exhibitions 
in the newly refurbished Turbine Hall created an important visitor 
attraction, and the building also completed the link along the South Bank 
between the Royal Festival Hall, Southwark Cathedral, Borough Market 
and Tower Bridge.
The development of Tate Modern had been accompanied by 
wider design thinking driven by Fred Manson, who had been Director of 
Regeneration and Environment at the London Borough of Southwark 
in the 1990s. Following its subsequent comprehensive upgrade, the 
Southbank Centre (Allies and Morrison, 2005–7) was connected to the 
Embankment and Covent Garden by the new Hungerford Bridge foot 
crossings (Lifschutz Davidson, 2002), while Norman Foster’s Millennium 
Bridge provided a new link to St Paul’s Cathedral. The partial pedestrian-
isation of Trafalgar Square (Norman Foster, 2003) under the Mayor’s 
World Spaces for All programme had also proved instantly popular.1 
These projects had not been part of a grand design by a centralised 
authority – they were a triumph for pragmatic incremental urbanism 
driven by individual architects and agencies. There was widespread public 
recognition that such interventions, particularly around public spaces, 
represented a significant improvement. London was at last catching up 
with other cities.
Another force promoting good design was the Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE). Founded in 1999 as a 
response to recommendations in the Urban Task Force, it replaced the 
Royal Fine Arts Commission’s role in design review. It also commissioned 
numerous best practice papers. It was a highly influential, if sometimes 
controversial, voice in support of contemporary architecture and design. 
CABE’s role in raising the profile of the design debate in England (there 
were separate bodies for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) was 
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significant. It had responded to the government’s agenda and had 
captured the public mood, acting as an important counterweight to the 
more conservative approach of English Heritage.
Purpose and structure of Design for London
Some in the GLA viewed the A+UU as maverick and difficult to control 
– more of a problem than an asset. Its fraught relationship with the 
GLA planning team was causing problems and its direct channel to the 
mayor through Richard Rogers represented another cause for mistrust. 
The idea of a new and more powerful design agency for London was first 
mooted in early 2005 by Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron, Richard Rogers 
and senior managers in the GLA. The rationale was to strengthen the role 
of design within London government and at the same time to exercise 
greater control over projects in TfL and the LDA. The intention was also 
to regularise the position and managerial structure of the A+UU.
The A+UU had established good working relationships with 
project officers in the LDA and TfL, and the GLA hoped that an integrated 
design team would be able to extend inter-agency working and access to 
capital budgets for mayoral projects. Architecture and design were still 
part of the mayor’s agenda and the creation of a single team represented 
an opportunity to establish a degree of common purpose between the 
GLA, the LDA and TfL, especially in the context of the rapid growth of the 
London economy and the forthcoming Olympics. The consolidation of 
design resources into a single unit would also increase the mayor’s design 
capacity without the need to find additional funding.
With the agreement of Ken Livingstone and Richard Rogers, David 
Lunts, Director of Regeneration at the GLA, brokered an agreement 
with TfL and the LDA to pool their resources into a new pan-London 
design unit. The jealousy with which the agencies defended their 
independence meant that this new unit could not be located in the 
GLA, but the GLA did not want to lose control of it to either of the other 
agencies. The compromise was that it would be outside the existing 
structure of London government and would have a degree of managerial 
and operational independence. While the LDA would provide ‘pay and 
rations’, it would have no managerial control over the new organisation. 
Instead, it would report to a board chaired by Lunts that would include 
a senior representative from TfL and from the LDA. Richard Rogers would 
also be on the board. The new agency would have access to the mayor 
through the board. Whether this was a deliberate attempt to reduce 
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Richard Rogers’ influence is unclear, but on paper at least the new agency 
would be managerially accountable for its activities. The new organisation 
was to be called Design for London (DfL), Richard Rogers would take 
a more strategic role in directing its work and a new director would be 
appointed to lead the integrated team. The arrangements were signed off 
by the mayor in the summer of 2006.
There was considerable media interest in the new agency, due 
partly to Richard Rogers’ involvement and the high profile of design in 
London. Media interest had already been sparked by controversy around 
CABE, which was facing accusations of conflicts of interest. These were 
possibly due to perceptions that it had become overly powerful. There 
was also friction between CABE and English Heritage, and criticism from 
some within the architectural profession that CABE was promoting a 
‘modernist’ as opposed to a ‘traditionalist’ agenda. Either way, design 
agencies were fruitful news stories for the architectural press. Another 
reason for the press interest was the name: Design for London represented 
a powerful brand image. It implied the power to shape and change 
London, as well as the independence to carry through projects. This was 
in keeping with the zeitgeist of the period. It also implied the prospect 
of conflict with CABE and English Heritage, and a potentially endless 
series of news stories. It brought in a period of intense speculation over 
who would be appointed as the new Director of Design for London.
The job was advertised in summer 2006 and a number of well- 
known architects were rumoured to be applying. The advertisement also 
caught the eye of Peter Bishop, then working as Planning Director at 
Camden Council. Bishop had worked as a planning director in central 
London for 25 years, at Tower Hamlets, Haringey, and Hammersmith 
and Fulham, and recognised that ‘this looked like the best job in the 
world’.2 An informal ‘interview’ – a lunch with Richard Rogers, Renzo 
Piano and others at the Venice Architecture Biennale – was followed by a 
formal interview with Rogers and senior officials from the LDA, TfL and 
the GLA. ‘I didn’t think I’d get the job,’ says Bishop, ‘but it became clear to 
me they were actually looking for a manager with experience in operating 
at the political interface. I knew London, I had been involved in urban 
design, but critically I also understood and could work within the systems 
of London government.’3 Bishop was appointed, and Design for London 
was launched to some fanfare from the design press, in October 2006.4 
Peter Murray, director of New London Architecture, commented:
We are very glad Peter Bishop has won this very important 
appointment. He has always been a great supporter of quality 
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architecture as shown by the work he did while at Hammersmith 
and at Camden. He is someone who can provide the link between 
the GLA and the Boroughs which will be so important for the 
successful implementation of the London Plan. We look forward to 
working with Peter Bishop in the future to encourage the best of 
design for the capital.5
The appointment of a director who was not from an architectural 
background surprised many people, as did the fact that the new director 
was from local government. Possibly there was no room for two big-name 
architects in London government. The appointment made a clear 
statement that DfL was to be an agency of government and was expected 
to move the propositional work of the A+UU onwards to achieve more 
delivered projects on the ground. The director was also expected to 
manage the A+UU and evolve the design team by amalgamating design 
staff from TfL and the LDA. To do this the director needed to understand 
the processes of government and be able to work within the politics 
of City Hall.
Approach and methodology of Design for London
DfL inherited the staff and work programmes of the A+UU together with 
the design teams at the LDA and TfL. The staff came with their existing 
work programmes, time commitments and approaches, but only the 
A+UU had a clear working methodology based on sound theoretical 
frameworks. Few staff from the LDA and TfL had design skills, but they 
did bring project implementation skills and a knowledge of organisa-
tional procedures – both of which had been areas of weakness of the 
A+UU. The A+UU’s tight-knit, energetic and talented team formed 
the core of the new organisation and its previous work provided a firm 
basis from which to build new momentum. Richard Rogers retained 
his close working relationship with the team and usually spent one day 
a week working in their offices, critiquing projects and discussing new 
policy ideas.6
Bishop shared the A+UU’s recognition that London was never 
going to be shaped by grands projets. The limited power of the mayor and 
the shortage of capital budgets for London in any case precluded major 
intervention. Bishop brought to the team his experience of working on 
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major development projects, a knowledge of the development industry, 
the skills needed to access public funding and a pragmatic approach to 
steering urban change through tortuous political processes. He was also 
more comfortable working in a political environment than the A+UU 
had been and understood the power of intercorporate working and 
networks.
As a planner Bishop had always been interested in the social and 
economic impacts of urban change and viewed urban design as an 
essential tool of the planning profession. He had been involved in major 
development projects and saw planning as a means to drive social 
improvement in the form of affordable housing, public space and the 
creation of economic opportunities for local communities.7 For Bishop, 
planning was a flexible and creative discipline that could be used to 
achieve urban change – planning process was of interest only inasmuch 
as it achieved tangible (and desirable) results. That said, Bishop 
understood process and understood politics and this combination had 
enabled him to drive through transformative change in the parts of 
London that he had worked in. He had been trained in urban design and 
was scathing of planning’s inability to be involved in the wider design 
debate. From the outset, he viewed DfL as a planning agency, but one 
that was able to use architectural approaches to shape the city.8
Bishop had been particularly influenced by the methodology of 
everyday or incremental urbanism, as developed by Margaret Crawford 
and Stephen Marshall, a theory of the city based on a degree of tolerated 
disorder.9 This approach is critical of ‘[b]anal suburbs, shiny but empty 
downtowns, formal office parks and abandoned districts [that] result 
from policies that neither recognise the everyday nor allow it to assert 
and reassert itself’.10 The everyday urbanism proposed by Crawford 
favours interventions that reinforce the heterogeneous qualities of small, 
temporary, not-intended, undistinguished though well-used spaces. 
It takes ordinary places, ‘the nooks and crannies of existing urban 
environments’, thinks about them in new ways and makes small changes 
that may accumulate to have a transformative effect on the wider 
locality.11 It aims to reconnect urban design with ordinary human and 
social meanings and thus strengthen ‘the connective tissue that binds 
daily lives together’.12 Inherent in this approach is an appreciation of the 
fine grain of the city.
Bishop’s thinking was very close to that of Mark Brearley and the 
A+UU team, whose way of working he easily embraced. This approach 
sat comfortably with the pragmatism required to orchestrate urban 
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change from the position of organisational weakness that DfL had 
inherited. To be effective, DfL had to be able to play a weak hand well. 
It had no power or money, but these could be considerable assets. In 
the absence of power there was no requirement to comply with the 
stifling conformity of government. If it could deploy the soft power of 
its access to the mayor, then other agencies would willingly work with 
it and could be influenced by its approach. If other agencies carried out 
the project work then DfL would be free of all of the responsibilities 
of dealing with public money and could be a strategic design agency. The 
ambiguity of its position in the structure of London government was to 
be its greatest asset.
From the outset DfL adopted much of the A+UU’s methodology, 
projects and programmes and fully embraced the approach of urban 
narratives rather than urban plans. Its more powerful position in London 
government, high public profile and ability to work more adeptly in a 
political environment allowed it to extend its influence further in the 
following ways:
– Partnership with stakeholders who controlled budgets. DfL set out to 
be collaborative and not didactic. The A+UU had been effective at 
finding allies within the boroughs, the LDA and TfL, and DfL was 
able to build on these networks. In particular it could now access 
a greater number of senior decision-makers. At the same time, it 
continued to ‘infiltrate’ key agencies of London government to 
persuade them to take a wider design perspective. This ‘soft power’ 
approach allowed DfL to build wider and deeper networks. To back 
up these networks, DfL worked hard to identify available resources 
within government budgets and programmes. By knowing where 
the money was and working with those who controlled resources, 
the team could assemble complex funding packages to implement 
its own project priorities. This ability to harness the power of 
funding set the new agency apart from the A+UU and enabled it to 
make an early impact.
– Influencing procurement and supporting the client role. The mantra 
‘good architects can design good buildings, bad architects never 
will’ is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. Influencing the 
procurement of architects was seen as one of the most effective 
ways of improving project design. Support from the mayor (real or 
perceived) gave the team access to stronger influence over the 
procurement of architects and designers. Over time DfL advised 
clients on development briefs and took on a pivotal role in 
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setting up new framework agreements. DfL deliberately used 
procurement to promote a new generation of practices – smaller, 
younger and more experimental – that had often been excluded by 
traditional procurement processes. It recognised the potential 
of such practices to move the design agenda forward with new 
ideas and approaches.
– Campaigning and publicity. DfL made the decision to exploit the 
high profile generated by its formation. This was a departure from 
the A+UU’s policy of keeping a low profile. There was a major press 
launch for the new agency, frequent contact with the architectural 
press, events and exhibitions. All were aimed at creating continuous 
media (and public) interest. In its publications, DfL deliberately 
eschewed any recognised public-sector house style. The graphics, 
covers, photos and plans were a deliberate departure from public-
sector norms. They were part of the branding of the team. This is 
covered in more detail in Chapter 7.
– International profile. European influences were evident in the 
methodology and early projects of the A+UU and it had built a 
good network with other cities and practitioners. Under DfL 
connections with German and Dutch practices were refreshed. 
Dutch masterplanning in particular was considered to be ahead 
of current thinking in the UK, as were German ideas around 
landscape. Consequently, links were strengthened with a range 
of practices such as KCAP, Maxwan, Vogt, and Latz+Partner. DfL 
became a significant conduit for new ideas for London. It also 
became an advocate for emerging UK and international practices 
to gain commissions in London.
At the heart of DfL’s approach was a detailed knowledge of London and 
an understanding of its uniqueness. London’s urban morphology is 
not as formal as that of other European cities and has an ingrained 
flexibility of form. Outside the areas of historical importance, the 
city has a wide range of diverse places that offered opportunities for 
experimentation. The team did consider whether there might indeed be 
a specific London ‘style’ but concluded that it was the approach to urban 
thinking that defined the city (Figure 2.1). Grands projets, certainly 
before the Olympics, were to be left to private-sector developers with the 
land and money to execute them. The strategic design team aimed to 
develop ideas and projects that could sit within the everyday fabric of 
the city. These could then be implemented by other agencies as the 
opportunities permitted.
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Design in a benign environment: 2007–2008
DfL’s first priority was to bring all the staff together while there was still 
momentum. This was achieved in less than two months. The second 
priority was an early and high-profile launch where major figures in 
London architecture and the press would be present. This took place 
in March 2007. Presentations by Richard Rogers and Ken Livingstone 
reinforced the impression that the new organisation had high-level 
support and would be a force to be reckoned with. Its inherited body 
of work gave DfL a head start and the first projects in the 100 Public 
Spaces programme were nearing completion. Although Gillett Square 
in Hackney (Figure 2.2) was officially opened in November 2006, two 
months before the new agency actually came into existence, it was 
badged as a DfL scheme and an instant sense of momentum was 
established. Similarly, the East London Green Grid Primer was published 
in 2006 and DfL was credited with the project. Richard Rogers’ association 
with DfL provided both national and international kudos, and he 
dedicated much time to boosting the team’s public influence.
Figure 2.1 Open city: London, a cosmopolitan city of many nationalities. 
Source: KCAP.
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Soon after DfL’s establishment, a new advisory panel was set up. This was 
recruited through open competition and provided more positive press 
coverage. DfL’s profile allowed it to attract some of the best practitioners 
from the UK and abroad (see Chapter 7). The panel deliberately included 
names that were unexpected, as well as representatives from development, 
landscape, engineering and environmental disciplines. It met quarterly 
and its role was flexible. It rarely advised on the design of specific projects. 
Its main purpose was to connect DfL to the world of practice (and to 
be seen to do so). Outside the formal meetings, a number of the panel 
members put in time to advise and mentor on projects. The panel was 
also an important conduit of new ideas and provided a powerful set of 
friends and advocates for the new team (Figure 2.3).
The creation of a new agency provided a good opportunity to 
reappraise projects that had been inherited from the A+UU, the LDA 
and TfL. The core programmes of town centre renewal, public spaces and 
the East London Green Grid were continued (Figure 2.4) and are covered 
in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5. Other initiatives, such as an ambitious 
idea for a cross-river park in east London, were dropped (when Mayor 
Johnson abandoned the Beckton river crossing in 2008). City East was 
not pursued as a project (it had achieved its purpose), but it did provide 
a strong foundation for later plans for the regeneration of east London 
and the Royal Docks.
The most significant change was one of traction. DfL had the profile 
and power to gain momentum for its projects. Complex funding 
Figure 2.2 Proposals for Gillett Square in Hackney as part of the 100 
Public Spaces programme. Source: A+UU/GLA.
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Figure 2.3 Richard Rogers (centre, in a characteristic coloured shirt) 
at the Design for London Advisory Panel. Source: Design for London 
Archive, DfL/GLA.
Figure 2.4 Influencing through policy documents. Source: Design for 
London Archive, DfL/GLA.
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arrangements were knitted together from various agencies to progress 
projects, in particular for the 100 Public Spaces programme. Direct 
involvement in procurement allowed the team to influence some LDA 
and TfL projects and the team expanded its involvement in writing 
briefs, setting up competitions and selecting design teams on behalf of 
London government and boroughs. The development and architectural 
sectors began to respond with better designs. Town centre projects were 
brought forward, most notably in Dalston and Barking, and the growing 
maturity of the team was apparent in its ability to extend its networks 
and work with local politicians. The style was cooperative, gentle, 
persuasive. Mayoral agencies had expected DfL to throw its weight 
about. The very name ‘Design for London’ suggested a body that would 
direct and impose its views and there was understandable suspicion, 
especially as the organisation reported directly to the mayor. From the 
start DfL recognised the danger of taking a high-handed position and 
sought to collaborate with agencies within London government. They 
were surprised and became more comfortable in cooperating with the 
team. In practice there was little friction in working relationships.
Perhaps DfL’s most influential work was in the field of policy. The 
GLA had responsibility for producing the London Plan – a task that they 
executed effectively. However, there are limitations to what can be 
achieved through planning policy and DfL was able to move into 
these openings. The London Housing Design Guide project (covered in 
Chapter 4) is an example of how a policy debate that was considered 
too controversial and politically sensitive for a statutory planning 
team to engage with could be moved forward. Ken Livingstone had 
concerns about any policy framework that would impose higher design 
requirements that might stifle private-sector development and increase 
already high land values. Initially it was agreed that the Design Guide 
could be produced as long as it only applied to a small handful of 
LDA-owned sites. However, eventually it was incorporated in the London 
Plan and became the basis for national housing policy. In a similar way, 
the team was able to float big conceptual ideas and spatial strategies 
without any requirement to justify them within the restrictions of the 
UK planning system. Thus, City East was developed into the Green 
Enterprise Zone and a strategy for the Royal Docks that led to the London 
cable car, the Siemens Crystal and the new business district at Albert 
Dock (commenced in 2017 by the Chinese company ABP). These are all 
covered in more detail in Chapter 6.
DfL’s other area of work was the London Olympics (see Chapter 6). 
The award of the Olympic Games to London in 2005 had completely 
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transformed the regeneration agenda for east London. The A+UU had 
been ahead of the game with City East and planning work in the Lower 
Lea Valley, but had not had the political strength to be involved more 
directly in the Games bid. Once the Games had been awarded, the 
Olympics project went into implementation mode and questions about 
architecture and design were sidelined. In fairness, there were significant 
concerns about the UK’s ability to deliver the Games on time and within 
budget, and agencies promoting design strategies were not welcome at 
the table. The Olympic Development Authority (ODA) was tasked with 
delivering the Games while the LDA took on the role of land acquisition 
and the relocation of existing businesses. Delivery of the Games’ legacy 
was also allocated to the LDA but, for the time being, was politely put to 
one side. There followed a long period of working behind the scenes 
to influence the ODA, first through the (eventual) establishment of 
design review panels and then through commenting on and altering 
the most inflexible parts of the Games plans. When the Games’ legacy 
was finally brought forward, DfL was fully involved in the appointment 
of a masterplanning team, the Dutch practice KCAP.13 DfL also produced 
various Olympic Fringe masterplans that aimed to spread the benefits 
of the Games into the wider community. Several DfL team members 
eventually joined the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC).
DfL’s relationship with CABE was generally good, even if the two 
agencies had very different philosophical approaches. CABE saw itself as 
an influencer (very much top-down) and employed design review, design 
policy and best practice as its principal workstreams. DfL viewed this 
approach as one of detachment rather than involvement. DfL was not 
overly interested in questions of aesthetics and saw design agency more 
as a matter for proactive involvement and the political empowerment of 
local communities. The difference was illustrated when CABE offered to 
pass design review in London over to DfL, an offer that was turned down. 
DfL considered that design review was a distraction that failed to address 
the central issues of why parts of London were deprived and of poor 
quality. The design review process would also have been administratively 
onerous, a distraction from the team’s core business and likely to create 
more enemies in the profession than friends.
Although the two organisations were largely promoting the same 
values, DfL was critical of CABE where it was seen to be ‘improving’ poor 
projects rather than intervening to change them. English Heritage, on 
the other hand, was often perceived as being at loggerheads with CABE. 
Some members of the architectural press and the profession made the 
rather artificial distinction that CABE was a supporter of ‘modernism’ 
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and English Heritage of more traditional approaches to design. DfL 
attempted to distance itself from this debate and saw such definitions as 
irrelevant to its work. There was certainly a perception from some in 
the industry that CABE was a creation of the Blair government and this 
association may have contributed to its ultimate demise under the 
Conservative administration of David Cameron in 2011. Political changes 
were to impact on DfL as well.
First challenge: the transition to a new mayor, 2008
Within 18 months DfL was maturing as an organisation. Its work 
programme was delivering results and it was strengthening its influence 
on the agencies that made up London government. It had chosen to 
concentrate on working with amenable boroughs and not to bother with 
those that were not. Its unique governance model provided independ-
ence. It might report to a board, but this only met quarterly. Richard 
Rogers continued to put in one day a week with the team and was their 
figurehead and champion. DfL relished its ambiguous relationship within 
London government and enjoyed access to support from the mayor. It 
was skilled at deploying its soft power and was viewed as an organisation 
to work with rather than against. Its Achilles heel was that its power 
rested on its political patronage and this was about to change.
The 2008 London mayoral election initially seemed one-sided. 
Ken Livingstone was generally popular and initially the Conservative 
challenger, Boris Johnson, was not taken seriously. Two factors changed 
that. The first was a campaign in the London Evening Standard that 
was critical of Livingstone. The second, and more important, was the 
mobilisation by the Tories of the outer London vote. In a campaign that 
was to have shades of the later Brexit referendum, Livingstone was 
portrayed as elitist and out of touch with ‘ordinary Londoners’. His 
achievements were painted as having benefited inner (and Labour-
controlled) boroughs. What had he achieved for the suburbs?
Johnson’s election in May 2008 caught many by surprise, including 
DfL. London government had not experienced a change in political 
leadership and had no way of ensuring a smooth transition. Mayoral 
advisors were cleared out overnight and replaced by a new team. Some 
key appointments had apparently been made directly by Conservative 
Central Office. Simon Milton, who had been Leader of Conservative- 
run Westminster City Council, was appointed as Johnson’s special 
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advisor on planning. Peter Hendy retained his position as TfL Transport 
Commissioner, but the chief executive and board of the LDA were 
replaced.
DfL mistakenly assumed that it was too small to be caught up in 
this shake-up and was in any case so obviously a force for good that it 
would retain its special relationship with the mayor. It was only a matter 
of keeping its head down and waiting for the right moment to impress. 
What was not clear at the time was that Milton had no love for DfL 
and that tensions within the GLA, dating back to the days of the A+UU, 
would resurface. DfL’s public profile – one of its strengths – suddenly 
became a weakness. It was too visible a target to escape notice. DfL’s 
re-emergence had been planned to coincide with the new mayor opening 
a major exhibition as part of the London Festival of Architecture at 
Somerset House. Curated by Isabel Allen and Morag Myerscough together 
with the team, it was intentionally quirky and thought-provoking. 
However, it soon became abundantly clear that DfL was peripheral to the 
mayor’s interests (see Chapter 7). Richard Rogers stepped down from his 
role as advisor, and DfL was left exposed and without support.
As members of its board focused on their own survival, there was a 
real possibility that DfL would be wound up. Peter Rogers was appointed 
as the new Chief Executive of the LDA with a remit to reform the agency. 
Rogers’ motives for retaining the team are unclear, but it is possible that 
he could see a role for it within an agency where new ideas were needed. 
Although it was notionally within the LDA, DfL had scrupulously avoided 
association with it. It was fortunate that Peter Rogers had known Peter 
Bishop when he worked in Camden (and had tried to recruit him to 
Westminster). Bishop was offered the role of Deputy Chief Executive of 
the LDA, a position he accepted reluctantly and on condition that DfL 
came with him and remained intact.
DfL survived the transfer of power but no longer had the 
independent position that it had enjoyed under Livingstone. It was now 
part of the LDA and had to report through line management structures 
to a board. However, DfL did have some advantages. First, it was a new 
organisation that had not been part of the traditional institutions of 
government. Second, it had a portfolio of projects that were ready to 
be implemented if the funding was available, and the decimation of 
LDA projects from the previous mayor meant that it was. Third, it was 
sufficiently agile to read and respond to the political changes. In return 
for its loss of independence, DfL gained direct access to LDA funding and 
took control of its land portfolio and environmental programmes. It had 
to undergo a rapid and painful process of growing up but could now 
dEsign for London: an intErEst ing But short L ifE 59
deliver its programmes. It had traded soft power for tangible power. 
Now, with Mark Brearley pushed forward as Head of Design for London 
and the close collaboration with Bishop sustained, the team changed its 
mode of operation in a number of ways:
– With the fresh closeness to those who controlled the LDA’s land 
portfolio, it developed new ways of using land as leverage to 
implement big spatial strategies and town centre regeneration.
– It shed design staff back to TfL since it could no longer exert 
significant influence over transport programmes.
– It developed expertise in the LDA’s Byzantine processes of internal 
project management.
– It rebadged core programmes. The Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces 
programme was replaced with London’s Great Outdoors. It covered 
the same set of schemes but was more flexible and included Better 
Streets and London’s Water Spaces. The East London Green Grid 
was reworked as the All London Green Grid, and the town centre 
projects evolved in response to the new understanding gained from 
the team’s research work on high streets, and after the 2011 riots, 
DfL was able to re-present these as ‘oven-ready’ projects that could 
become a core element of the Outer London Fund.
– It moved staff out into other agencies. Peter Rogers had given away 
the LDA’s lead role in delivering the Olympic legacy and a new 
development corporation had been set up – the Olympic Legacy 
Development Corporation (LLDC). The new chief executive of the 
agency, Andy Altman, was an American architect and a friend of 
Richard Rogers and Peter Bishop. He was a natural ally and took 
two staff from DfL, thus allowing a degree of direct influence over 
the Olympics that had previously been absent.
– It found new friends. The Advisory Board was now effectively 
defunct, so a new London Design Advisory Board was recruited. Its 
role was less clearly defined under Johnson, but it demonstrated 
to the press and professions that the mayor was maintaining 
continuity in design policy and that DfL was still alive. Johnson 
appointed Daniel Moylan, a councillor from Kensington and 
Chelsea, as his advisor on public realm. Moylan was also the chair 
of the TfL board and had pioneered a series of public realm projects 
in Kensington. He was also a friend of Richard Rogers and a 
supporter of public space programmes. This gave an important 
degree of continuity and Moylan was to prove an important 
supporter of, and collaborator with, the team.
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Design in a hostile environment: 2008–2011
If working for Ken Livingstone was like being in the court of the Medicis 
(cf. Chapter 1), the period under Boris Johnson was more like the 
Sublime Porte of the Ottomans: the courtiers were replaced with a group 
of powerful advisors whose role was to ensure that no one was allowed 
access to the ‘sultan’. Contact with the new mayor was closely controlled 
by his chief of staff, Simon Milton. Meetings were formal and agendas 
were agreed in advance. Simon Milton, who also controlled planning, 
viewed DfL with deep mistrust.
In such an environment DfL was forced to rethink its mode of 
operation and develop new strategies. It focused on the art of the possible 
and dropped some of the more ambitious schemes that would have 
required political commitment from the mayor. The highest-profile of 
these was the second of the World Squares for All projects, the partial 
closure to traffic and re-landscaping of Parliament Square (Chapter 5). It 
was clear that under the new mayor the project, designed by the Swiss 
landscape architect Günther Vogt, would never be realised. English 
Heritage and Westminster Council opposed it and the mayor could see no 
reason to change the existing layout. Other schemes, however, could be 
rebadged more easily.
On the positive side, the Johnson administration was far more 
conciliatory to the boroughs than Livingstone’s had been and there was a 
view, probably stemming from Milton’s own background in Westminster 
Council, that the boroughs should largely be left alone. Money was 
reallocated to the outer London boroughs to honour election pledges 
and this opened up opportunities for new partnerships.14 Otherwise, 
DfL’s work with boroughs was largely unaffected and indeed some new 
opportunities for collaboration opened up. A degree of refocusing 
took place and greater emphasis was placed on suburban town centres 
and high streets across London. This suited the design philosophy of 
the team. Projects such as Making Space in Dalston, typical of this period, 
are covered in Chapter 3. In addition, the London’s Great Outdoors 
programme identified new opportunities and, with access to LDA budgets 
and the political support of Daniel Moylan, the programme gained real 
traction. As a result, a flurry of new projects were completed, for example 
in Brixton (Windrush Square), Kensington (Exhibition Road) and Tower 
Hamlets (Aldgate Roundabout).
The team also dropped its campaigning profile and worked more 
deeply within the machinery of government. While it had been forced to 
become part of the institution of government, this did not prevent it from 
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subverting that machine. As Deputy CEO of the LDA, Bishop saw his role 
as shielding the team and allowing it to function without being drawn 
into the LDA’s difficult working environment. Brearley and his by now 
highly experienced team were familiar, from their A+UU days, with a 
subsurface way of working, so they readily adjusted, exercising influence 
while pushing credit to the mayor and others.
Bishop could also access new sources of funding through an 
investment subcommittee that was largely made up of business and 
financial consultants. The secret to working with this group was to use 
drawings and plans, which were an entirely new concept to many on 
the committee. They might challenge the business cases presented by 
other sections of the LDA, but found plans and drawings intoxicating. 
Public space improvements were also real and material. Although the 
projects might lack any output indicators or metrics, they were the 
subject of well-worked-through inter-agency funding packages where 
LDA money was leveraged to good effect. The committee members were 
also open to a good narrative. The idea of storytelling and narratives 
had been developed by the A+UU and perfected by DfL, and Bishop had 
employed the concept extensively in his work with politicians in his 
previous positions in London boroughs.
Access to the mayor was restricted. Through his role as Deputy 
CEO of the LDA, Bishop (and therefore DfL) had weekly meetings with 
the mayor, but these were carefully controlled and monitored by his 
advisors. Individual meetings were discouraged. The formal meetings 
covered the range of business of the LDA and the mayor rarely showed 
any interest in design. The trick was to find a way of engaging and holding 
his attention. Obscure historical references (especially classical ones) 
usually worked, as did unusual turns of phrase.
Nevertheless, this was the working environment and DfL did adapt. 
In some ways the mayor’s working style was conducive to the team’s 
approach of ‘big ideas – small moves’. Livingstone was interested in 
detail; fail on this and he would dismiss the initiative. Johnson was 
capable of engaging with a big idea and was largely content to allow 
the team to get on with it as long as his advisors ensured there was no 
adverse political fallout.
DfL was sufficiently agile to work in this way and could package 
ideas and narratives quickly to suit the prevailing climate. A specific 
example was the creation of the Green Enterprise Zone (Figure 2.5). At 
the end of 2008, Bishop had a rare meeting with Johnson on his own. The 
conversation ranged from the economic slump and the risk of London 
being too heavily reliant on the financial industries sector to the lack of a 
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credible Olympic legacy strategy and the pressure that the mayor was 
under to find a convincing environmental strategy. The response to ‘Can 
you do something?’ was the Green Enterprise Zone. The idea was simple: 
brand a large area of east London that included the Lower Lea Valley, the 
Royal Docks, Beckton and Barking as a zone for the emerging green 
economy. The zone would include district energy grids, research and 
development establishments, and state-of-the-art ‘green’ manufacturing. 
The strategy was written up in a morning and a plan was produced. It 
was presented to the mayor a week later and he liked it. It had not been 
anticipated that two weeks later he would show it to the prime minister, 
Gordon Brown, who liked it too. There followed a frantic post hoc 
justification of the project. Management consultants Ernst & Young were 
brought in to verify the concept and put numbers behind it, but the 
concept stood. It was then taken to the Shanghai Expo as part of the 
London pavilion curated by DfL (see Chapter 7). Later that year Siemens 
invested in the Green Enterprise District,15 a move that triggered a new 
DfL workstream around regeneration of the Royal Docks (Chapter 6).
Johnson was always affable and enjoyable to work with and was 
undoubtedly popular with his staff and many Londoners. The key was to 
find a time when he was not being chaperoned by his advisors. The mayor 
cycled in and out of City Hall and it was often possible for Bishop, also 
a cyclist, to intercept him on his way home to Islington. A number of 
Figure 2.5 The Green Enterprise Zone: a conceptual plan for the 
regeneration of east London. Source: DfL/GLA.
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projects were discussed and ideas planted in this way. The London cable 
car (Emirates Air Line), for example, was mooted one evening at the 
traffic lights on Pentonville Road.
The period from 2008 to 2010 was a productive one for DfL. The 
LDA was used as a funding vehicle for projects, and the integration 
of design work with Bishop’s control of property assets and environ- 
mental programmes opened up new possibilities for area-based design 
strategies. Town centre regeneration projects were being developed in 
new locations. The Royal Docks were beginning to attract investment 
interest and the doors were opening for greater involvement with the 
Olympic legacy work.
The Olympic Fringe masterplans (Chapter 6) were a response 
to agitation from the five ‘host boroughs’ for tangible investment in 
their communities. Central government and the mayor did not have 
answers, but DfL did. Indeed, many of its new projects were a response 
to problems that existed at the interface of the GLA, TfL, the boroughs 
and central government. Such power interfaces represent real problems 
for formal institutions of government but are fertile areas for creative 
design thinking. Consequently, DfL developed new strategies around the 
wider integration of land development, housing and environmental 
programmes. These were launched at the annual property conference at 
MIPIM in March 2010 as the New Urban Agenda. Other initiatives were 
developed around town centre regeneration on the back of the impact 
of Crossrail.16 LDA land had dropped so sharply in value after the 2009 
crash that it could no longer be considered as a significant asset. This 
triggered a period of intense policy development around how it could 
be used to support area-based regeneration programmes. This moved 
the policy emphasis away from financial returns towards design-based 
interventions which could achieve social and economic benefits.
But once again there were problems on the horizon. In May 2010, 
the newly elected Conservative government was determined to reduce 
public spending and slim down the agencies of government, especially 
the quangos (quasi non-governmental organisations). CABE’s funding was 
removed and the regional development agencies were abolished. This 
included the LDA and once again DfL was both homeless and under threat.
An unwanted child: 2011–2013
Following the spending cuts in the 2010 autumn budget, the LDA began 
the process of winding down its organisation in preparation for its 
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abolition. All programmes and projects that were not party to a binding 
contract (and some that were) were immediately suspended. Staff 
redundancies commenced, with a view to terminating the LDA by early 
2012. DfL was caught up in this storm and initially no one in the mayor’s 
administration showed interest in preventing its abolition. With disaster 
looming, Brearley worked behind the scenes, helped by Richard Rogers 
and several members of the London Design Advisory Board, to get a 
survival campaign going. In response the team received a huge amount 
of support from the professions and press. Ellis Woodman described it 
as ‘an agency to be cherished’17 and Merlin Fulcher wrote a piece in the 
Architects’ Journal entitled ‘Save Design for London’.18 Letters were 
written to the mayor from the presidents of the Royal Institute of British 
Architects, the Landscape Institute and the Architecture Foundation. 
Building Design published an open letter from international architects 
including Renzo Piano, Zara Hadid, Rafael Viñoly and Frank Gehry 
urging the mayor to retain the team.19 DfL had moved from the fringe to 
the mainstream! After an intense period of internal lobbying, a small core 
of staff of five architects from DfL were moved to the GLA, with other staff 
going to TfL and the Olympic Legacy Development Corporation.
In March 2011 Peter Bishop left the LDA to join the architects 
Allies and Morrison. Mark Brearley moved back to the GLA with a greatly 
reduced team to face an uncertain future. One of the conditions of 
survival for the design team was that it would be absorbed within the 
planning and regeneration group at City Hall and the name Design for 
London would be dropped. Brearley’s team was almost back down to the 
size of the A+UU in 2006, but this time it had no obvious champion at 
either political or managerial level. The team took the decision to ignore 
abandonment of the name, judging that perhaps no one would challenge 
continuity. No one did, so the DfL name continued, and the team 
flourished for another two years, regrouping and adapting its strategy 
once again. The team focused on progressing its existing workload rather 
than becoming too distracted by events, but as it happens a number of 
external events presented unexpected new opportunities.
First, the unexpected death of Johnson’s principal advisor, Simon 
Milton, led to Daniel Moylan taking over the mayor’s responsibilities on 
the built environment and separating these from planning. This gave DfL 
both a committed champion and a clearer niche in London government. 
While he was a councillor at Kensington and Chelsea, Moylan had been 
responsible for streetscape improvements in Kensington High Street. 
These had set new benchmarks for design quality and Moylan was both 
interested in and knowledgeable about architectural design. He supported 
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a number of DfL projects that might have otherwise been abandoned. 
In addition, he agreed to continue with the London Design Advisory 
Group, changing its membership to include Terry Farrell, Nick Serota 
(Director of the Tate), developer Roger Madelin and experienced civil 
servant Joyce Bridges. The mayor’s occasional attendance, encouraged 
by Moylan, provided an opportunity to engage him in a design debate and 
float ideas that would otherwise never reach him. It was through these 
sessions that, for example, interest in high streets was nurtured and 
enthusiasm for the Great Outdoors programme was strengthened.
Many small projects that had been developed with the boroughs 
could still proceed, often with the explicit support of the mayor. With 
Moylan now keen to make use of DfL’s skills, it became possible to dovetail 
with TfL projects and with borough projects funded by them. Moylan 
established a design review process for TfL-supported projects and he 
pushed the team’s nimblest critics to the fore. The Green Grid work was 
promoted by the mayor after a pitch to him that it offered a big impact 
for a low cost and his advisors noticed that these projects also afforded 
several photo opportunities. The team’s approach was low-key and 
opportunistic. Although in theory DfL had been wound up, the team’s 
continuity and distinct status was validated by Daniel Moylan and he 
coached Brearley in the art of politics and survival. It was a matter of 
staying in the game and waiting for an opportunity to rebuild.
The second relevant external factor was the need to provide a 
tangible response to outer London, a political payback that was required 
in response to Johnson’s 2008 election victory. Elections were coming 
up again in 2012, and the mayor’s Outer London Commission20 was 
struggling to find meaningful responses to the suburbs. The riots in 
August 2011 (a year before the Olympics were due to open) concentrated 
minds. The DfL team had a series of projects on town centres and 
high streets that had been prepared earlier in response to the economic 
downturn and demise of the high street. These were ready to be 
implemented (see Chapter 3). They had the advantage of being tangible 
and local, and were not funded from borough budgets. The resulting 
projects, initiated by DfL working with boroughs, were rolled forward 
through what became the Outer London Fund. This bold programme 
was acknowledged by Johnson as an important contribution to his 
re-election in 2012 (indeed, in May 2012 he spotted Brearley in the City 
Hall cafe and marched over to ask that he thank the team).
The third factor was the mayor’s relationship with the boroughs. 
This was less confrontational than under Livingstone since the political 
assumption of the administration was that decisions, wherever possible, 
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should be taken at local level. This was very much in keeping with the 
Cameron government’s policy of localism. This gave the DfL team access 
to new political clients. As long as its work was well grounded and in 
boroughs that actively sought its involvement, it was seen in a relatively 
positive light within the GLA. In the weeks before his departure from the 
LDA, Peter Rogers had arranged for Brearley to present to the mayor a 
proposal to focus regeneration efforts on a scatter of smaller projects 
across London, in places identified as ‘Good to grow and ready to go’. This 
approach was recognised as able to deliver much with small budgets, 
while enthusing boroughs and being welcomed by the public. Before 
long new initiatives and a flurry of projects had been tailored to respond 
to opportunities as they arose. The team thrived again, making rapid and 
substantial achievements. But this was to be short-lived.
Following Johnson’s re-election in 2012, there was another reshuffle in 
City Hall and the design team was again left without any political or 
managerial support. Daniel Moylan was moved to another job outside 
City Hall and lost his key role at TfL. New advisors were appointed 
and the planning lead passed to Edward Lister, formerly leader of 
Wandsworth. The emphasis of policy moved to raising the density of new 
housing. With a new round of budget cuts on the horizon, time had 
run out for DfL and the team was abruptly disbanded. No reasons were 
given nor announcements made. This time there was to be no survival 
campaign as it was clear that it would be futile. Mark Brearley departed 
with several of his colleagues, and the remaining team members were 
incorporated within the GLA regeneration team as project managers, to 
see out existing commitments. This effectively marked the end of the 
design experiment that had started 12 years earlier with the A+UU.
Designing for London: the legacy
While the Design for London brand name came to an end, it was not 
the end of the work of the team. The final element to this story is the 
diaspora of the team. Some members (Peter Bishop, Lara Kinneir and 
Richa Mukhia) have gone into academia; others (Tobi Goevert and 
Adam Towle) moved to city government, while some (Eleanor Fawcett, 
Esther Everett and Steve Tomlinson) worked for Mayoral Development 
Corporations. Mark Brearley is a professor of urbanism and has taken 
over a manufacturing enterprise in south-east London. Eva Herr, 
Charlotte Kokken and Fenna Wagenaar are all senior planners and 
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designers, in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. Some 
have advisory roles to other cities (Mark Brearley: Brussels; Peter Bishop: 
Zhuhai, Goyang and Riyadh). Through this diaspora the promotion of 
good design within city government continues.
It was always envisaged that the team would operate through the 
networks that it built in London government and it has been successful in 
advocating the importance of good design within London government. 
There are today many individuals within the GLA and TfL who understand 
the importance of good design and who make efforts to promote it in 
their everyday work.
Ten staff remained in the GLA as part of a Regeneration Team 
within a larger department. The loss of the brand name proved to be 
liberating. It removed the profile that had made DfL such a target and 
allowed the team to be assimilated into the structure of government. 
There they were seen to be under management supervision and had 
‘proper jobs’. The team continued a number of projects with mayoral 
support on high streets, public space, town centre regeneration and the 
Green Grid.
When Sadiq Khan (Labour) was elected as mayor in 2016, there 
was no debate about re-establishing a design agency to replace DfL, but 
the process of transition was easier and there were no major upheavals. 
The remnants of the DfL team were by then well embedded in the GLA 
and had matured into a design-led regeneration team with sound 
relationships across London government. Khan’s agenda is broad and 
ambitious in certain areas but does not place design and urbanism at 
its centre. The main threads of the team’s design work – open space, 
landscape, town centres and high streets – all continue, as does work 
on housing standards and London Plan policy. The team continues to 
work in a refreshingly collaborative manner and has developed further 
strategies to support other parts of the GLA and TfL and the boroughs. 
There is political support for the team and its work. The team has learnt 
to play by the rules and is now an established voice for the promotion 
of good design in London.
Good Growth by Design, a programme of London’s current 
mayor, Sadiq Khan, aims to promote quality and inclusion in the built 
environment.21 It recognises the role of design in improving development 
and delivering quality of life in an ever-denser city. It has six pillars 
of activity:
– Setting standards. This involves design-related research to provide 
evidence and information to inform policy, investments and 
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decision-making, including a refresh of the Housing Design 
Supplementary Planning Guidance, guidance to promote the reuse 
and recycling of materials across a building’s life cycle, and guidance 
on making London child-friendly.
– Applying standards. This involves mechanisms to provide scrutiny 
of London’s development, such as the London Review Panel (City 
Hall’s design review panel), which has undertaken more than a 
hundred reviews since its launch.
– Building capacity. This concerns building and supporting local 
authority place-shaping capacity.
– Supporting diversity. The Supporting Diversity Handbook, launched 
in July 2019, addresses the barriers at each stage of career 
progression, from school age through to leadership.
– Commissioning quality. The programme recognises the role of 
good procurement and accessing the best design practitioners. 
Work includes the Design Quality Management Protocol – a 
framework for ensuring design quality, including design review 
and procurement. The Architecture Design and Urbanism Panel 
(ADUP) is a pre-approved panel of built environment consultants 
that can be used by public-sector bodies.
– Championing good growth. Advocacy work continues to be 
undertaken by Mayor’s Design Advocates and Advocate 
Organisations engaging on behalf of the mayor across London, 
nationally and internationally. This includes events, conferences 
and design awards.
Conclusions: an agency to be cherished?
The Introduction to this book compared forms of city government in the 
UK and other countries. It would be a generalisation to say that UK 
politicians are more sceptical about professional advice than their 
European counterparts, but the generalisation is borne out by how few 
examples there are of architectural advice reaching the heart of city 
government in the UK. The period in which the A+UU and DfL operated 
was both exceptional and volatile. The team and its work survived a 
change of mayor, but ultimately could not survive both that and a change 
of national government. It was not alone here, since CABE and other 
agencies were also axed. It was particularly unfortunate to have been 
incorporated into the LDA, where it ultimately suffered from the agency’s 
own demise.
dEsign for London: an intErEst ing But short L ifE 69
There is always the need for champions at the political and 
operational level. When these existed in Ken Livingstone, Richard Rogers 
and Daniel Moylan, the team flourished; when they were absent, the 
team struggled. A design team will always be a fragile entity within city 
government. To be effective, DfL had to deploy a high public profile with 
an operational ability to influence and subvert. This worked when it 
was located close to the centre of political power, but it can make for an 
interesting but short operational life. Operating effectively within the 
heart of government inevitably makes enemies. Urbanism and design 
are approaches to shaping government programmes rather than core 
statutory requirements and therefore are always potentially expendable.
DfL was politically savvy and able to adapt and constantly reinvent 
itself. The approach of ‘big ideas – small moves’ (incremental urbanism) 
was robust enough even when architectural design was no longer at the 
centre of mayoral priorities. Programmes that deal with public space, 
climate change, town centre regeneration and streets are universal and 
should be able to cut across political boundaries. Some of DfL’s most 
effective work was in the field of policy development. DfL did not take a 
detached and technocratic approach to this work. Policy was abstracted 
from an understanding of its likely design impacts and this in turn 
was derived from extensive and careful research. The team understood 
where power and money were located in government and was adept at 
accessing these to support its projects. It learnt to build allies in different 
government agencies and to find new clients, budgets and workstreams. 
During this volatile period, it repackaged its programmes and ‘sold’ the 
ideas to different politicians and organisations. In the final analysis DfL 
was tenacious, resilient and agile and did not become institutionalised. 
Some of its work around the Olympics, high streets, public space, street 
design and urban landscapes has achieved a lasting impact. Perhaps 
its greatest achievement was the way it changed the culture of design 
thinking in government and the organisations within it. It supported 
those who were working to improve design quality and helped to build 
common methodologies as well as an evidence base that demonstrated 
the benefits of well-crafted and thoughtful design-led interventions.
DfL sought to plan London strategically as a whole by transcending 
boundaries and making relationships beyond sites and masterplans and 
between boroughs. It recognised that a city is a live and changing entity 
and worked to bring convergence between the disciplines of planning, 
architecture and landscape through its multidisciplinary, multi-scaled 
approach. Its approach was simple: to collaborate with others as part of 
the design process; to value and present the existing city with clarity; to 
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support its work with fresh research; to help improve the quality of design 
through influence; and, most crucially, to bring the designs of others 
together in one place, thus enabling a coordinated dialogue.
DfL was the kind of creative influence that London needed at 
the time (and still does). Its approach was loose. It could not shape the 
city through formal powers or the control of capital budgets. Instead 
it relied on its ability to influence and used the support of the mayor for 
this purpose. The approach to urbanism was to develop big ideas and 
implement them in small steps. DfL’s effectiveness lay in its ability to 
forge alliances, to influence public agencies and private developers, and 
to improve design quality through better design procurement and con-
structive design critique. Its ad hoc and opportunistic approach can be 
seen to have lent itself successfully to the naturally piecemeal patterns 
and behaviours of city regeneration, particularly in the London context. 
Its form of practice was in response to this very London condition.
This brings us to the underlying questions of how cities can be 
shaped by design strategies, what methodologies are the most effective 
and how these can be implemented within the structures of government. 
Possible answers to these questions include the following:
– Political leadership is essential. City politicians need to recognise 
that architecture and design are not abstract concepts. Well-thought-
through and carefully applied design strategies can transform a city 
for the better (and benefit all of its inhabitants).
– A tactical approach, utilising big ideas and then bringing them to 
realisation through small projects, is an effective methodology.
– Long-term commitment and design continuity are essential. Many 
of DfL’s ideas and projects are still coming to fruition.
– A small design team that is unrestricted by city bureaucracy can 
act as a conscience, as a catalyst and as a conduit for new ideas. 
A design team needs to be given political licence to ‘think about 
the city’.
– Partnership and cross-agency working are very effective ways of 
channelling resources for change.
– Strengthening client roles in procuring and managing design work 
is essential.
– Public engagement – winning hearts and minds both at the city 
scale and through public involvement in local schemes – is vital.
– Drawings, phrases and narratives are important mechanisms for 
framing ideas and engaging partners.
dEsign for London: an intErEst ing But short L ifE 71
– Research and intelligence gathering are essential to make the case 
for design interventions.
– Finally, achieving better design outcomes is difficult. It requires 
tenacity and stubbornness.
Kees Christiaanse described the methodology of DfL as ‘a negotiated 
approach, an urbanism of brokerage’, and Kieran Long commented, 
‘Design for London is using guerrilla tactics to become the most influential 
city architect’s office in the country’.22 This legacy can be seen in many 
of the projects that have been delivered and in the continuing work of 
those who still work in London government. DfL and the A+UU might 
not have changed London, but they certainly shaped it, and in most cases 
for the better. At its height, from 2006 to 2011, DfL employed 25 people 
– the most concentrated group of city designers in the history of London 
government. The impacts of its projects and programmes are considered 
in more detail in later chapters.
Notes
 1 The programme originally planned the partial pedestrianisation of Trafalgar Square, 
Leicester Square and Parliament Square. Plans for Leicester Square were implemented by 
Westminster City Council and the GLA in 2012. Those for Parliament Square were abandoned 
in 2008 when Boris Johnson became mayor (Chapter 5).
 2 Interview with Richard Brown, writer and Senior Policy Officer at the Centre for London, 
May 2019.
 3 Interview with Richard Brown, writer and Senior Policy Officer at the Centre for London, 
May 2019.
 4 Building 2006.
 5 New London Architecture 2006.
 6 Richard’s contribution and generosity deserves wider recognition. Not only did he give one 
day a week of his time without any payment; he was also available at any time to offer advice 
as well as to use his personal reputation and contacts to support the work of the team. He asked 
for no public recognition for this work.
 7 Bishop and Williams 2016.
 8 Interview with Richard Brown, May 2019.
 9 Chase, Crawford and Kaliski 2008.
10 Kaliski 2008, p. 108.
11 Crawford 2008a, p.14.
12 Crawford 2008b, p. 25.
13 The mayor’s team intervened to insist that KCAP were partnered with Allies and Morrison.
14 An Outer London Commission was set up to look at ways to do this, chaired by William McKee 
and advised by Terry Farrell. In reality little significant funding was diverted from existing 
programmes but recommendations did feed into the London Plan. 
15 Siemens built the Crystal at Victoria Dock, opened in 2011.




20 Set up to devise ways to move investment, the Outer London Commission (OLC) was 
established in 2008 by the Mayor of London. Chaired by William McKee CBE, it included 
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representatives of business, the boroughs, the development industry and the voluntary sector. 
The OLC published its Third Report in July 2014.
21 Summary of the Good Growth by Design programme provided by Jamie Dean and Sarah 
Considine, GLA (March 2020).
22 Long 2008. Editor of the Architects’ Journal 2007–9.
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High street places: doing a  
lot with a little
tobias goevert and adam towle
London might be one of the wealthiest cities in the world, but it also 
contains areas of intense deprivation. These are predominantly centred in 
east London around the docks and areas that had previously been centres 
of manufacturing. Unlike many other cities, London also has pockets of 
deprivation set in otherwise relatively wealthy districts. The planning 
system has recognised this problem and has formulated numerous plans 
to tackle it. These plans, however, are largely policy documents that have 
no real means of implementation.
When the Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) and Design for 
London (DfL) formulated their mission to nurture a compact, mixed-use, 
well-connected and well-designed London, the general consensus was 
that improvement strategies for London still required radical surgery. 
Vast swathes of development, usually on brownfield land, required con-
siderable site preparation, infrastructure provision, financing and 
marketing. To date, the transformation of such sites had been slow 
through projects such as Canary Wharf, the Greenwich Peninsula and 
the London Olympics. For projects such as Barking Riverside, the scale of 
investment required has been a barrier to delivery for decades. Such 
large-scale regeneration can yield major change, but momentum and 
continuity can be hard to maintain and there is no certainty that the 
benefits will be spread across society. Furthermore, the resources 
available for regeneration were limited from the 1980s onwards and 
within the public sector they were almost non-existent. As a consequence, 
a number of districts, particularly in inner London, had been left behind. 
Where development was planned, it was largely piecemeal, rarely part of 
a wider strategy and often of very poor quality.
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When Clive Dutton1 joined Newham Council as Regeneration Director 
in 2009, he considered possibilities for redeveloping the Royal Docks. 
Having reviewed the tortuous planning history of the area and counted 74 
development proposals, plans and strategies, he concluded that the area 
did not need a 75th masterplan, but a totally new planning approach. His 
solution, as described by Peter Bishop, was to ‘throw away all the previous 
plans, write a short strategy, sign up the politicians and then broadcast it’.2
Looking back, it feels as if Clive drew the curtain on a ‘Big 
Plan-making era’ for London. He recognised that London needed 
a different form of strategy – one that was incremental, nimble and 
nurturing. London, of course, had seen major regeneration projects 
such as King’s Cross, Bishopsgate and Paddington. These had to varying 
degrees been successful, but they were all driven by the private sector 
and were in areas traditionally considered commercially viable. There 
were no public-sector programmes to address the poorer neighbourhoods 
– interventions where success would be measured in social as well as 
financial returns. Previous attempts to regenerate these localities had 
been limited to superficial measures that had been inadequately funded. 
The structural reasons for an area’s demise had not been tackled.
The centre of a locality is often its high street. Many in inner London 
were in a state of decline but they remained the psychological centre of 
the community and represented a unique opportunity for intervention. 
Get these places right and wider regeneration could occur that might 
benefit everyone.
Chapters 1 and 2 looked at the emergence of DfL’s approach to 
promoting change through ‘incremental urbanism’. Incremental urbanism 
focuses on small-scale interventions that are allied with compelling and 
overarching strategies. These strategies set the broad direction of the 
mayor’s funding programmes and gave them clarity and coherence. 
Individual projects could then be devised and implemented as and when 
there were opportunities to do so (Figure 3.1). No single project would 
fundamentally change an area, but cumulatively and over time they 
could. This pragmatic form of urbanism proved to be especially effective 
for a team ‘without power or money’3 working within the complex institu-
tional networks of London’s government. In this chapter we look at how 
incremental urbanism was applied to regenerate town centres in some 
of London’s poorest localities. In Mark Brearley’s words, ‘This was about 
how a sparky group of proposition-minded public planners was shaping 
ideas and initiatives, acting as entrepreneurial urban curators, making 
the case for care and flair, working in partnerships across London, all 
with the support of the mayor.’4
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London: a city of high streets
Matthew Carmona, who has written extensively about London’s high 
streets, argues that London is distinct from cities such as Paris or Barcelona 
in that, while it has planned neighbourhoods (e.g. Bloomsbury), it is not 
a city of grand boulevards and civic set pieces. Instead, it is characterised 
by its continuous network of ‘everyday streets’, principal of which are 
its high streets.5 London’s high streets have been at the centre of its 
economic, social and civic life since they were first established along 
Roman roads such as Watling Street, Ermine Street and Portway Street. 
By the sixteenth century, as London grew beyond its medieval walls, 
these roads formed the backbone of the urban region (Figure 3.2). They 
attracted commerce and public services and joined existing villages 
together. In time they became a part of the morphology of London – its 
connections and nodes.
These lively and varied streets came under pressure during the 
twentieth century, when planning started to respond to mass car 
ownership. Since many high streets formed major transport arteries, 
many were damaged by road building. Some town centres, such as 
Paddington, were more or less destroyed before schemes like the 1960s 
Motorway Box proposals were shelved in the 1970s. The damage was 
lasting and was compounded by the popularity of out-of-town shopping 
centres and retail sheds in the 1970s and 1980s and by the subsequent 
Figure 3.1 Incremental urbanism as a collection of interlinked 
small-scale interventions: Bankside Urban Forest. Source: Witherford 
Watson Mann/DfL/GLA.
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withdrawal of major players like department stores. At the same time 
car-based policies saw the development of ring roads to bypass town 
centres and of large car parks to serve superstores that severed them 
from adjacent high streets. At the end of the 1980s it was clear that high 
streets across the UK were in decline and this had become a political 
problem. National planning policy responded by placing restrictions on 
the growth of out-of-town shopping. When considering superstores in 
urban areas, local councils were required to use a sequential test that put 
existing town centres first. Developers had to demonstrate that there 
were no available opportunities within existing town centres before they 
could create new out-of-town or edge-of-town complexes.
The turn of the century brought in new shopping trends. Apart from 
online shopping, inner urban shopping malls were developed, such as the 
Westfield developments in White City and Stratford. These catered for a 
younger clientele that had high disposable income and low car dependency. 
While arguably less damaging than out-of-town centres, these large retail 
Figure 3.2 Map of London (1832) showing Roman roads (in crimson). 
Source: Fiona Scott/DfL/GLA.
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malls still pulled yet more of the ‘high street brands’ off the high street. By 
2005, many of London’s high streets were experiencing significant decline, 
with well-known chain stores like Woolworths or HMV going into 
administration. The aftershocks of the 2008 financial crash and the rise of 
internet shopping created a perfect storm.
In early 2020, London still has over 600 high streets and has fared 
well in comparison to the rest of the UK, with the vacancy rate on its high 
streets two thirds of the national average.6 High streets might be busy 
roads and they might be suffering from structural changes in shopping 
habits, but they are still diverse places and provide community hubs 
where activity of all types can prosper and grow. They still take advantage 
of flows of people and goods, opportunities for trade, and have easy 
access to the economy of the metropolis. The future of these areas, as 
with their past, cannot be defined by shopping alone. High streets provide 
pubs, restaurants, schools and colleges, town halls, stations, markets, 
libraries, doctors, dentists, banks, workshops and yards, cinemas, offices, 
parks, museums and of course shops (which typically account for only 
half of the activity along high streets). They are the places where the 
city’s community and its economy are at their most vibrant and obvious. 
Figure 3.3 London’s 600 high streets (outside the Central Activities 
Zone). Source: Greater London Authority, Learning from London’s High 
Streets, 2014 (originally High Street London), Fiona Scott/DfL/GLA.
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High streets define certain localities and their communities and they 
therefore define the spatial and social geography of London (Figure 3.3). 
They typify Alexander’s semilattice7 and Jacobs’ view that cities are 
complex systems of enormous heterogeneity, which maximise economic 
and social opportunities8 (Figure 3.4). Consequently, they provide an 
excellent framework for the incremental growth of the city.
While most of London’s high streets survive, they are struggling 
to recover from the planning mistakes of the late twentieth century. 
Changes in consumer shopping habits facilitated by online shopping have 
made the future of many of them precarious, and structural changes in 
the local retail economy have led to the loss of small local independent 
stores, especially in the food sector. Bread, meat and grocery shops are 
being squeezed out by the supermarkets and many of the UK’s high 
Figure 3.4 Whitechapel Road and Market. Source: GLA/DfL.
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streets have lost their local character, diversity and distinctiveness. 
Across London, many high streets are indistinguishable from one 
another and are dominated by clone retailers and chain stores.9 Many 
of the chain store owners have little interest in the future of the places 
in which they are located.
To compound matters, many high streets have lost their pride, spark 
and quality. The public realm often lacks investment in maintenance 
and many pavements are in a poor condition. Some boroughs reached 
crisis point in the 1990s when street maintenance budgets had been 
slashed to the point where a cycle of continuous decline was occurring.10 
The Streetscape Design Manual (Chapter 1) was an early response by the 
A+UU to the problems of poor street maintenance. Lack of investment 
in high streets can set off a spiral of decline as busy street life ebbs away, 
people start to avoid them for fear of crime, and they become abandoned. 
This is more than the loss of local shopping; it is a cancer that eats away 
at community identity.
London’s high level of housing need (along with rising land values) 
has meant that surplus retail and office space is being converted into 
housing, often of poor quality. This has been supported by planning policy 
that sought to shrink core town centre retail areas. While shopping ‘core 
areas’ were generally protected, ‘fringe areas’ that extended out along the 
city’s arteries were released for other development. This was compounded 
by the relaxation of ‘permitted development’ rules (introduced in 2014), 
which relieved developers of the need to seek local planning consent for 
conversions from commercial to residential use. Paradoxically, planning 
policies to protect high streets often seek to restrict non-retail in the 
protected core areas – uses such as cafes and local businesses – and thus 
hinder their diversification.
The decline of high streets had become a popular concern. In 2011, 
Prime Minister David Cameron commissioned the TV presenter and 
entrepreneur Mary Portas to investigate and be the national face of the 
struggle of small towns to revitalise their high streets. Portas’s final report 
recognises the irreversible nature of the structural changes that have 
impacted on the British high street:
New benchmarks have been forged against which our high streets 
are now being judged. New expectations have been created in terms 
of value, service, entertainment and experience against which the 
average high street has in many cases simply failed to deliver. These 
reasons alone conspire to create a new shopper mind-set which 
cannot and should not be reversed.11
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She advocated a range of measures to revitalise high streets that were 
taken forward by the government. These included the setting up of 
27 Portas Pilots across the country where Town Teams would take control 
of the operation and management of high streets. These were supported 
by a Future High Streets Fund that allocated up to £100,000 per high 
street. Such paltry funding could not have a lasting impact on struggling 
localities. It was a populist response to a deep-seated structural problem. 
The reasons for decline were far more complex.
A methodology for town centre and  
high street regeneration
The re-establishment of London government created a political and 
organisational opportunity to address the problem. Under Mayor 
Livingstone, Transport for London (TfL) funding was redirected from 
road building to public transport and then to schemes to promote a modal 
shift to walking and cycling. This presented the A+UU and DfL with an 
opportunity to generate new renewal strategies. If powerful narratives 
for high streets could be developed, then political influence could be 
used to access significant budgets within the transport authority. DfL set 
about refocusing its research and drew attention to both the plight of, 
and opportunities on, high streets. By doing this it was able to devise a 
wide range of new programmes and projects for the mayor.
High streets have always been at the centre of many Londoners’ 
everyday lives and vital to the spatial, economic and social structure of 
the city. A strategy that sought to nurture them back into healthy centres 
of community life was both strategic and local. It would also provide a 
relatively easy and popular set of projects that could be branded and 
communicated to a wider audience. A focus on town centres and high 
streets had other advantages for the design team. First, the programmes 
could focus on some of the most deprived communities and this was 
in line with Mayor Livingstone’s social objectives. Second, it addressed 
an issue of universal concern. Third, it allowed the A+UU, and later DfL, 
to build working relationships with a number of boroughs which 
were welcomed when the team could bring funding from the various 
mayoral agencies that the boroughs could not access alone. Fourth, the 
methodology of incremental urbanism coupled with intense community 
engagement provided an effective modus operandi. As Rowan Moore 
commented in The Observer in 2012: ‘The idea, therefore, is to do a lot 
with a little’.12 The little money available for regeneration needed to be 
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spent in those localities most ready and able to show tangible benefits 
quickly and efficiently to give the greatest ‘pops per pound’.13 High streets 
and town centres offered the opportunity to use all the talent within 
local communities to create multiple and overlapping benefits.
In a comprehensive study on high streets (commissioned by DfL), 
Jones, Roberts and Morris14 describe what makes high streets so critical 
to the growth of the city:
– They are key components in the strategic transport network.
– As transport interchanges they accommodate movement between 
different modes of transport in London, including tube and rail, as 
well as buses and walking.
– As pseudo-estuaries they channel movement from the surrounding 
catchment of, typically, residential streets.
– They contain a rich mix of uses – retail, services and residential and 
office uses above the ground floor.
– They are locations for a wide range of on-street facilities and 
services, from the infrastructure under the street to that on top, 
such as kiosks, cash points, telephone boxes, public art, parking, 
benches, bins, signage, CCTV, street lighting and so forth.
– They are identifiable public spaces (positively defined by continuous 
street walls and active frontages) for social encounter and exchange.
– They are centres of local identity, often peppered with landmark 
features that give them a distinctive/historic appearance.
Carmona15 also draws attention to the fact that high streets are a key 
driver of entrepreneurship. They are places where business space is 
generally more affordable and they offer local employment, space for 
innovation and sophisticated business networks. Businesses within 
high streets are generally small, lean and able to adapt (up to a point) to 
changing local circumstances.16
One-size-fits-all solutions to the decline of London’s high streets 
were unlikely to be appropriate. Neither would purely physical (cosmetic) 
interventions work. Regeneration programmes had tried cosmetic 
‘improvements’ in the 1980s and 1990s and it was clear that painted lamp 
posts and hanging baskets would not impact on the structural problems 
that these places were facing. A far more considered methodology 
was required, one that understood the reasons for decline and would 
find new carefully crafted responses. Incremental urbanism is such a 
methodology. It requires a detailed understanding of the politics of the 
city – its governance, its organisation and its institutions. It is based on 
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deep research and community dialogue and works within the system to 
positively distort its outcomes. It is patient and subtle, and in many cases 
the design outcome is a product of the process – the art of the possible. 
At heart it is subversive. Barcelona first inspired DfL’s incremental 
approach: ‘the scale of action does not need to be immense; rather, a 
cumulative effect should be sought’.17 This, of course, is also echoed in 
North American urban thinking, going back to the work of Jane Jacobs, 
the ‘tactical urbanism’ of Stephen Marshall18 and the ‘deliberative 
planning’ of John Forester.19
DfL coordinated delivery agencies within deliberately loose but 
long-term urban strategies, each tailored to the needs of the particular 
locality. It commissioned design teams and acted as the ‘intelligent client’. 
It identified the gaps and invented small-scale projects to work on the 
ground in these often very deprived communities. Peter Bishop described 
the work of DfL as ‘urban curation’ and provocatively referred to the 
architects in the team as planners, but ones who understood how cities 
worked, could visualise and draw better future scenarios and work the 
system to get physical things built. This is a far cry from how the planning 
system sees its role today.
In July 2014 the Greater London Authority regeneration team, the 
successor body to DfL, produced the internal report Learning from 
London’s High Streets, which identified a number of different ways to 
stimulate and facilitate a growing and prosperous high street.20 These 
measures start on a micro-level with improvements to pedestrian and 
cyclist priorities. They also include the redesign of shop fronts with new 
colour, materials, imagery, improved signage and enhanced architectural 
features. Empty shops, disused buildings and vacant land can be revived 
through temporary ‘pop-up’ uses and exemplar projects. These present 
essential opportunities to experiment, test and celebrate the variety 
of uses along high streets. Public events – regular, seasonal or one-off – 
can bring liveliness, public interest, consumer confidence and media 
attention. In the long term, such small interventions help to strengthen 
community cohesion and the unique identity of a place, be it through 
food, arts or local history. The sustained organisation of local stakeholders 
and authorities into town teams or trader associations, or in Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs), can strengthen local networks and facilitate 
long-term improvement. Such groups can help to engage local businesses, 
especially start-ups, through providing access to business advice or 
low-cost workspace. The physical activation of high streets can be achieved 
through simple, qualitative and durable pavement improvements, good 
lighting and places to sit and rest. Works to buildings, traffic-calming 
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measures and adjustments to parking layouts can all create a better 
experience for the pedestrian. These are all straightforward measures but 
they do need to be combined into a coherent strategy, and having the 
appropriate design quality governance in place is essential.
First projects
The first project, focusing on ‘opportunity centres’, was developed in 
2002. The A+UU introduced area-focused working with team members 
looking after particular places and borough relationships on a long-term 
basis. The aim was to bring together all the opportunities – spatial 
planning, physical regeneration, and skill and employment initiatives – 
into a single conversation. Part of the Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces 
programme (Chapter 5) sought to tackle the problems of major thorough-
fares through town centres. It chose Coulsdon High Street, Lewisham 
town centre and Brixton as early schemes that would demonstrate both 
the value of public space and ways to carve it out from existing highways. 
The A+UU was also involved in two comprehensive town centre 
studies. The report TEN: Town Centre Enhancement in North London in 
200621 was followed in 2009 by SEVEN: Housing Intensification in Seven 
South London Town Centres.22 These two reports proposed strategies for 
suburban town centre improvements under themes that were tailored 
to the particular conditions in each locality. They were well researched 
and grounded in the particularities of each place. They included strategies 
for landscaping, pedestrianisation, connectivity, diversity and growth. 
These documents did not seek to address the problems on the ground 
through the creation of another raft of planning policy. Instead, they 
were design-led studies that included practical projects that could be 
implemented quickly.
The association of many of these projects with transport gave them 
a common theme but also opened up the process of implementation. 
TfL controlled the largest available source of funding in London and 
the mayor had radically shifted its priorities towards pedestrians, cycling 
and the public realm. Follow the money, develop an idea that could 
capture the public imagination, find a sympathetic champion in TfL and 
a project could be realised. Better still, DfL did not need to manage the 
tedious public procurement processes but could remain strategic, agile 
and inventive.
This work started a set of experiments in design-led planning in 
Barking town centre and Dalston, described by Long as ‘a feedback loop 
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of thinking and doing that resulted in a range of carefully crafted public 
realm projects that were diverse in their nature but rooted in a deep 
understanding of the area’.23 This was incremental urbanism by retrofit 
and by constant refinement. By engaging the communities in the design 
process, this work was overtly democratic and well founded.
Barking town centre: an east London phoenix
Since the early 2000s Barking town centre had been the focus of public-
sector-led regeneration. The trigger was the council’s commitment 
to counter social and economic decline caused by loss of traditional 
industries, including the scaling down of the Ford Motor plant at 
Dagenham. The resulting deprivation had encouraged the emergence 
of the far-right British National Party. There was a particular need to 
respond with regeneration programmes that would achieve visible 
change on the ground. The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 
(LBB&D) was eager to experiment with new ideas and saw DfL as an ally 
and agent for change. Through this emerging partnership, an opportunity 
came up to rethink the town centre.
Barking town centre was blighted by disjointed public spaces, 
poor-quality social housing blocks and the decline of local business. It 
lacked any sense of urban coherence and was not an obviously attractive 
area, but it had a rich historic and cultural heritage that could be used as a 
basis for regeneration. Overall it had real potential to be so much better. 
In early 2006 the LBB&D initially commissioned DfL to help prepare and 
implement a town centre strategy to support a major housing development 
that was being sponsored by the London Development Agency (LDA). 
From this a series of projects ensued and DfL commissioned the architec-
tural practices muf architecture/art, AHMM and Witherford Watson 
Mann. These projects included a new town square, estate improvements, 
and housing and cultural developments.
The projects started with a series of street theatre events that were 
designed to engage the population in a debate. One of these involved a 
group of polar explorers on an expedition to ‘search for Barking town 
centre’. A design-led masterplan was then developed in consultation 
with the local community to provide the context to turn around the 
fortunes of this once vibrant hub of civic life in east London. Barking 
had always suffered from poor-quality public realm so DfL’s approach 
deliberately incorporated crisp well-finished contemporary design and 
sought to use striking and innovative design to raise local aspirations. 
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This made it an exemplary case study of design-led regeneration. 
Design-led regeneration continues in Barking 14 years later and is still 
based on close collaboration between the local council and the Greater 
London Authority (GLA). The reworking of the Town Hall car park was 
part-funded through a mixed-use high-density development. New public 
realm was laid out in line with a coherent design palette that included 
locally made street furniture – the ‘Barking bench’. Multi-award-winning 
interventions led by muf architecture/art included a folly (Figure 3.5),24 
an urban arcade lit by 13 chandeliers designed in collaboration with 
Tom Dixon, and an arboretum (Figures 3.6 and 3.7).25 Thoughtful 
masterplanning along the River Roding and elsewhere is beginning to 
deliver high-quality new housing (including council social rented 
housing) and is continuing the spirit of proactive planning, now driven 
by the council-owned regeneration company BeFirst.
Figure 3.5 Barking town centre 
folly. The folly wall was designed 
as a ruin to recapture Barking’s 
sense of its past. The wall 
references Barking Abbey and 
nearby Eastbury Manor House. 
Source: muf/DfL/GLA.
Figure 3.6 Barking town centre 
arcade beneath affordable housing 
by AHMM. Source: muf/DfL/GLA.
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Making Space in Dalston
The project that best illustrates incremental urbanism as applied to town 
centre regeneration is the multiple-award-winning Making Space in 
Dalston programme that was carried out between 2007 and 2012.26 It 
established the mantra: ‘Value what’s there, nurture the possible, define 
what’s missing’ (Figure 3.8).
The project started in Gillett Square, one of the first of the Mayor’s 
100 Spaces (see Chapter 5 and Figure 2.2). This was opened in 2006 and 
included new public space, affordable workspace and a new home for 
the Vortex Jazz Club. As with many DfL projects, it acted as a ‘foot in the 
door’. Once local contacts had been established and networks formed, 
other projects invariably followed. Incremental urbanism was as much 
about the incremental development of client relationships as about 
projects on the ground.
The impetus to return to Dalston was provided by the revamp of 
the East London line (as part of London Overground), which involved a 
Figure 3.7 Barking town centre arboretum. Source: DfL Archive.
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new station at Dalston Junction.27 The station was built on a deck that 
also provided housing, public space and a library. Development of the 
transport hub was driven by public bodies – TfL, the LDA, and Hackney 
Council – with the publicly procured development partner Barratt 
London. The development provided the catalyst for local regeneration. 
A case for £1.5 million funding for new public realm had to be made to a 
sceptical LDA. The argument was that if £250 million had been spent on 
transport infrastructure, not to complete the public realm would be the 
equivalent of buying an expensive house and then economising by not 
fitting any carpets.28 The money was agreed without dissent.
The project addressed local concerns within a broad strategic 
framework and an evolving process of communication and action research 
(Figure 3.9) that helped develop a shared vision with the residents, 
businesses and organisations. The project focused on achieving a high-
er-quality and more extensive public realm without losing the place’s 
Figure 3.8 Value, nurture, define, deliver: a methodology for incremental 
urbanism. Source: J & L Gibbons and muf/DfL/GLA, Making Space in 
Dalston.
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existing assets. The active public involvement helped a once struggling 
locality to turn the corner and find new momentum and civic pride. The 
public space network, framed by the new development, was at the centre 
of proposals. Muf architecture/art and J & L Gibbons – teams that DfL had 
worked with on previous community collaborations – were appointed 
as designers. The initial brief sought to identify 10 costed projects and 
an action plan for cultural programming and management. In fact, over 
70 projects were identified in 10 themes, based on discussions with almost 
200 individuals and groups. Frequent steering group and stakeholder 
meetings were held in local venues, and numerous presentations were 
made to the community and other stakeholders. The initial mapping 
work29 secured funding for 10 demonstration projects that ranged from 
small-scale interventions in collaboration with local artists to larger 
phased engineering projects. Bird-boxes, a green wall, new lights for 
Figure 3.9 Mapping community assets in Dalston. Source: J & L 
Gibbons and muf/DfL/GLA, Making Space in Dalston.
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the local cinema and the Eastern Curve Community Garden30 were all 
completed. Improvements to Ridley Road Market and public realm along 
the High Street attracted further resources in later funding rounds.
Making Space in Dalston is an example of design-led, incremental 
masterplanning.31 This is a process based on constant feedback between 
thinking and doing. Partners need to ‘get their hands dirty’ in collaboration 
with local people, rather than spending money on reports or following the 
conventional top-down approaches typical of traditional masterplanning 
processes. The grassroots-based methodology of ‘valuing what’s there, 
nurturing the possible and defining what’s missing’ allows for a shift in the 
balance of power to local residents. Involving local people in decision- 
making meant that local partners were able to take ownership of the 
projects (Figures 3.10 and 3.11) and from this evolved the mechanisms 
for future partnership working.
Figure 3.10 (Continued overleaf)
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Figure 3.10 ‘Lots of projects everywhere’: incremental urbanism in Dalston. Source: 
J & L Gibbons and muf/DfL/GLA, Making Space in Dalston. (Continued from p. 89)
Kieran Long32 provides a good summary of the outcomes. He argues that 
the projects are a ‘test case for how the idea of the Big Society will play 
out at the point of delivery of new urban plans’.33 The brief for 
the projects was cowritten by the local community and developed 
gradually in response to conversations. Long says: ‘[i]t demonstrates 
that the results of engaging meaningfully […] are not predictable, and 
the outcomes are sometimes born out of conflict as much as consensus.’ 
Interestingly, the foreword by Mayor Boris Johnson celebrated the 
success of the project by quoting Horace’s phrase concordia discors 
(‘harmony in discord’).
Shared Spaces  
9.34 St. Marks  
Semi-public spaces  
enhanced with play  
and greening.
Ridley Road  
4.0 Market 
Value what’s there. An 
amenity that brings people  
to Dalston from out of  
the borough.
Release Spaces  
2.15 Dalston Lane 
Pockets of green are  
supported as  
semi-guerrilla  
gardens.
Green Routes  
8.2 Rhodes Estate 
Routes enhanced with  
greening, play and event. 
Physical change and  
engaged maintenance.
Host Spaces  
3.2 Empty Shops 
By bringing cultural activity  
the main street gets revitalized 
while cultural players benefit 
from location.
Green link  
8.1 Eco Park 
The unused Eastern curves  
feral propeties are  
 intensified to create an  
   amenity for education  
and escape.
Host Spaces 3.8 
Bootstrap Car Park 
Use of unexpected  
locations to host cultural  




7.2 Aswin St. Closure 
Temporary pedestrianization 
gives opportunity to have an 
active and enhanced 
public space.
Release Spaces  
2.22 Winchester Pl. 
Enhance pockets of public  
realm off the street. Exploit  
the topography and  
adjacency to the  
market.
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Figure 3.11 The Eastern Curve Community Garden summer project as 
wheatfield and flour mill. Source: J & L Gibbons and muf/DfL/GLA, 
Making Space in Dalston.
High street places
Early in 2009, in response to the election of a new Mayor of London, DfL 
started to focus on high streets as a core part of its programme. The 
argument was that London was fortunate in having 600 or more high 
streets that could provide an excellent basis for future growth. They were 
vital, if neglected, elements in the city’s structure. Such high streets were 
ideal locations for new regeneration programmes that would spread 
investment outside central London. This had been part of the mayor’s 
electoral pledge, and programmes that centred on high streets and town 
centres would strike a chord with the new mayor and his team. Nearly 
70 per cent of London’s high streets did not fall within a designated 
town centre boundary and this meant that the majority of high streets 
lacked policy designation and consequently were potentially vulnerable 
to development pressures.34 At the same time, high streets were also 
some of the most congested, polluted, complex but neglected spaces 
in the city. For this reason, they often languished on the ‘too difficult to 
handle’ register.35
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The High Street 2012 project (beginning in 2008 with London’s 
Great Outdoors; see Chapter 5) aimed to inject new life into one of 
London’s most famous arterial high streets: the A13, or Whitechapel 
Road.36 By examining the condition of the road from Aldgate to Stratford, 
and the places that it connected (Figures 3.12 and 3.13), the aim was to 
demonstrate that incremental rather than comprehensive change was 
the most effective way to realise the potential of such vital urban arteries. 
This approach was in stark contrast to that which prevailed for most 
transport projects at the time. These saw such roads as corridors where 
single funded programmes would implement linear improvements 
along the length of the carriageway. Consequently, the places that these 
roads ran through and connected were either ignored or were considered 
to be expedient. The choice of name was a piece of DfL opportunism – 
using the ‘2012’ from the Olympics logo to create a ‘project brand’ and 
applying this to lever out the funding.37
Whitechapel Road was the archetypal DfL project. The area had a 
rich history and cultural diversity. It was damaged and poor, yet the road 
had historic buildings, institutions and street markets. It was a series of 
town centres, each with its local identity. Although it was a busy and 
congested transport corridor, it still had sufficient space to accommodate 
Figure 3.12 High Street 2012: conceptual design strategy. Source: DfL.
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interventions to widen pavements and to improve the public realm. The 
remarkable historic buildings along its length provided a framework to 
create distinctive places (Figure 3.14).
High Street 2012 followed the approach of incremental urbanism. 
It celebrated the everyday, built on local identity and creativity, and 
brought about effective, durable and lasting change. The project was 
divided into eight sections, each of which had a punchy theme:
– Aldgate: A fitting gateway to High Street 2012
– Whitechapel: A historic area of immense diversity and intense activity
– Mile End Waste: A welcome green oasis
– Ocean Green: A place where people can pause, rest and play
– Mile End Intersection: Landscaped access to the park and canal
– Bow Flyover: Improved pedestrian environment and links to the 
waterways
– Greenway: Reveal and celebrate the Lea Valley
– Stratford High Street: New crossings to connect to the station.
Alongside these area-based design-led projects were themed interven-
tions to improve lighting, landscape and pavements, to remove street 
clutter and to reinforce wayfinding. The entire initiative was built around 
an intense community involvement programme.
Figure 3.13 High Street 2012: projects and interventions. Source: 
DfL/GLA.
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In Aldgate, a new park – Braham Street Park – was created through 
unravelling a one-way traffic system (Figure 3.15). This project was 
funded by a private developer who recognised that offices next to a park 
would be much more attractive than offices next to an urban gyratory. 
Since the park’s construction a new food and drink outlet has occupied 
part of the ground floor of a building fronting the space. This has helped 
to activate one edge and draw people into and through the park. The park 
Figure 3.14 High Street 2012: refurbished terrace on Whitechapel 
Road, illustrating heritage as a key design anchor. Source: Peter Bishop.
Figure 3.15 High Street 2012: Aldgate to Whitechapel Road. Source: 
High Street 2012, Vision document (2009), DfL/GLA.
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itself was designed to be a flexible and programmable space. The design 
(EDCO Design with WilkinsonEyre, 2010) was a simple creation of ‘space 
out of nothing’ and provides a moment of reprieve in a busy and congested 
area. One of the greatest challenges was to find a public body to maintain 
the park.38 The decision was taken that without a long-term management 
regime, the project would fail and it was consequently put on hold, but 
after lengthy negotiations the space was adopted by the City of London.39
At Altab Ali Park, the team worked with the local community to map 
its historical and cultural significance (Figure 3.16). A community-based 
archaeological dig excavated the site (the White Chapel) while an Alpana 
street painting event revealed the rich culture of the local Bangladeshi 
community (Figure 3.17).40 These events opened up a meaningful dialogue 
between those using the park and those living, working and studying 
nearby. This helped the design team to produce a sophisticated and layered 
design that provided space for sitting, chatting, playing, and for social and 
political gatherings, as well as being a space to learn about the local history. 
A similar process of engagement helped to produce a new multilayered 
landscape at Mile End Waste. Whitechapel Market was the most complex 
project and the most difficult to deliver. The improvements led by East 
Architects were subtle and designed to make the market work better. They 
incorporated improved lighting, drainage and servicing (anticipating the 
arrival of the new Crossrail services nearby). English Heritage was involved 
as a significant partner and provided funding to restore historic buildings 
along the route.
Figure 3.16 High Street 2012: Altab Ali Park provides room to breathe 
just off Whitechapel Road. Source: Peter Bishop.
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At Ocean Green (Figure 3.18), plans were already well advanced and 
were incorporated into the High Street 2012 project. The resulting design 
uses landscape at the edge of the estate to reconnect it to the high street 
while maintaining privacy and protection for residents. Access to Mile 
End Park was also improved and the Green Bridge was replanted. A new 
floating towpath was constructed on the canal and the cycle superhigh-
way now snakes down part of the street. At the end of the route, paving, 
lighting and carriageway changes have started to make Stratford High 
Street a little more like a street than an urban motorway.
Getting good designers on board was crucial to the success of this 
project, as was coordinating an expanded client team for them to work 
with. This team included highway authorities, local authorities, heritage 
organisations, private developers, parks departments, artists, market 
traders, schools, museums, women’s groups, religious organisations and 
many more. The scope of this partnership allowed the project to tap into 
shared visions of the future and plan the appropriate physical changes 
to improve everyday life.
A key lesson from this and other projects was that the design process 
is not limited to the architect and the drawing board. Perhaps the most 
creative aspect of DfL’s work was in brokering common interests and 
managing creative inputs. High Street 2012 was a lesson in collaboration 
and partnership building. Not only were there many funding partners, 
but some of the improvements were done in partnership with private 
Figure 3.17 High Street 2012: Altab Ali Park community programme, 
using traditional Bangladeshi chalk paints. Source: muf/DfL/GLA.
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landowners and developers. This involved harnessing disparate funding 
pots, levering in further investment and ensuring that the execution of 
works was of a consistently high quality across the statutory authorities. 
All of this required time and negotiation. Finally, more mundane issues 
such as management and maintenance (and securing the long-term 
funding for this) had to be addressed.
High Street London: understanding the problem and 
developing responses
Over the past 30 years, the capacity of public bodies to undertake research 
has been cut significantly. At its peak, DfL had 23 staff, but it never 
employed dedicated researchers.41 The team had to rely on other institu-
tions of London government for facts and data to support its work and 
recognised this as a weakness. An attempt to address this was the Urban 
Design Scholarships programme.42 This was sponsored by the planning 
consultancy RPS and launched in 2008. It created funded secondments 
for talented practitioners to work with the team on applied research. One 
of these was Fiona Scott.43
There was very little systematic spatial analysis or quantitative data 
on London’s high streets and in order to make a case for investment in 
London’s high streets, DfL needed statistical, economic, planning and 
Figure 3.18 High Street 2012: proposals for Ocean Green and Mile End 
Waste. Source: High Street 2012, Vision document (2009), DfL/GLA.
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cultural research. Working as a sponsored ‘scholar’ in the DfL team, Fiona 
Scott set about creating a new interpretation of London’s polycentric 
urbanism – one that focused not on the point (the town centre), but on 
the line (the high street; Figure 3.19). This is not to deny the importance 
of the town centre, which has both historical and cultural precedents, 
but it takes into account another history – that of the city which grows 
along linear space (in this case its Roman roads). The urban artery has its 
own significance and value; it is both ‘place’ and ‘connector’ at the same 
time. Initially, the study focused on a stretch of road between Ilford and 
Chadwell Heath – part of the old Roman road running from the City 
of London to Colchester in Essex. Its scope soon expanded to investigate 
the full 51-kilometre length of the ‘high street’ connecting Uxbridge 
to Romford through central London, with Oxford Street at its centre 
(Figure 3.20).
The research, and its meticulous drawings (Figure 3.21), revealed 
a wealth of new facts about the hidden economy of this stretch of 
road, such as it being home to 80,000 jobs and 6,500 businesses – more 
than Canary Wharf. The initial research was followed by a commission 
for research into London’s entire high street network, identifying the 
role of high streets in supporting London’s sustainable growth and 
development.44 This became the High Street London project.
Figure 3.19 London, a city of high streets. Source: Fiona Scott/GLA.
Figure 3.20 Uxbridge to Romford: non-residential 
land uses. Enlarged section shows Aldgate to Oxford 
Street. Source: Fiona Scott/GLA.
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Much of the previous discussion about failing high streets had focused on 
their very obvious problems rather than their potential. Underpinning the 
city-wide study was the proposition that London’s high streets represented 
an important element in the city’s urban fabric and could play a vital 
strategic and local role across the capital. High streets had great potential 
to accommodate much of London’s predicted future growth, through the 
provision of new jobs and housing.
High Street London found that London’s high streets are an 
economic system made up of some 175,000 businesses, employing 
almost 1.5 million people (or 35 per cent of London’s total jobs), and 
home to a significant portion of London’s micro and small businesses. 
The analysis also showed that half of London’s brownfield land is on 
or within 200 metres of a high street. The Strategic Housing Land 
Availability Assessment at the time identified over 3,369 large sites 
(within a 300-metre buffer around the newly defined high street) with a 
capacity to deliver 155,137 dwellings over a 10-year period.45 This was 
54 per cent of the overall capacity of large sites in London for this period. 
Furthermore, two thirds of Londoners (5 million people) lived within a 
five-minute walk of a local high street and many did not venture beyond 
it in their day-to-day lives.
Two publications stemming from this research, High Street London46 
and the mayor’s Action for High Streets,47 focused hearts and minds on 
Figure 3.21 Diverse economic and cultural activity on Tooting High 
Street. Source: Fiona Scott/GLA.
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these social, economic and structural assets and formed the foundation 
of work over the years to come. They built the business case to support 
and strengthen the resilience of high streets strategically and pointed out 
the huge potential in them.
Crossrail: a new impetus for town centre regeneration
High Street London set the basis for a serious rethink by policy-makers at 
a time when almost all investment was being focused on big regeneration 
projects in the Thames Gateway and east London, particularly around 
the Olympic area. Outer London suburbia, where a large proportion of 
London’s population lives, had been largely ignored (a point emphasised 
by Boris Johnson’s campaign team during the 2008 mayoral elections). 
The fact that suburbia is rather ‘ordinary’ should not make it uninterest-
ing to policy-makers. Indeed, designing in lower-density locations 
presents unique challenges. The interest in suburbia culminated in the 
2016 London Plan’s suggestion for increased intensification targets for 
suburban areas.
Once again transport investment, this time for Crossrail, presented 
the opportunity for the team to become involved at the local level.48 The 
Crossrail Atlas, commissioned from the architects’ practice 5th Studio, 
explored the opportunities for change that might be opened up by the 
new railway line, particularly in some of the outer London town centres.49 
The business case for the Crossrail infrastructure project had been 
based on economic growth, and, while the railway line was undoubtedly 
encouraging speculation in places like Ilford, a key growth centre along 
the new line, there were no specific local studies to ascertain where 
growth might occur or the form that it might take. There was a real risk 
that the scale and quality of regeneration activity would actually be 
damaging to the local area.
The case for local growth linked to Crossrail was examined by 
5th Studio, Regeneris and Cyril Sweett. Their study aimed to establish 
the points where regeneration activity might be focused to create oppor-
tunities for local benefits, and a series of maps visualising the opportuni-
ties were brought together in the Crossrail Atlas.50 This provided a 
comprehensive description of the regeneration potential and possible 
geography of urban change that might be triggered by the Crossrail 
project. Each station was first ranked by indicators of deprivation and 
economic performance. Second, each station locality was ranked according 
to its development opportunity. This took into account deprivation 
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indicators, market opportunities and those areas where investment could 
have the greatest proportionate impact. Six stations where GLA/LDA 
investment could bring the furthest-reaching benefits were shortlisted for 
further study. These were then split into two priority groups: one where 
the current opportunity related to existing town centres and would be 
driven by residential development, the other where the opportunity was 
for commercial or mixed-use development. The project built a strong case 
for town centre renewal by gathering detailed data that identified where 
modest investment would have the biggest impact.
A change of political priorities: the Outer  
London Commission
Following his election in 2008, Mayor Boris Johnson set up the Outer 
London Commission to investigate actions which could help areas that 
had not seen much regeneration investment. These were also areas 
where many Conservative voters lived.
Chapter 5 considers the tactics that DfL used to rebrand existing 
programmes to adapt to a change in political leadership. In the case of 
town centres, the team successfully pitched a new idea that was really 
a rebranding of existing work: programmes of comprehensive change 
focused on high streets across all of London. High-street-based regenera-
tion was well suited to suburban London and an initial £50 million was 
pledged over three years, with local authorities and organisations bidding 
for funds. The ‘new’ programme targeted high streets in London’s outer 
areas. The political programme continued after the election in 2010 of a 
Conservative-led coalition central government that severely reduced 
public spending. In order to survive, DfL had to change its focus from 
town centres like Barking, with brownfield sites and high levels of 
deprivation, to a more opportunistic approach that was geared towards 
economic growth opportunities.
Town centre programmes repackaged: ‘good to grow 
and ready to go’
In 2012, central government abolished the LDA and brought together, 
under one roof at the GLA, what was left of DfL, the London region of the 
Homes and Communities Agency and the London Thames Gateway 
Development Corporation. The GLA now had a broad remit for public 
space projects, town centre and high street schemes, housing renewal and 
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development, public transportation, place-shaping, and growth corridor 
and Opportunity Area planning. Although it was significantly reduced 
in size, DfL saw this as an opportunity to create a new methodology for 
investing in localities that were ‘good to grow and ready to go’. This term 
best described decisions made in a time of declining public funding and 
based on both need and opportunity.
The repackaged town centre programme reflected how political 
decisions on funding allocation had changed and where there might be 
support for new interventions – in particular, where there might be a 
measurable opportunity for growth arising from small-scale public 
subsidies. Inspired by the diagram ‘London: Social and Functional 
Analysis’,51 which elegantly described London as a series of places 
with distinct identities, the team (with the property firm GVA) collated 
pan-London data to identify and evaluate all of London’s 600-plus high 
street localities. This provided an evidence base for better-informed 
regeneration and investment strategies. Analysis of the data identified 
places that were ‘good to grow’ (had the capability to support housing 
and job growth, and were ‘good’ as in virtuous or right) and ‘ready to go’ 
(had all the ingredients in place to grow: willing and proactive people, 
space in the right ownership and supportive planning policy). Adding 
these layers of analysis to the localities map enabled a detailed and 
complex picture of the city to be drawn up. From this, multiple approaches 
to investment and regeneration could be derived. The study corrobo-
rated the places in which the GLA Regeneration Team (and previously 
DfL) had been investing over the last few years. It also strengthened the 
case for investment in overlooked (at the time) places like Southall, 
Sidcup, Erith and Blackhorse Lane.
The 2011 riots provided an unexpected catalyst for this new work. 
Civil unrest erupted first in Tottenham and later spread to other centres, 
including Croydon and Clapham Junction. Urban riots form a subline 
through English history from the twelfth century (religious riots and gang 
warfare between guild apprentices) to the eighteenth century (the 1780 
Gordon riots, against Catholics) and the nineteenth century (a series 
of riots over electoral reform). More recently London had seen civil unrest 
in the Brixton riots of 1981 and the poll tax riots of 1990. As always, the 
riots caught the authorities by surprise, and with the Olympics scheduled 
to open in less than a year, an instant response was demanded. The riots 
had of course focused on high streets as these are the natural places for 
community congregation, and these seemed to be the places to start 
rebuilding community confidence. Additional funding was made available 
as part of the £70 million Mayor’s Regeneration Fund, with a focus 
on Tottenham and Croydon, which had been the worst-affected areas. 
DESIGN FOR LONDON104
The ‘good to grow and ready to go’ high street strategy (Figure 3.22) 
was able to secure a significant proportion of the £221 million total52 
that had been allocated since 2011 by the mayor and others to help boost 
high streets, strengthen local trade, create new jobs and shape better-
quality places. These schemes had been carefully researched and well 
designed – sadly, an unusual occurrence for short-term politically driven 
initiatives. More important projects were based on a clear rationale and 
could be implemented quickly.
The ensuing regeneration programmes acknowledged the 
importance of combining analysis and place-based mapping to identify 
the opportunities for each locality. Practical action was accompanied 
with strategic research on a London-wide level to understand the 
implications of change in the economy, including impacts on retailing, 
commerce, civic activities and housing demand. Projects were both 
practical and at a stage where implementation could occur as soon as the 
funding was made available and the green light given. The partnerships 
were already in place with partners ready to provide support.
Figure 3.22 Good to grow. Source: Adam Towle, DfL/GLA.
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The impact of the high street and town centre work
One question is whether the high street is uniquely British and whether 
the work of DfL was a response to a unique London problem. High streets 
may have different names in Paris, Milan, Amsterdam or Hamburg but in 
essence their structure, use and socio-economic importance are very 
similar. Some of DfL’s ideas have proved transferable to other cities and 
the team has worked with a group of German academic researchers 
called Think Berl!n, led by Dr Cordelia Polinna, to apply London’s tried 
and tested approaches. This work has ranged from articles to political 
workshops on Design for Berlin.53 It was recently commissioned to 
prepare a proposal for an International Building Exhibition (IBA) 
based on Berlin’s high streets (the Radialen) and called Radikal Radial 
(Figure 3.23).
On the dissolution of DfL, many of its team members secured 
new jobs in different cities and took with them their networks, method- 
ologies and approaches to urban regeneration. A number of the 
programmes have been adapted to new circumstances. The London 
Borough of Harrow, for example, took on Tobias Goevert, Adam Towle 
and other ex-members of DfL who shaped the Building a Better Harrow 
regeneration programme, which owed much to the Barking and 
Dalston town centre projects. Fenna Haakma Wagenaar is now Design 
Lead (Hoofdontwerper) in Amsterdam, where a variation of the high 
street strategy, Stadtstraten, ‘is the most used (and abused) strategy 
for combining improved pedestrian links and public space with the 
general demand for densification’.54 Another team member, Eva Herr, 
works in the planning department in Hamburg on improving and 
Figure 3.23 Schematic representation of a Berlin radial road that runs from the 
city centre to the outer city through various types of neighbourhoods (2011). 
Source: Thomas Hauck.
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densifying the city’s arteries in outer areas, called the Magistralen. The 
city commissioned a major design workshop, Bauforum, in 2019, using 
200 experts and audiences of 8,000 to inform a programme of high 
street demonstration projects.55 Peter Bishop has just completed new 
masterplans for Barking town centre.
The UK government has launched a national Future High Streets 
grant programme, with the first round of bids in 2019. This has picked up 
on the approach applied in DfL’s original high street funds and is looking 
at opportunities beyond high street improvements, including major 
housing-led town centre restructuring.56
Conclusions
DfL’s high street work is not without parallels, but it is hard to find 
a comparable initiative that rode successive political changes and 
funding fluctuations and delivered such a range of projects. Opportunism 
is important in times of uncertainty. This is not to say that a number 
of the town centres would not anyway have seen changes or indeed 
improvement. But that change would have been piecemeal without the 
team’s active involvement.
The work on town centres and high streets was a response to 
economic and social forces that were manifest in radical shifts in 
consumer behaviour. It was also a response to the volatile and turbulent 
politics of the period. Simple programmes for town centre and high 
street regeneration had to be constantly repackaged and adapted to new 
sources of funding and new political priorities. Agility, invention and 
opportunism are central elements of survival, and incremental urbanism 
is possibly the only approach that is able to withstand the stresses and 
uncertainties of local government.
High street and town centre regeneration projects show the 
importance of carefully designed small-scale interventions that emphasise 
sensitive urban design. London is under constant development pressure 
and this growth is taking place through infill and brownfield site 
development as well as through the reuse and reactivation of empty 
buildings. Strengthening retail functions is an important first step, but 
the future of the high street lies in the diversification of use through 
developing the whole ecosystem – small firms on upper floors and 
production in backyards. Structural changes in the UK and London 
economies are heralding the return of small businesses and customised 
manufacturing. This ‘creative milieu’ is essential to the future development 
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of cities. These jobs are more resilient in the face of financial crisis, create a 
local economy and are able to react flexibly to new circumstances and 
changes in demand. The high street is a perfect seedbed for such activities.
The projects illustrated in this chapter show that robust relation-
ships with (and within) local authorities, business and resident groups 
are the key to developing, implementing and maintaining good urban 
change. Local charrettes (workshops carried out over a number of weeks 
involving the architects and the local community) and design reviews 
with all stakeholders are a key element in this process. They helped to 
create a climate supportive of design quality which was hard for private 
investors, local planning departments and engineers to disregard. 
Targeted public-sector investment is just the starting point of a regenera-
tion process, but it does set the agenda for longer-term programmes and 
further investment from local authorities, developers and businesses. 
Coordination between the various bodies involved in high-street-related 
activities is essential. The projects with the most impact were those that 
involved communities from the outset, took local needs into account, 
fostered uniqueness and diversity, nurtured individual assets and 
developed strong partnerships between all stakeholders.
However, not all lessons from the last decade of high street inter-
ventions are positive. Shopfront improvements, popular as ‘quick fix’ 
local programmes, are often ephemeral due to short retail leases and 
lack of understanding by shopkeepers of their ‘design value’. The 
problems of high streets are deeper than the quality of shopfronts. 
Physical improvements that fail to address the root causes of decline 
lose any regenerative impact quickly. Long-term improvements in the 
quality of high streets cannot be achieved by politically driven quick 
fixes. High streets and town centres are complex places that are built on a 
web of social and economic relationships. Long-lasting improvements 
are driven by meticulous research, skilful design-led interventions and 
programmes that build capacity and resilience. Most of all they require 
long-term commitment and agency. The projects that DfL brokered 
in Dalston and Barking demonstrate a methodology for renewal that has 
an enduring legacy.
If the high street is to have a future, there must be more innovation 
to diversify and grow the high street ecosystem. It is probably true that 
the high street is no longer the centre for a neighbourhood’s shopping 
needs. Some, especially where they have the benefit of an attractive 
historical environment and a wealthy residential hinterland, will 
continue to thrive. Many other high streets will have to reinvent 
themselves. In a time when local shopping is declining in importance, 
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high streets are still centres of their communities and can diversify to 
become local economic, service, leisure and transport hubs. They still 
need to have a welcoming and well-maintained public realm and a 
distinctive local identity. The London high street of the twenty-first 
century will need to become more resilient and capable of ongoing 
reinvention. This might include the use of buildings and space for local 
markets, digital manufacturing and fabrication, community enterprises, 
leisure and recreation, or food production. High streets must also improve 
their capacity for walking and cycling in order to reduce vehicular flows 
on London’s already congested medieval street pattern.
London’s future development challenges can only be addressed 
through sensitive place-based strategies and plans. In some places that 
may mean incremental change and adjustment; in others it might mean 
more comprehensive redevelopment. Town centres and high streets will 
continue to play a key role in supporting urban change, but this requires 
a recognition of their important physical, social and economic attributes 
and continued support.
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Whitechapel Road, and DfL argued successfully for funding to improve the route. The fact that 
the Olympic Committee decided to reroute the marathon on the grounds that Whitechapel 
Road did not present a picturesque enough route illustrates the shortsightedness of some 
institutions of London government. The project went ahead regardless. A number of other key 
routes were eventually tidied up, in particular those that would take participants and press 
between the different venues. 
38 An offer by the Royal Bank of Scotland to adopt it was rejected as inappropriate for a new piece 
of public space.
39 The park is actually in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.
40 By muf architects.
41 The extensive research that was used to support its work was carried out by the team members 
themselves as part of its design methodology. 
42 The Urban Design Scholarships programme was sponsored by the planning consultancy RPS 
with a launch at London Met and publicised by the Architects’ Journal. The programme ran 
for two years. Based on a public call for submissions, it placed talented practitioners in the 
DfL team to develop a specific research programme under close mentoring from DfL leads 
(see Chapter 7).
43 Fiona Scott now runs the London-based architecture practice Gort Scott with Jay Gort.
44 The commission was awarded to the young practice Gort Scott, assisted by The Bartlett Faculty 




46 Gort Scott Architects, 2010.
47 Greater London Authority 2014a.
48 Now renamed the Elizabeth line, this new high-speed railway line under central London will 
connect Heathrow Airport to the east of London, radically altering transport accessibility and 
land values.
49 The Crossrail Atlas attempts to provide a comprehensive description of the regeneration 
potential of the Crossrail project. The atlas was prepared by 5th Studio on behalf of DfL/LDA, 
and was undertaken in parallel with an economic study by Regeneris Consulting and Cyril 
Sweett. See http://www.5thstudio.co.uk/projects/crossrail-atlas-london/
50 5th Studio, 2011.
51 Drawn by Arthur Ling and D. K. Johnson and first produced in the County of London Plan 1943 
by Patrick Abercrombie and others. Variously described as the ‘Abercrombie Plan’, ‘Potato Plan’ 
or ‘blob map’ (see Chapter 1).
52 This sum was made up of the Outer London Fund (£50 million), the Mayor’s Regeneration 
Fund (£70 million), and other TfL and GLA funds and injections from Central London funds.
53 Urban Design, Winter 2013, Issue 125. and a book, Bodenschatz, Hofmann and Polinna 2014.
54 Interview, Fenna Haakma Wagenaar.
55 https://www.hamburg.de/bauforum/
56 The budget for the fund was increased significantly in August 2019 after Boris Johnson became 
prime minister; see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/1-billion-future-high-streets-fund- 
expanded-to-50-more-areas
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Better housing for London:  
how on earth did we pull  
that off?
richa mukhia
It [the London Housing Design Guide] is quietly radical. It demonstrates 
that it is still possible for public authorities to direct city building for  
the better.
– Rowan Moore, Slow Burn City1
The London Housing Design Guide (LHDG) was arguably the boldest 
and most influential of all the projects of Design for London (DfL). It was 
a conviction-driven mission, fighting for a better standard of housing for 
the average Londoner.
This fragile project survived against the odds and steered a new 
course for housing in London. In essence, the LHDG proposed 90 standards 
that set out a confident vision for housing quality in the capital. Of the 
suite of standards, the most controversial were the minimum space 
standards. These have now been transplanted into national policy through 
the National Technical Standards published in March 2015. Now, for the 
first time in history, Britain has minimum space standards for all housing 
tenures. London really did lead the way, under the watch of a Conservative 
mayor and a Conservative government and during a turbulent era of 
financial crisis and public-sector cutbacks in Britain.
Writing this chapter has presented a valuable opportunity to revisit 
this story, speak to the protagonists involved and learn lessons from 
a most unlikely success story. The focus of this text is the process of 
delivering the LHDG and not the standards as published. These can be 
found in the guide itself.2
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UK housing standards: historical background
Since the publication of the London Building Act of 1667, London has 
always had some form of regulations concerning housing design. These 
were often put in place with urgency after national disasters or wars and 
were invariably at the mercy of politics and economics.
In the late nineteenth century, the Disraeli government passed a 
raft of legislation to tackle poor and insanitary housing, including the 
Public Health Act 1875, which set out construction bylaws for terrace 
housing, and the Artisans’ Dwellings Act 1875, which empowered 
councils to buy and demolish slum housing and construct new public 
housing. The Tudor Walters report (1918) arose from the Homes Fit 
for Heroes campaign after the First World War and sought to raise the 
standard of housing in the country. Crucially, it acknowledged the 
importance of housing quality in improving living conditions and made 
the link to space standards by proposing minimum floor areas for a range 
of dwelling types. The Dudley report (1944) and the Housing Manual 
(1949) built on this legacy. These standards applied to public housing 
and did much to bolster quality.
In the 1950s, as private house building accelerated and political 
priorities shifted to increasing the supply, there was a notable deteriora-
tion in housing quality. The amount of space in homes was falling just as 
living standards were rising and people were demanding more space. 
In response, Sir Parker Morris was appointed to chair a committee tasked 
to ‘consider the standards of design and equipment applicable to family 
dwellings and other forms of residential accommodation, whether 
provided by public authorities or by private enterprise, and to make 
recommendations’.3 The committee was open and outward-facing, and 
consulted with a wide array of stakeholders and interested parties. There 
was also a great deal of fieldwork, with visits to over 600 dwellings 
supported by a functional analysis of needs and requirements of ‘new 
patterns of living’. The committee’s hugely influential report Homes for 
Today and Tomorrow was published in 1961 (Figure 4.1) and made the 
case for space standards: ‘Additional floor space takes first priority in the 
evidence, and this call cannot and must not be ignored, for a good house 
or flat can never be made out of premises which are too small.’4
The Parker Morris standards were derived by examining how 
residents used their homes, what equipment and furniture they needed, 
and the space required to perform household activities. The report 
concentrates on the usability of a home but also devotes an entire chapter 
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Figure 4.1 The Parker Morris report: (a) Cover; (b) Livable housing. 
Source: Homes for Today and Tomorrow, HMSO, 1961.
(a)
(b)
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to ‘The Home in Its Setting’, focusing on the relationship of the dwelling 
to the street and surrounding context. Initially, the standards were 
applied through good practice guidance, but in 1967 they were made 
mandatory, first for the New Towns and subsequently (1969) for all new 
council housing.
While the standards had an influence on the private housing market, 
the ambition to apply the guidance across tenures failed to materialise, 
apart from in the New Towns. However, since local authorities remained 
the primary deliverers of housing in the 1960s and 1970s, this ensured a 
legacy of well-sized and functional housing stock from this period.
In 1980 a new Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher, 
rescinded the Parker Morris standards and introduced the Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act. The Act had further far-reaching con-
sequences for the delivery of housing in the UK. New financial controls 
curbed local authority house building, and as a result housing associations 
became the main providers of social housing and private enterprise the 
main supplier of housing overall. This marked a structural shift in the way 
housing was delivered in the UK and sowed the seeds for the market-led 
approach to housing that defined the following decades.
A new millennium: housing in London
The year 2000 was significant for governance and planning in London. 
Ken Livingstone was elected as Mayor of London in May 2000. The 
same year, Planning Policy Guidance 3 (PPG3) was launched, sanctioning 
higher densities and development on urban and brownfield sites. As 
David Birkbeck notes: ‘Prior to PPG3 no one built very high or very 
dense. After it launched everything changed very quickly. Developers 
who had been building four-storey blocks were suddenly building 
12-storey schemes with very little thought given to design or the particular 
challenges of living at higher density.’5
The first mayoral London Plan was published in 2004. It promoted 
London as a high-density global city, giving developers another charter 
to densify. Critics voiced concerns that ‘the quality debate had been 
blindsided’.6 In the publication Towards a Strong Urban Renaissance, Lord 
Rogers and his fellow Urban Task Force members demanded that:
the design of individual housing units must be improved, and 
the quality increased to reflect advances in new technologies, 
construction techniques and environmental efficiency. The Urban 
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Task Force did not address the issue of the private residential sector 
in detail, but it is clear that new measures are needed to ensure 
that private housebuilders – despite their best intentions – do not 
build a new generation of mono-functional enclaves based on lowest 
common denominator design.7
At City Hall, the focus remained on housing output and the ever-growing 
pressure to ‘get the numbers up’. Housing targets were in the low 20,000s 
in 2000, after which they rose steadily, reaching a target of 42,000 by 
2015. In 2000 densities in London (56 dwellings per hectare or dph) were 
already higher than the national average (25 dph), as observed by Christine 
Whitehead, who further states: ‘By 2005 national average densities had 
increased by almost two thirds to 41 dph. Densities in London had doubled 
to 112 dph – almost 175% above that average.’8
Community groups were increasingly concerned about the impact 
of this growth on their communities. They put pressure on members 
of the London Assembly, who in turn began to discuss the issue of 
housing ‘quality’. In 2003 Housing for a Compact City was published by 
Richard Rogers, as the mayor’s Chief Advisor on Architecture and 
Urbanism, and the Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU; Figure 4.2). 
This promoted successful high-density housing projects from across 
Europe along with a clear message about quality: ‘In seeking to meet our 
targets, we must not put quantity before quality. We must provide future 
generations of Londoners with the best of contemporary housing, 
creating places that will accommodate and sustain London’s vibrant and 
diverse communities. High quality design and increased densities are 
critical to this equation.’9
The London property market showed no sign of slowing down. 
A rising population, ready access to credit and international investors 
fuelled the booming housing market. Despite the warnings about quality, 
little changed, and it was clear that self-regulation by the private housing 
market was not working.
The A+UU and, later, DfL were at the front line in reviewing housing 
proposals across the capital, and these were of increasingly poor quality. 
The prevalent typology was the double-loaded corridor serving two-
bedroom, low-ceilinged, single-aspect flats. Homes seemed to be shrinking 
at a startling rate and there was real concern that a sustainable housing 
stock was not being created. Our instinct and awareness told us London 
was in danger of leaving an alarming legacy of poor housing for future 
generations to sort out. Of course, we were not alone in observing these 
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Figure 4.2 Housing for a Compact City: (a) Cover; (b) Three alternative 
approaches to designing at the same density. Source: Architecture and 





worrying trends, as shown by this anonymous post from the blog of the 
Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE):
Where does one start? The shrinking new builds since 1980 and the 
Thatcher removal of mandatory space standards? The disappearance 
of the bath to be replaced by a shower only in new flats? The 
disappearance of the kitchen to be replaced by a corner unit stuck 
in the living room without a window over the sink or being in its 
own four walls? The loss of what was formerly loft space in a 
building by bedrooms with Velux and not dormer windows such 
that the occupant has no direct view out? The increase in double 
loaded corridor apartment blocks leading to vast numbers of poky 
single aspect flats in blocks that will stand for 30 years at least? 
Much has been built that even a lay person would find unacceptable 
as a flat dweller and I am one such, not an architect but you don’t 
need to be an architect to see that rooms are too small, ceilings too 
low, that places lack storage space, and that there is an absurd 
number of toilets and showers in newly built flats. Since when did 
people refuse to share a toilet? I could show you the floor plan of a 
two bedroomed flat in Essex that has three toilets, one in each 
ensuite and one presumably for visitors. Are we now so precious 
about our backsides that sitting on a toilet somebody else has used 
is anathema? I don’t think so.10
Research, articles and campaign documents published by CABE, the 
Royal Institute of British Architects, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
HATC, Shelter, Design for Homes and others added to the groundswell 
of concern. The studies confirmed that London was producing some of 
the smallest homes in western Europe.11,12 Not only were these homes 
small, but also only 18 per cent of schemes assessed by CABE were rated 
as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, ‘revealing overall a disappointing picture of 
housing quality, and demonstrating that consumers are getting a raw 
deal when it comes to new homes and neighbourhoods’.13
In response to this growing pressure, the Greater London Authority 
(GLA) commissioned the housing consultants HATC to produce a report 
investigating ‘the potential role of internal space standards for dwellings … 
to be considered within the forthcoming review of the London Plan …The 
purpose of this study is to attain an understanding of the evolution, role, 
operation, and impact that space standards have had and may have in 
the future within London and to propose policy for incorporation in the 
London Plan and related guidance’.14
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As Andrew Drury of HATC explained, ‘We were being asked to 
answer two fundamental questions: 1. Should the GLA establish minimum 
space standards? and 2. Could the GLA legally establish minimum space 
standards? Our answer was yes and yes.’15 There was a clear case for space 
standards and associated guidance on design quality. Homes in London 
were shrinking and there was a case for the GLA to intervene.
Despite the mounting evidence, there was little change to the status 
quo. The house builders out-lobbied everyone else, insisting that the 
introduction of space standards would be catastrophic for delivery. The 
spectre of housing targets loomed over the politicians, quantity was 
prioritised over quality and the HATC report and recommendations 
regarding the introduction of standards were shelved.
Design for London
Design for London (DfL) was established in October 2006, two months 
after the publication of the HATC report. There was an awareness 
from the outset that the team was a political creation that was unlikely 
to last. In Mark Brearley’s words,16 ‘Design for London was inherently 
vulnerable, not likely to survive for many years, as there was no legal or 
procedural requirement for us to exist. Hence we made a concerted effort 
to have as big an impact as possible, as soon as we could.’ During their 
time at the A+UU, Mark Brearley and Richard Brown had realised that 
work on strategy and policy had a greater impact than location-specific 
projects. With the establishment of DfL, the involvement with policy 
work increased. The team was involved in a wide range of policy work 
on Opportunity Areas, the London Plan, industry, high streets, streetscape 
guidance, public space and housing. As Peter Bishop commented, ‘We 
were given freedom to ask big questions, which civil servants embedded 
within the GLA could never do. Design for London was allowed to initiate 
policy debates. We had an open brief and the productive naivety of having 
direct access to the mayor. We had licence to generate ideas and licence 
to upset people.’17
In the early days we did not always have a seat at the table when 
housing policy decisions were being made, but the team continued to 
push the conversation on housing quality and worked to build momentum 
for the cause. Mark Brearley observed: ‘We were conviction-driven people 
and we found others who supported the mission and were interested 
in positive action. It was an innocent mission – we wanted to make the 
city better.’18
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Although at arm’s length from City Hall, DfL were still consulted 
when policy drafts were circulated. We also had direct access to the 
London Development Agency (LDA), particularly their land development 
team. A last-minute review of the mayor’s draft Housing Strategy by 
Deborah Mathieson19 revealed that ‘there was virtually no mention of 
design or quality. I sent some comments about design just before it got 
sent to the mayor, and Alan Benson (Head of Housing Strategy at 
the GLA) agreed that the document must include a narrative about 
quality.’20 The GLA agreed that a supplementary guide focusing on 
housing design should be produced. This was to give very general design 
guidance, focusing solely on consolidating existing standards. No one 
wanted us to include anything new or propositional, as this would have 
been far too controversial politically. We agreed but, of course, did not 
abide by this. In stealth, we looked at the issues holistically, produced 
a one-page brief and sought out a sympathetic collaborator at the LDA, 
who funded the project.
In parallel, the DfL team continued ‘making the argument for 
standards in different ways to different levels and layers of the 
bureaucracy. They were out there convincing people. A project like this 
needs leaders who have the ear of politicians.’21 For example, when a 
group of prominent housing architects and Design for Homes informally 
presented the findings of a report on living at superdensity in 2007,22 
the team capitalised on the opportunity to build up sympathy for the 
cause within the LDA. As David Birkbeck commented, ‘Peter Bishop 
stage-managed a presentation to David Lunts and the LDA.’23 (Lunts was 
the executive director for regeneration at the GLA.)
Peter Bishop later recalled:
There was no appetite from the mayor’s office for any kind of housing 
standards, his senior aides fearing that they would discourage 
investment from house builders. The agreement (already brokered 
with the agencies concerned) was that the team would produce 
standards that would only apply to LDA land holdings and HCA- 
funded schemes – the argument being that if there were cost impli-
cations, then they would be reflected in lower land values (that the 
LDA was willing to accept) or higher subsidies (that the HCA were 
willing to accept). In other words, I explained as politely as possible 
that it was none of the GLA planners’ business. Design for London 
then secured support (with strings attached) to test some of the 
emerging principles on an LDA-owned site in Bow (St Andrews).24
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There were many mountains to climb. The project was deeply contentious; 
there were many cooks, many stakeholders; the evidence needed pulling 
together; there was a complex web of existing regulations to navigate 
that were often contradictory or onerous; there was a well-funded lobby 
from the house builders, and scepticism and reluctance from the delivery 
community generally. There were, however, many voices lobbying for 
change and they all contributed to the growing momentum to address 
the problem of housing quality. DfL was fortunate to take the lead on the 
project. Strict instructions from the GLA and the LDA ensured that our 
brief and public statements on the project would apply to publicly funded 
projects only. However, in truth the prize was always the application of 
standards to all tenures across London. In the early days this seemed like 
a fragile, distant ambition rather than an inevitability.
Doing the homework
The project started with an intensive research period. We looked at 
historical precedents (Parker Morris, Housing as if People Mattered,25 the 
Smithsons’ writings on housing26) and at best practice across Europe and 
beyond. We pooled our collective knowledge about what makes good 
housing. Richard Rogers was a strong advocate for balconies and private 
outdoor spaces; others brought experience from practice and design 
reviews. There was also considerable observation and reflection, drawing 
on the team’s own experiences of living in London.
DfL was an atypical policy-making unit. It was a diverse group of 
individuals from different backgrounds. Many of us had trained as 
architects and brought with us experience of working in practice and 
delivery. Most of us had experience of living in other cities and countries, 
and very few fitted the stereotype of white-collar civil servants living in 
suburban homes in the commuter belt. We brought with us experiences 
of living in studios, in homes with no storage and with poor insulation and 
security, in single-aspect flats with no outdoor space. Such experiences 
were highly relevant but unusual given that decision-makers are often far 
removed from the realities of some issues. Personal experiences helped us 
to pitch action and policy with added persuasiveness.
We knew we needed support with the project as we were not in a 
position to devise standards or check for consequences. Unlike the Parker 
Morris committee with its 19 members, we had one officer, working with 
Mark Brearley, leading the project (Deborah Mathieson from 2006 to 
2009 and Richa Mukhia from 2009 to 2011). As with all DfL projects, 
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we started by pulling together the best team for the project. The tender 
for the draft LHDG was won by a team led by Urban Initiatives and 
supported by Proctor and Matthews Architects and Mae Architects.
The project team began by addressing the pressing need for consoli-
dation and consistency. The guidance was to be primarily a consolidation 
of existing standards, bringing together existing policies and guidelines 
already embraced by the mayor (Lifetime Homes, Code for Sustainable 
Homes, Building for Life and Secured by Design). A survey of existing 
regulation revealed inconsistencies. Standards varied depending on 
whether schemes were funded privately or publicly and this added to 
the complexity of delivering mixed-tenure schemes. Additionally, it was 
clear that some of the guidance developed at a national level did not relate 
well to the high-density London context.
This started a long period of consultation and dialogue. We went 
back to the commissioners and authors of existing guidance. We worked 
out where there was scope for flexibility (particularly in standards 
developed by single-interest groups) and negotiated clarity and 
compromise where the standards produced by different groups seemed 
contradictory or overlapped.
As well as rationalising the plethora of existing guidance, it was 
clear that to really improve quality, the guidance would have to plug the 
missing gap in terms of space standards. Alex Ely of Mae Architects later 
recalled another issue:
Developers were focused on promoting a certain type of residential 
block layout that was leading to other problems. The double- 
loaded corridor plan created a high proportion of single-aspect 
dwellings, many of which received no sunlight or alternatively 
suffered from overheating. Given that there was a growing trend 
towards apartments [80 per cent of dwellings produced were flats], 
we felt something should be done about access to outdoor space 
as well.27
Minimum space standards, private open space, ceiling heights, dual 
aspect and shared circulation were the key new additions that the 
research suggested would make the greatest difference. The spatial and 
ergonomic parameters that formed the basis of many of the new standards 
are universal. The amount of space required to live comfortably in a 
home does not vary from borough to borough, and therefore it was 
appropriate that the issue was addressed at a strategic level by City Hall. 
Alex Ely later commented:
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We did a huge amount of research into housing standards across 
the UK and internationally. The most widely used were the Housing 
Corporation’s Housing Quality Indicators, English Partnerships’ 
Quality Standards Delivering Quality Places and Habinteg’s Lifetime 
Homes Standards. To some extent our commission was about syn-
thesising these standards into one set of requirements. Nonetheless, 
I was interested in the whole history of standards from the Tudor 
Walters report of 1918, which promoted low-density solutions for 
housing that complemented the garden city movement of the time, 
through to the Parker Morris report of 1961, Homes for Today and 
Tomorrow, which, for the first time, linked space standards with 
occupancy. The report took a functional approach to determining 
space standards in the home by considering what furniture was 
needed in rooms, the space needed to use the furniture and move 
around it, and the space needed for normal household activities. 
We were then able to adapt this approach to arrive at a suitable set of 
standards for today.28
There was an extensive consultation process involving different interested 
parties, public-sector investment partners, key external stakeholders, 
registered social landlords, private house builders, expert consultants, and 
a core group of respected housing architects and other industry experts. 
There were meetings, working groups, workshops and building visits; 
there was formal and informal feedback, as well as a public consultation 
on the draft document.
St Andrews, Bow: live project research
St Andrews, an LDA-owned site in Bromley-by-Bow, East London, was an 
ideal opportunity to test some of the emerging ideas in a live project. The 
tender for the project to build housing on the nine-acre former hospital 
site was won by Barratt. Mark Brearley explained:
There was a good relationship between the LDA and Design for 
London and a sense that there was a great opportunity for live 
project research. We steered the LDA towards the process of upfront 
specification parameters and an offer was made to Barratt on that 
basis. We made an agreement to use the project to test some of the 
key requirements that were being considered.29
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As Peter Bishop commented:
This was the first LDA project that the team was able to influence 
at the procurement stage. Barratt came in with the best financial 
bid but a poor scheme. We worked behind the scenes at the LDA to 
persuade them to accept Barratt’s offer only if they changed their 
architects. This they duly did.30,31
Allies and Morrison were appointed as the new masterplanners. Hendrik 
Heyns of that practice later commented:
St Andrews changed the way residential units were built in London. 
The typology of units changed. Daylight requirements and the 
move towards dual-aspect dwellings meant the proportions of 
units changed. There was also a move away from the two-bed-unit 
dominant scheme to a more interesting mix of tenures and types. At 
St Andrews, 50 per cent of homes were affordable and 30 per cent 
family housing.32
Parker Boris?
In 2008, progress on the LHDG was stalled by the pre-election purdah. 
Ken Livingstone was standing for re-election against the Conservative 
candidate Boris Johnson. A Conservative win would have significant con-
sequences for the future of the LHDG but we knew nothing of Johnson’s 
view on housing quality. After Johnson’s win in May 2008, we seized 
every opportunity to promote the work of DfL and pitched as many 
projects and ideas as we could. The opportunities were more formal and 
orchestrated than they had been under Ken Livingstone. They were 
also heavily vetted by the mayor’s advisors, who would often require 
pre-presentation. Guessing that housing standards were not very high up 
on the mayor’s agenda, we knew it was crucial that we pitch an irresisti-
ble, compelling case to get the new mayor on board. Mark Brearley was 
adept at making arguments and had mastered an engaging, seemingly 
off-the-cuff style of delivery. He used this skill to make the case for a host 
of projects and ideas: public space, high streets, regeneration spending, 
streetscapes, opening up procurement and, of course, housing standards.
As Brearley said later:
We managed to get through to the mayor and he supported it. I gave 
a structured PowerPoint making the argument for the LHDG to the 
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mayor. We were surprised by his response, with words something 
like ‘I want this to happen, I think this is right’. After that, Boris 
publicly stated his belief that we shouldn’t be building what he 
referred to as ‘hobbit homes’, and success became possible. The 
fragile initiative was sustained because of support based on belief, 
from the mayor, at odds with the doom-mongering of the house 
builders. A huge amount of luck allowed this venture to succeed. 
We were well aware that our team’s existence was itself a lucky 
occurrence, resulting from the earlier one-off coincidence of 
Richard Rogers’ support and input, and Ken Livingstone’s way 
of handling politics and interests. But that unique alignment 
during Ken’s years never fully empowered us; in fact we were kept 
at arm’s length. We were surprised by Johnson’s enthusiasm for the 
introduction of new housing standards.33
Like most new mayors, Johnson was looking for quick wins when he 
came to power; the LHDG was well progressed, but not yet public, so 
‘up for grabs’ in many ways. However, it did (and still does) seem 
unlikely that a Conservative mayor would champion a project that 
seemed so against the thrust of traditional Conservative neoliberal 
ideology. Housing standards clearly was an area that Johnson was 
interested in. Peter Bishop believed that it chimed with a nineteenth-
century Conservative ideology:
When briefing Johnson on anything, you had to find a turn of 
phrase or an obscure historic reference if you were to have even 
a remote chance of engaging his interest. In this case it was 
referencing the [Conservative] Disraeli government’s reforms in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century. He loved the turn of phrase 
of ‘the Artisans’ Dwellings Act’ and kept repeating it. Referencing 
the LHDG back to nineteenth-century ideals of ‘Tory democracy’ 
got him genuinely excited. Even so, it was a complete surprise when 
he wanted the LHDG to be incorporated as the standard in the 
London Plan.34
A conversation with Kieran Long revealed a similar speculation:
There are lots of ways to be conservative. There is a way to be 
conservative which is about deregulating markets; there is also 
a way to be conservative which is about preserving things – 
conserving a certain quality of life or understanding London as 
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having a certain character that housing contributed to. It became 
a conversation about architecture which transcended the clichéd 
ideological camps. It didn’t work under a radical mayor but it 
worked under a conservative mayor.35
Although ‘Boris got the bit between his teeth’36 on the housing quality 
issue, we soon learnt that he relied heavily on his advisors to deal with the 
content. Sir Simon Milton had a detailed knowledge of planning policy 
and was comfortable in signing off the detail. Without a sympathetic 
mayoral advisor, we would probably not have been able to withstand 
the fervent campaign from the house builders. The happenchance of a 
supportive mayoral team just when the LHDG was emerging meant that, 
for the first time, London-wide cross-tenure design guidance for all new 
homes was a real possibility.
Draft LHDG and consultation
Officially, the guidance was still focused just on publicly funded projects, 
but the introduction indicated that there was an ambition to level the 
playing field between public and private housing delivery and therefore 
the guide would be considered as part of the London Plan review. In July 
2008, the draft LHDG was published for consultation (Figure 4.3). We 
knew there would be protest from the house builders and others in the 
industry, but we were bold with the content and ready to test the waters 
on some of the more contentious issues, rather than reining back for 
fear of causing controversy. Again, being at arm’s length from the GLA 
and having a ‘licence to generate ideas and upset people’ enabled us 
to be more radical than conventional policy-makers. As Rowan Moore 
commented, ‘You wouldn’t have had the same outcome without Design 
for London being involved. The GLA is run by civil servants – they are 
administrative, not proactive. The mayor has to have a vision, but the 
civil service is, by nature, cautious.’37
The formal consultation on the draft ended in September 2008. 
A team at the LDA trawled through the feedback and produced a 
comprehensive review of comments. A new team began work on refining 
the document in response. The consultant team was led by Emily Greeves 
and supported by Kieran Long and by Julia Park from Levitt Bernstein 
and Alex Ely from Mae Architects. As project manager and editor, I was 
supported by Fenna Wagenaar. A new phase of collaboration with the 
GLA and the London board of the Homes and Communities Agency 
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(HCA London) then began. There was now momentum for the final set of 
standards to be included in the mayor’s Housing Supplementary Planning 
Guidance (SPG), as well as forming the basis of the HCA London design 
standards (for publicly funded projects). Effectively this would mean that 
the standards might eventually apply to private development and publicly 
funded projects.
Complexities and compromises
Although we were closer to the goal of cross-tenure application, there 
were still many obstacles to overcome. There was the complexity of 
dealing with so many stakeholders with varying political agendas. There 
was also the bureaucracy involved in trying to make anything happen in 
local government: briefings, sign-off procedures, board approvals and 
so on. These were cumbersome but necessary procedural hurdles, and 
Figure 4.3 Cover, London Housing Design Guide, consultation draft, 
2008. Source: GLA.
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the project required us to keep track of approval processes for all three 
agencies. Cross-agency working was challenging, but there was an 
underlying collaborative attitude among many of the players involved, 
born from a realisation that the downward trend in housing quality had 
to be stemmed. The officers involved seemed willing to push aside the 
usual party lines; architects and specialists attended meetings pro bono 
in return for a seat at the table, realising that this was something that 
needed to happen.
HCA London needed the standards to be precise and prescriptive 
because their funding process was about demonstrating strict adherence 
to requirements. However, the GLA was concerned with planning and 
housing outputs so was keen to ensure that there was flexibility and room 
for negotiation. Key allies such as John Lett (Strategic Planning Manager 
at the GLA) facilitated negotiations with City Hall. The solution was to 
have a two-tier system of standards where Priority 1 standards were the 
baseline and Priority 2 the best practice. This meant that standards were 
flexible enough to be included in planning policy,38 while the entire suite 
of standards could potentially be prescribed for publicly funded projects. 
It was a compromise, but crucially enabled a cross-tenure set of standards.
The consultation and subsequent lobbying efforts also had a 
significant impact. Some of the most fiercely debated issues concerned 
studio flats, ceiling heights, dual-aspect dwellings, minimum space 
standards and private outdoor space. There were many compromises (for 
example, the ceiling height standard was lowered from 2.6 m to 2.5 m, 
the dual-aspect standard was watered down, and studio flats were 
permitted in certain scenarios), but the core principles of private outdoor 
space and minimum space standards were protected.
Cost and delivery
To address concerns about the impact of the standards, a Cost and 
Delivery Impact Assessment study was commissioned jointly by the LDA, 
GLA and HCA London. GVA Grimley and Sheppard Robson produced a 
report that concluded:
Overall, it is not believed that introduction of the Guide will lead 
to the delivery of fewer dwellings on any given site other than in 
those locations where constraints are so strong that it is likely to be 
difficult to accommodate as many dwellings as might previously 
have been the case in the absence of the Guide.39
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The report did speculate that an increase in build costs might occur (of 
1–5 per cent by 2013 for developments where sale values did not drop 
below the London average). There were also warnings about the viability 
of some schemes, but the counterargument was that clear rules become 
priced into land values rather than build costs, so the costs would fall on 
the landowner, not the developer.
We believed that any cost implication would be outweighed by the 
certainty and simplicity that a single set of design standards for all new 
housing would bring. There was nothing too bold in the LHDG: indeed, 
the standards were mostly a reminder of what had previously been 
required, and any extra demands were cautious and well chosen. Some 
of the new standards, such as those for private outdoor space, would add 
a cost, but they would also add value and might enable properties to be 
sold more rapidly.40
Fundamentally, we did not think we were asking for very much. 
For example, we wanted a bedroom to have enough space for items 
such as a bed, wardrobe and chest of drawers, and to have sufficient 
circulation space and the most basic provision for wheelchair access. 
These are reasonable, basic ergonomic requirements that are as relevant 
in Hackney as they are in Kensington. They are not place-specific but 
concern ordinary furniture and equipment and the everyday things 
people need to do to live in a dwelling.
Crafting the document
We realised that the clarity of the content, the quality of the writing and 
the graphic design were all crucial to the success of the document. We 
were lucky to have a like-minded core group of contributors at this stage. 
Emily Greeves led the writing, with Julia Park and Kieran Long reworking 
sections, while I incorporated the various markups into the final version. 
The process involved countless edits, with every word, sentence and 
implication pored over. We were determined that the content should be 
straightforward and concise.
Again, our engagement with the industry meant we were able to 
find the right people for tasks. Engaging Kieran Long, a journalist, was 
key to making the content more accessible, and he also helped us craft a 
confident voice:
I was switching lots of language around – asking, ‘Can we say this in 
a clear way using active verbs, using subject–verb–object grammar?’ 
DESIGN FOR LONDON130
Bringing something of a journalistic sensibility to it, I hoped, 
ensured you are immediately in the topic. One of the reasons it was 
easy to do that was that the guide was built on very high-quality 
research, a thoughtful sensibility, and officers felt confident with 
the material. When I asked, ‘Can we put this in an active verb? Can 
we be less vague about this – can we be more specific?’, you [Richa] 
would say, ‘Yes, of course we can, because we know that this works. 
We are totally committed to this conclusion.’ Our intention was, 
therefore, not to hide behind a passive voice but to make conclusions 
and draw these conclusions out. It would be lovely to imagine this 
is one of the reasons why it feels as if it has a relevance today, 
because it ended up very serious but very readable.41
Julia Park, Head of Housing Research at Levitt Bernstein, noted: ‘The 
final narrative and phrasing really struck a chord with people – for 
example, “Home as place of retreat”, “From street to front door”.’42
We made a conscious decision at an early stage not to get bogged 
down in trying to illustrate the document. However, as with all DfL 
documents, the graphic quality was very important. The interim 
LHDG (Figure 4.4) marked a departure from Richard Rogers’ preferred 
Figure 4.4 Cover, London Housing Design Guide, interim edition, 2010: 
clear, austere and easy to navigate. Source: GLA.
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neon as used in most of the previous publications. We were well aware 
of the risk that the standards might not make it to the final policy stage, 
so we were keen that the document be taken seriously immediately 
on publication.
The graphic designers Atwork were given a brief to design the 
document to be as austere, sombre and clear as possible. Many users 
appreciated the ‘Swissness’ and ‘austerity chic’ of the final grey document. 
As Kieran Long noted later:
Design for London were skilled at making documents that cut 
through, felt of their time but felt aspirational. If designers are 
not in the room, these documents take a completely different 
form and would be received and used differently as a result. You 
simply can’t imagine the LDA coming up with it. It wouldn’t have 
happened.43
The PR bluff
At the time of publication in August 2010, the interim LHDG had no 
material weight outside LDA developments and projects on mayoral 
land. In truth there was very little development that it applied to. Our 
months of compromise and close working with the GLA and HCA meant 
that we were hopeful (but not certain) that the standards would find a 
larger audience. The spectre of the Examination in Public on the draft 
Replacement London Plan (dRLP) loomed large as the forum in which 
the wider applicability of the standards would be decided.
We realised that a successful launch was important if the industry 
was to accept the LHDG as the future for housing in London. As with most 
DfL projects, we had very little budget and no press team to support us. 
We fought hard to get 1,000 copies printed and there was no scope for a 
big launch. Instead we listed everyone we wanted to influence – planners, 
policy-makers, those in the GLA ‘family’, house builders, developers, 
contributors and architects – and posted copies to all of them on the same 
day (personally stuffing copies in envelopes). Even though it was not 
policy, it helped that a copy of the document landed on the desks of key 
decision-makers, that it had ‘Mayor of London’ on the cover and that it 
contained very accessible and engaging content. The immediate uptake 
by the industry implies that the strategy worked. According to Hendrik 
Heyns, ‘People have a copy on their desk and use it all the time. People 
take it as the bible.’44
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Judgement Day: Examination in Public
The space standards were in the dRLP so were part of the Examination 
in Public process. On the day of the examination, the house builders’ 
lobby was not as fierce as anticipated. Some of the concessions seemed to 
have pacified them, and the Home Builders Federation even conceded 
that the standards might bring greater clarity to the planning process. 
Subsequently the dRLP was adopted and a Housing SPG published 
containing the full suite of standards.
According to Julia Park:
Opposition to the GLA standards (including the space standard) 
soon weakened and the vast majority of designers and developers 
quickly conceded that having a single set of rules was better than 
having different requirements in every borough. Because dwelling 
‘footprints’ were interchangeable in terms of tenure, it also meant 
that designs could remain fluid for longer.45
We were braced for a negative reaction from the press but surprisingly this 
did not materialise. Much of the reporting was in fact jubilant and con-
gratulatory. Headlines included: ‘Boris is Brave to Think Bigger’,46 ‘Room 
to Change the Way We Live’47 and ‘Standards Can See Off the Sharks’.48
London vernacular
The LHDG was deliberately agnostic on design aesthetics. The external 
characteristics of this new ‘vernacular’ are widely acknowledged to be 
brick cladding, deep reveals and recessed balconies, described by critics 
as ‘Weetabix architecture’. Some detractors feel that the emergence of 
this typology has stifled creativity and narrowed the spectrum for 
designers. During the drafting process, there was a conscious effort to 
avoid entering into discussions about aesthetics and style. A conversation 
between Peter Bishop and Boris Johnson did touch on the question of 
appearance and vernacular:
At one meeting the mayor suddenly became surprisingly excited 
about architecture, in particular ornamentation. He declared that 
all great architecture had used ornamentation and he wanted a 
new vernacular for London that reflected this [self-evident truth]. 
Apart from being wrong, this was not the purpose of the LHDG. 
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In the ensuing conversation, I referenced the simplicity of the 
Georgian terraces of Islington [where he lived] as examples of a 
vernacular that grew out of the available materials, technology, 
and cultural and social values of the time. I also reminded him of 
the Artisans’ Dwellings Act and the lasting importance of standards 
over style. The idea of a London vernacular was never mentioned 
again.49
Following this debate, we included in the interim LHDG a brief narrative 
about ‘a new London vernacular’, promoting the view that the ‘best 
housing comes from robust guidelines in planning and regulation’ and 
that ‘London’s housing should not be striving for “iconic” architecture, 
but should focus on great background architecture made of durable 
materials that weather well.’50 As it happened, the publication of the 
guidance coincided with the revival of brickwork – coincidence rather 
than design. It is true that some of the standards had an impact on forms 
and massing. For instance, dual-aspect guidance affected configuration, 
and guidance on private outdoor space affected the proportions and 
arrangements of windows, apertures and so on. There was no intention 
to instigate a new stylistic trend; rather, there was an acknowledgement 
that, historically, where there have been clear ideas and thinking about 
how cities should develop, this has often seeded a vernacular. For 
example, various Housing Acts gave rise to Victorian housing in the UK, 
and zoning laws shaped the development of New York City. Mark Brearley 
recently commented:
I think of a vernacular as something positive. A vernacular is 
understood, it’s copied, not appraised afresh with each project. It’s 
a way of doing something because it is obvious that it’s the best 
way. A strong vernacular reflects a period of maturity, of running 
in a line, whereas we are currently going through a shift, a time of 
immaturity, of type invention, and such periods are usually filled 
with mistakes and uncertainties, until they find the way ahead that 
best fits with needs.
London is clearly in a shift moment, figuring out challenges afresh, 
so it makes the emergence of a vernacular difficult. We would like 
there to be a London vernacular, but we aren’t there yet. If people 
just carry on for another few decades, building in a confident way 
to house the city, if they do mix in the right way, configured use in 
the right way, then we could talk with pride of a vernacular. Worries 
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get raised about sameness, but even if all was built in exactly the 
same brick with exactly the same windows, it wouldn’t trouble me, 
particularly as you don’t have to live very long to realise that ways 
of building don’t last forever. There is no need to worry about the 
world all becoming the same, it just doesn’t happen like that.
Those wonderful chunks of eighteenth-century city, for example, 
that have worked so well through all kinds of evolutions and 
changes, that today we understand as finite and precious, admiring 
their long-forgotten confident vernacular – those were not seen in 
the same way in the nineteenth century. They saw what had been 
inherited as loathsome, plain and substandard, hating the Georgian 
city, just as in the sixties and seventies people loathed the Victorian 
city, because they were too close to it. My headline on this matter is: 
‘If you can get to a vernacular then you’re laughing!’ – laughing 
because a vernacular indicates a confident and easily growing city.51
Influence of the LHDG
The London mayor’s London Housing Design Guide has arguably been 
the single most influential piece of design for housing in the capital so  
far this century.
– Finn Williams52
The reach and influence of the LHDG surpassed all expectations. From 
Scotland to Brighton, the interim LHDG has had a direct and far-reaching 
effect on local and regional policy. Many boroughs across the country 
adopted the standards immediately (for example, Ashford Borough 
Council adopted the standards in October 2011). In particular, the space 
standards have been incorporated into the Nationally Described Space 
Standard (NDSS) published in 2015. This too was a keenly fought battle 
and an unlikely outcome for a government-led Housing Standards 
Review which initially focused on reducing regulation. Julia Park later 
commented:
The government’s review of housing standards was all about 
reining in over-zealous planning authorities – those who set high 
standards in local policy and guidance. It began in 2010, just two 
years after the global financial crisis that had seen house building 
stall across the UK, and the new Conservative/Lib Dem coalition 
government was desperate to ‘get Britain building again’. The 
BEttEr housing for London: hoW did WE PuLL that off? 135
mantra from ministers was deregulation, removing the barriers 
that developers claimed were holding them back.
London hadn’t experienced quite the same setback in terms of falling 
supply, sales and demand as the rest of the country, and having 
published the ambitious and comprehensive LHDG just the year 
before, the GLA was in no mood to give it up, or even compromise. 
Boris Johnson had been Mayor of London since 2008, and nervous 
about rocking that particular boat, the DCLG [the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, later renamed as the Ministry 
of Housing, Communities and Local Government] was minded to 
leave London out altogether. But you can’t simply delete the capital 
city from a nationwide review, and many of us knew that London’s 
involvement would be vital if we were to prevent the ‘race to the 
bottom’ which seemed to be the implication of the exercise.
So the GLA was invited to join the industry-wide working groups 
tasked with ‘streamlining local standards’, albeit a little late. The 
review took five years in total and there is absolutely no doubt that 
the quality, clarity and almost universal popularity of the LHDG, 
coupled with the GLA’s steadfast refusal to give way, prevented 
the national review from becoming a national disaster, in terms of 
housing quality.53
Critics and supporters alike agree that the LHDG has been hugely 
influential. Some of its achievements concern championing an ideological 
shift in how we as a society think about housing. In terms of the cross- 
tenure debate, government standards have historically only applied to 
publicly funded housing. Andrew Drury of HATC recently commented:
There was a deep-rooted cultural feeling until the mid-2000s that 
there should be space standards for publicly funded housing 
but not for private housing. The reasons given were that publicly 
funded housing is more intensely lived in; that private housing is 
more loosely lived in, with a lower household density. But this is 
not the case over the life of the dwelling. Often, over the decades, 
existing housing stock is converted to offices, houses in multiple 
occupation, shops and vice versa. We don’t know now what the 
use of the dwelling is going to be in 50, 70, 90 years’ time. People 
exercising their ‘right to buy’ and then selling on means that publicly 
funded housing becomes market housing. Housing associations 
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and others buying up street properties and refurbishing them turns 
privately owned housing into ‘public’ housing. Tenure and use ebbs 
and flows over the decades.
How can we use rules for something as fundamental to the dwelling 
as space, but tailored only to one household type, when all we know 
with any certainty is that over the life of the building it will have 
more than one household type in it? We made that case strongly 
in our 2006 report, and the GLA accepted it. The LHDG space 
requirements applied to all housing and it was the first time this 
position was adopted by an organisation that affected national 
thinking and behaviour. Well done, the GLA.54
In addition, the guidance took a clear position that the ‘design of buildings 
should be “tenure blind” whereby homes for affordable rent, intermediate 
forms of tenure and private sale are indistinguishable from one another’.55 
As Mark Brearley commented, ‘It is what we hoped for, but we weren’t 
expecting it. Why was cross-tenure application important? Because it is 
fairer. If something is desirable, it is desirable to all.’56
Other achievements are more tangible. According to Hendrik 
Heyns, ‘The LHDG has changed the way the industry approaches housing 
in London. Beyond the dwelling and housing block, it fundamentally 
changes the way streets work.’57 There is also now a requirement for new 
dwellings to have private outdoor space. For Rowan Moore:
It’s a good thing to have more balcony space, but I like the fact that 
you can walk down the street with a new housing development on 
it and it has balconies facing the street whereas before it wouldn’t 
– it probably would have had Juliet balconies if anything. Even if 
there is nobody on the balcony, it creates a sense of connection 
between the interior and exterior, between the public and private 
sphere, which is a modestly good thing to have in a city.58
Of course, with the positives come the negatives. Minimums fast become 
maximums and there is always the risk that rules will be applied doggedly 
even when not appropriate. We are aware that the document was not 
all-encompassing and there is plenty of room for improvement. There 
have been lots of compromises during its development and since then. 
Although the space standards have endured, many other key requirements 
have been watered down or lost over time. For example, the original 
standard for ceiling heights to be 2.5 m has been superseded by the NDSS 
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requirement for 2.3 m, and the requirement to include furnished layouts 
is under threat as the GLA may be forced by the DCLG to remove this 
standard. At the time of writing (2019), the current Housing SPG is 
weaker on quality than the 2012 Housing SPG, with most of the ‘best 
practice’ standards having been removed.
Conclusion
Some important lessons were learnt during the process of developing 
the LHDG:
– You need champions. Not every project has a political champion 
from the outset. The DfL team worked hard to build a compelling 
case and craft an irresistible argument to deliver to the mayor and 
his advisors. We played the long game, building support and 
momentum for the project among politicians and officers.
– Ask for less, end up with more. It is often best to get something 
half-decent on the table and then build up from there. This might 
go against the accepted rules of bargaining in business, but pushing 
through change in the risk-averse public sector requires a different 
approach. You can gain trust with a modest but compelling pitch 
and build on this once people are on board.
– Do the homework and you win. This is a spin on Mark Brearley’s 
adage ‘Do the drawings and you win’. With policy work, it was 
about having robust and credible research that we could defend in 
the face of fierce opposition.
– Create shortcuts to the politicians. The more hierarchical structure 
under Boris Johnson’s administration meant that we lost some 
of our ‘shortcuts’ to the mayor, which directly impacted on some 
projects. It is important that the people doing the thinking are able 
to communicate with the politicians.
– It helps to be transparent. Much policy-making is shrouded in 
secrecy. We sustained an open dialogue with the industry and 
stakeholders. It meant that the emerging policy was fully informed 
by their feedback, so that there were no big surprises when it was 
finally published.
– If you are developing policy about design, then you need designers in 
the room. Clearly, it makes a huge difference to the output of policy 
development if the designers who will use the policy are involved 
from the outset.
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History teaches us that these types of endeavour take a long time and 
considerable effort to develop and put in place, and that they are always 
under threat and can easily be eroded by changes in leadership and 
ideology. As Julia Park commented:
Previous major standards (including those produced after the 
First and Second World Wars, and the Parker Morris standards) 
were all lost due to new political ideology. … Housing standards, 
particularly space standards, will remain vulnerable. We’ll always 
need advocates to defend them.59
Others, such as Rowan Moore, are more hopeful: ‘It’s always easy for 
politicians to kill off policy. However, the headline “I want to lower 
housing standards” is not a good one.’60
Kieran Long shared some interesting views on this topic:
Maybe space standards are only political if, as a society, you haven’t 
thought it through. … Of course, a group of housing developers 
could come and say this is limiting our freedom of choice, our action 
and our output. I would hope that it is possible to get to a point where 
some of these topics are no longer political, to get to a point where 
they are accepted as the tool we have to preserve quality in the most 
important building type we have in our city, which is housing.
Any statement of quality is always vulnerable. Anything that stands 
for quality is always vulnerable to the banal critique that ‘this 
is constraining my capitalist rights’. Housing cannot only be left 
to capitalism. This doesn’t mean you have to have a command 
economy or even social housing, but it does mean we need some set 
of values around which we can agree. Housing is the primary tool 
we can use to build the city. If it’s just left to the market, it will not 
provide decent homes for the widest range of people to live in.61
I hope the optimists are right – that there is now acceptance of the idea 
that something as important as housing should benefit from having 
some modest standards and that these standards can improve quality. 
Implementation has proved that the policy has not reduced housing 
output, which means that the prevailing argument pre-LHDG is no longer 
as compelling. Recent changes to permitted development rights (PDRs) 
that allow office-to-residential conversions provide all the proof we need 
that without London’s housing standards, new homes could be much 
smaller than they were before the LHDG was introduced. Where the SPG 
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cannot be applied because of PDRs, we are now seeing new flats of 13 m2 
and others without windows.
The legacy is visible throughout London. It is easy to spot a 
post-LHDG building. On a personal level, I feel proud to observe a new 
development being built with balconies and usable private outdoor 
spaces. Once residents have moved in, with plant pots and outdoor 
furniture, I can be confident that similar positive outcomes exist internally 
as well. It is good to know that we had a hand in achieving that.
The project proves that thoughtful policy work can shape a city for 
the better. The LHDG has delivered a better standard of housing for the 
average Londoner. Let us hope the politicians can see the value of this 
work, protect the hard-won victories from the wolves at the door and 
build on the legacy for future generations.
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Chapter 1 identifies the importance of the Urban Task Force report1 in 
setting in place a framework for urban practice – one that was heavily 
influenced by European models of thinking, in particular by Barcelona. 
One of the fundamental rationales for the city is human interaction and 
this is greatly reduced in a city based on the automobile. Public spaces, 
parks, streets and squares are the mainstay of civic life. They are places 
for exchange, encounter and protest. In a good city they are also places to 
linger, relax and gossip. In many ways one can judge a city by its streets 
and public spaces.
In the foreword for the Global Public Space Toolkit for UN-Habitat,2 
Joan Clos writes: ‘Public spaces contribute to defining the cultural, 
social, economic and political functions of cities. They continue to be 
the first element to mark the status of a place from a chaotic and 
unplanned settlement to a well-established town or city.’3 It is valuable to 
understand and evaluate public spaces through the lens of their social, 
civic and environmental importance.
The Urban Task Force report was based on a set of values that 
included environmental responsibility and social wellbeing. Long 
before the present focus on climate change, it identified ‘the ecological 
imperative’ as one of the key drivers for changes to urban thinking. Public 
space was seen as not only a ‘good thing’ but also an essential ingredient 
of urban strategy if the city was to be both environmentally responsible 
and resilient. In a century where global temperatures are set to rise by at 
least two degrees and where extreme climate events will become more 
frequent, the importance of public space is heightened. In denser and 
more compact cities, open spaces provide vital places for relaxation 
and recreation for the urban population. The relationship between the 
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city and nature needed to be redefined in new city policies. The report 
identified urban spaces as a key element of civic life and community 
cohesion. It described the importance of public space: ‘Safe, well 
managed and uncluttered public spaces provide the vital “glue” between 
buildings and play a crucial role in strengthening communities.’4 It 
recommended that local authorities establish public realm strategies 
to set out a clear hierarchy of open space provision, management and 
maintenance. This was turned into practice in some of the early 
programmes of the Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) and then 
Design for London (DfL).
This chapter briefly explores the theories of public space and 
landscape urbanism and examines some of the ways in which these 
were applied in London. In particular, it looks at how the ideas from 
best practice were brought in and applied in London through the team’s 
public realm and regional landscape projects.
The importance of public space
The Task Force’s ideas were not new. There had been extensive interest 
in the public realm and urban landscape from various practitioners 
going back to the 1970s at least. In the European context, much older 
traditions – the square, the piazza, the common and the municipal park 
– had been staples of urban design before the advent of mass car 
ownership. Although mass car ownership had only really been a factor in 
European cities in the immediate postwar period, the car had distorted 
urban strategies, dominated the agenda and led to the virtual destruction 
of large swathes of the fabric of many cities. In London, attempts to 
build inner-city ‘motorway boxes’ had caused such visible destruction 
to historic areas that it had led to widespread protest and had been 
abandoned by the end of the 1970s.5
Jane Jacobs’ work in New York focused on the then radical idea that 
the centres of cities should be designed around the needs of people, with 
streets that were walkable and safe and had a mix of uses. Jacobs had 
organised local opposition to protect neighbourhoods from comprehen-
sive ‘slum’ clearance programmes, in particular attempts by Robert Moses 
to drive major roads through inner-city neighbourhoods. She was instru-
mental in the eventual cancellation of the Lower Manhattan Expressway, 
which would have passed directly through SoHo and Little Italy.
Jan Gehl’s work in Copenhagen is another example of a reaction 
against the car, but this time driven by someone in the city administration 
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rather than by activists. His studies of public space in 1968 underlined 
their popularity and value. A programme of pedestrianisation had 
already commenced in 1962 with the main shopping street, Strøget. Gehl 
defined the functions of public space in cities as: Necessary – to move, 
Optional – to stop, and Great – to enjoy.6 The number of car-free streets 
in the city centre increased sixfold from 1962 to 2000.7 Importantly, the 
programme, its impacts and public reactions were monitored over 
the years by the School of Architecture at the Royal Danish Academy of 
Fine Arts. This provided an objective research basis to support the 
continuation of the initiative.8 Parking was reduced by 2–3 per cent per 
year as city streets and spaces were progressively turned over 
to cyclists and pedestrians.9 Gehl later applied his methodology in 
Australia to Melbourne city centre, which in the middle of the 1980s was 
in decline. New housing was built, and streets were pedestrianised. 
Between 1994 and 2004 there was a 39 per cent increase in pedestrian 
activity in the city centre and the night-time economy doubled.10
The importance of good public space is now accepted by most 
urban practitioners. Public space comprises those areas of the city that 
are commonly owned, publicly managed and accessible to all. It provides 
places where citizens meet, exchange goods and ideas, debate, linger, 
play and celebrate. It is the place for protest and in the last resort a place 
of refuge for the homeless. It is where the civic life of a democratic society 
takes place. Public space also includes streets which are the arteries of 
movement in the city. This conflict has ushered in a debate about the 
relative importance of vehicular traffic against pedestrian movement. 
Highways offer the greatest latent resource for new public spaces in 
the city.
Increasingly, however, the simple division between public space 
and private space is being blurred by intermediate spaces or ‘privileged’ 
space11 where the public has access under particular terms including 
payment. Under this definition cinemas, shopping malls, theme parks, 
hotel lobbies, bookshops and cafes have become important intermediate 
spaces that also harbour civic life. Oldenburg talks about ‘third places’ 
that can ‘host the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated 
gatherings of individuals beyond the realms of home and work’.12 
These places are neutral ground and have no formal membership 
requirements. They are in essence convivial and comfortable spaces. In 
contrast, ‘corporate’ spaces, where public access is allowed under certain 
conditions (including dress code and social background), offer another 
aspect of urban life. They include the plazas and street networks of office 
complexes, gated housing and shopping precincts that are becoming a 
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ubiquitous part of city life. Restrictions on the use of such spaces are 
essentially undemocratic. That said, the threat to public space in the city 
is not restricted to private developments. The monetarisation of public 
space by city authorities and the growing restrictions posed by security, 
policing and bylaws also present growing threats. In this respect, the 
planning system has an important responsibility in maintaining open 
access in our cities.
Public space in London
The ideas of car restraint have been embedded in London’s planning 
since the 1960s, when parking enforcement was first established across 
the city and planning policy started to restrict parking in new commercial 
developments. More recently Transport for London (TfL) made the 
transition from a highway to a transport authority, with highway space 
being reallocated to buses and pedestrians. Congestion charging was 
introduced in central London in 2002, resulting in a 15 per cent reduction 
in traffic. These measures, which were a direct result of mayoral policy, 
created the opportunity for programmes to improve public spaces.
The other problem facing London was serious underinvestment 
in the public realm. Following the abolition of the Greater London 
Council (GLC), there had been no city government between 1986 and 
2000. Moreover, their opposition to the Thatcher government, where 
they had borrowed money to maintain their spending programmes, had 
left many central London boroughs so severely strapped for cash that 
basic services, including street maintenance and cleaning, had come 
close to collapse. While the boroughs were beginning to recover by 2000, 
there was still a significant backlog of maintenance work on London’s 
streets and no money for new investment in public space. In any event, 
the capacity for new design initiatives for the public realm had been lost 
with the staff whose jobs had disappeared.
By 2000, when the Greater London Authority (GLA) was 
established, it was clear that London was well behind other European 
cities such as Copenhagen, Paris, Lyon and Berlin in terms of the quality 
of its streets and public spaces. The World Squares for All programme 
was an early initiative to redress this imbalance. It aimed to transform 
Leicester Square, Trafalgar Square and Parliament Square into attractive 
city spaces.13 Norman Foster’s scheme remodelled Trafalgar Square and 
closed the road in front of the National Gallery. It was opened in 2003 to 
much public acclaim and set the scene for further projects.14
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100 Public Spaces: brokering and financing a public 
realm programme
One of the earliest programmes launched by the A+UU was the Mayor’s 
100 Public Spaces programme. This was inspired by Jean Clos’s public 
space programme in Barcelona, which had received international 
acclaim. The 100 Public Spaces programme sought to identify opportuni-
ties to create new public space, especially in poorer areas where it was 
lacking. There was no funding for the programme, nor were there ever 
100 public spaces – the name was simply a brand designed to engender 
public interest and political support.
New public spaces, particularly where road closures are required 
and inter-agency partnerships brokered, take time and are not well suited 
to a marketing approach that seeks to capture the public imagination 
without fully explaining the complexities of the processes involved. 
This was an early lesson for DfL and it adapted its approach to other 
programmes accordingly. One of the successes of the programme was 
that it built relationships with other agencies, in particular TfL. The new 
commissioner of TfL, Bob Kiley, was a personal friend of Richard Rogers, 
the mayor’s architecture advisor, and this contact had given the A+UU 
unprecedented access to TfL project staff. This access began to influence 
the procurement and management of design teams, leading to a culture 
change in some parts of TfL.
When the A+UU set up the 100 Public Spaces initiative, it had no 
funding of its own and had to rely on others to come forward with projects 
and money. The aims of the programme were:
– the improvement of pedestrian mobility (providing the space to 
move around)
– the promotion of good design
– the creation of social value
– the cultural activation of spaces.
The A+UU could offer support and an ability to work with other 
organisations to broker partnerships and access money. The programme 
was launched with a call for project ideas from TfL and the boroughs. The 
bids had to identify funding sources and include a commitment to 
the long-term management of the new space. Despite the shortage of 
public money, there were still some funding pots that could be accessed. 
Regeneration programmes such as the Single Regeneration Budget 
(1994–2003) had made small amounts of money available to local 
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authorities; the London Development Agency (LDA) had capital funds that 
could be directed to local initiatives, including public space projects; 
and TfL had significant resources. TfL was a particularly useful starting 
point for resources as many of the early schemes were on the public 
highway. With TfL’s move away from highway construction, money 
was available if one knew where to look. ‘Road safety’ budgets were 
particularly flexible, as were the annual transport grants to the boroughs. 
At the borough level, there was often scope to use maintenance budgets 
to part-fund new works, and Section 106 monies15 could be used to top 
up project budgets.
Some of the boroughs had already started to manipulate budgets 
creatively to fund new public-realm works. Camden had instigated a 
‘Boulevard Project’ – a rolling programme to renew all pavements in the 
borough to a very high-standard specification that allowed mechanical 
washing and cleaning.16 Peter Bishop at Camden, with University College 
London and Terry Farrell, developed this into an integrated plan for 
Bloomsbury. The theory behind the project was that over a 50-year 
period there would be numerous incremental and random decisions on 
street design, parking, bus stops, street trees and paving. These, by their 
very nature, were piecemeal and would therefore fail to optimise either 
movement or streetscape quality. Camden recognised that over a 25-year 
period it would renew most of the streetscape in the Bloomsbury area. If 
this was to be directed by a rational plan and with a standard specification, 
then a high-quality public realm could be pieced together using day-to-day 
budgets (effectively for nothing). In later projects in Camden, the Bedford 
and Shaftesbury estates contributed capital funding to top up highway 
maintenance programmes in order to achieve a comprehensive and high-
quality streetscape.
In Kensington and Chelsea, Councillor Daniel Moylan had experi-
mented with the concept of shared space that he had seen in other 
countries. He championed the renewal of Kensington High Street with 
high-quality paving and simple street furniture. In defiance of the advice 
of his professional staff, guard railings around pedestrian crossings were 
removed and bicycle racks were placed on the central reservation. The 
effect over two years was a 44 per cent reduction in accidents compared 
to a London average of 17 per cent.
The 100 Public Spaces programme commenced with 10 schemes:
 1. Lewisham town centre (Lewisham)
 2. Windrush Square, Brixton (Lambeth)
 3. Gillett Square (Hackney)
DESIGN FOR LONDON148
 4. Coulsdon High Street (Croydon)
 5. Euston underpass (Camden)
 6. Rainham village centre (Havering)
 7. Embankment Gardens (Westminster)
 8. Sloane Square (Kensington & Chelsea)
 9. Lower Marsh (Lambeth)
10. Exhibition Road (Kensington & Chelsea).
Those boroughs that responded did so for the kudos of involvement in a 
programme that was championed by the new mayor and his advisor Richard 
Rogers, and on the understanding that help and money might be leveraged 
in from other organisations. The borough would take the responsibility for 
project delivery using architects appointed with help from the A+UU.
The establishment of DfL added weight and impetus to the scheme. 
When the third round of the programme was launched, 34 new spaces 
(Figure 5.1) had been identified. New projects were added to the 
programme, including the following:
11. Southall (Ealing)
12. Harrow on the Hill (Harrow)
13. Tottenham Hale (Haringey)
14. A4 Green Corridor (Kensington & Chelsea)
15. Barking town centre (Barking & Dagenham)
16. Grahame Park, Colindale (Barnet)
17. Aldgate roundabout (Tower Hamlets)
18. Gallions (Newham)
19. Mitcham Fair Green (Merton)
20. Little Wormwood Scrubs (Hammersmith)
21. Dagenham Heathway to the Thames (Barking)
22. Acton Town Square (Ealing)
23. Canning Town (Newham)
24. Ealing Broadway (Ealing)
25. Wembley Stadium Spaces (Brent)
26. Bow Church (Tower Hamlets)
27. Gants Hill (Redbridge)
28. North Street, Romford (Havering)
29. Pontoon Dock (Newham)
30. Highbury Corner (Islington)
31. Potters Fields (Southwark)
32. Kender Triangle, New Cross (Lewisham)
33. Erith town centre (Bexley)
34. West India Quay (Tower Hamlets).
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These were opportunities to create public space from the fabric of the city 
by closing roads, as in Brixton and Woolwich (Figures 5.2 and 5.3), and 
discovering small areas of leftover space, as in Dagenham (Figure 5.4). 
The spaces would be well designed and have in place robust management 
regimes that would guarantee their future. Many were in deprived 
neighbourhoods that were deficient in public spaces, such as Windrush 
Square in Brixton (designed by Gross Max). Others, such as the shared 
surfaces in Exhibition Road (designed by Dixon Jones), were in areas of 
central London that had a high footfall. In some cases, such as in Union 
Street, Southwark, a simple intervention to reconfigure a road junction 
offered an opportunity for a new civic space. This project also involved 
the owner of the local cafe and paid for the pink chairs and tables that 
allowed him to activate the space (Figure 5.5). These were not grands 
projets. They were tactical and opportunistic interventions. The work 
was publicised in the Civilising Spaces exhibition that was held at the 
National Theatre in 2010. Alongside this programme there were other 
complementary initiatives, including the Streetscape Design Manual 
(Chapter 1) and Every Detail, which highlighted the importance of 
attention to detail and finish.
Figure 5.1 The Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces programme. Source: DfL/
GLA.
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The absence of a dedicated funding stream did mean that the projects 
took a long time to broker. The A+UU and DfL had to fight numerous 
battles, especially over the use of restricted highway widths and shared 
surfaces. The team learnt the importance of seeing urban design from 
the perspective of highway engineers. Most of the schemes were 
Figure 5.2 New public space in Brixton. Source: DfL/GLA.
Figure 5.3 New public space in Woolwich. Source: DfL/GLA.
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implemented.17 The schemes that failed did so due to lack of money or 
insuperable difficulties on the ground. However, the most common cause 
of failure was political change. A public-realm scheme that involves 
significant highway changes can take up to three years to brief, design, 
obtain consents for and then procure. It might also take nine months to 
construct and might entail considerable disruption. Programmes might 
be championed by an individual politician, but a degree of continuity is 
Figure 5.4 Dagenham Heathway to the Thames. Source: DfL/GLA.
Figure 5.5 Union Street, Southwark. Source: DfL/GLA.
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required to see them through. Opposition, particularly from motorists, 
can sway a faint-hearted politician. That said, eight out of the first ten 
schemes were implemented, as have been the majority of other schemes.18
An approach to public space provision that provides an interesting 
contrast to London was that pioneered by Janette Sadik-Khan, New York’s 
Transportation Commissioner (2007–13). Sadik-Khan closed sections 
of Broadway to create new public spaces at Herald Square and Times 
Square. The difference was that these highways were closed overnight, 
the surfaces were painted, and pot plants and tables and chairs were 
put out. New Yorkers woke up to find that their city had changed and 
by midday most liked it. This was a brave and brilliant project19 that 
impressed DfL staff when they heard about it. There were regrets that 
they had not thought of taking the same approach.
London’s Great Outdoors: a new mayor but the same  
old programme
The biggest challenge to established DfL programmes came with the 
election of a new mayor in 2008. London government was ill-prepared 
for political change. Richard Rogers resigned as mayoral advisor and the 
support for DfL ebbed away. An early casualty was the plan to part- 
pedestrianise Parliament Square – the third and undoubtedly most 
difficult of the World Squares for All programme. The project had been 
commenced late in Livingstone’s second term as mayor (with the 
expectation of a third term). It was always going to be contentious. As 
the square represents the centre of government, every MP and member 
of the House of Lords was likely to have an opinion on its future, as 
were those involved in the Supreme Court and Westminster Abbey. The 
project needed to incorporate appropriate security measures and cater 
for ceremonial events such as the State Opening of Parliament, royal 
weddings, funerals and coronations. The 1950s design by George Grey 
Wornum was protected as a historic landscape and the politics involved 
in moving any of the statues would be Byzantine. Finally, it was located in 
the borough of Westminster, which saw little reason to change the existing 
scheme (particularly as any diverted traffic would almost certainly go 
into streets where some of their councillors lived). Any government team 
concerned for their future careers would have steered well clear of it. DfL 
saw this as a brilliant opportunity to do something radical.
Fosters had already produced an outline scheme. The working 
proposal was to close the arm of the square next to Westminster Abbey, 
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thus connecting the abbey precinct to the square. There were three 
immediate problems. The first was that the abbey boundary railings were 
listed, so any attempt to fully integrate the two domains was a non-
starter. The second was the displacement of traffic. TfL had modelled this 
and concluded that part-closure was achievable, but that traffic would be 
displaced into other boroughs. The third problem was that an accessible 
square would attract up to 36 million people a year. Clearly the use of 
grass would not be an option in the design.
The project started with a long battle between DfL and TfL, who 
had already appointed an architect from their approved list. DfL’s 
argument was that a scheme of this importance required a specialist 
landscape architect and a good one. Eventually, the architects who had 
been appointed were removed from the contract and Günther Vogt, a top 
landscape practice from Switzerland, were appointed. The symbolism 
of the square dominated the discussions. Parliament Square was seen 
to represent the heart of democratic government in the UK. How could 
this be represented while dealing with security and the anticipated 
increase in tourism? Could the statues be re-curated, what would happen 
to the mature trees and to what extent could the historic landscape be 
incorporated? The outline Vogt scheme retained little of the Wornum 
scheme, arguing that the surfaces were worn out and beyond repair, that 
grass would not survive and that in any case the 1950s scheme had been 
a response (albeit a good one) to the creation of a traffic gyratory that 
was no longer required. Vogt proposed using Scottish sandstone, slightly 
elevated in the centre where there would be a lightly defined circular 
sitting area. Most of the trees would be retained, but some of the statues 
would have to be moved and a specialist curator would be brought in to 
advise on this.
The proposals were presented to Ken Livingstone, who was 
unconvinced and reluctant to push the scheme forward with a mayoral 
election coming up.20 The upshot was that the scheme was deferred 
until after the election. Johnson, as the new incoming mayor, rejected 
the whole notion of touching Parliament Square. The scheme was 
scrapped at that point and there have been no attempts to bring back 
any new proposals.
Contractual and funding commitments required the public space 
programme to continue, albeit with a much lower profile. With the 
transfer of DfL to the LDA (see Chapter 2), a long-term future seemed to 
have been secured. The team also had access to LDA funding. Stripped of 
its role on the Olympics and under pressure from the new mayoral 
administration, the LDA had a new board and was looking for new ideas. 
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With many of the LDA’s programmes discredited, DfL was able to 
resuscitate the programme as London’s Great Outdoors – a manifesto for 
‘Great Spaces’ (Figure 5.6). In this, it found a new ally and champion in 
Daniel Moylan, an enthusiast of urban design and public spaces and now 
the de facto chair of TfL.
‘London’s Great Outdoors’ was deliberately written as a mayoral 
manifesto in the first person, with headings such as ‘My ambition for 
London’s public space’. The language was clear and readable. The 
document was more than a repackaging of the 100 Public Spaces 
programme. It specifically brought in objectives concerning climate 
change, carbon emissions, health and wellbeing, and reaffirmed the 
importance of public space as an essential ingredient of London as a 
global city. It was subdivided into Better Streets, and Better Green and 
Water Spaces. The programme also developed concepts related to 
use and the promotion of public space for informal activities and for 
events such as marathons and festivals. This included a clear political 
commitment to close streets and host car-free days and other temporary 
events. For existing parks, it challenged the long-accepted views on 
night-time closures. Finally, it set out existing and proposed projects 
with identified lead authorities, budgets and timescales. Subtitled 
‘Practical Steps’, it was liked by the new mayoral administration, and also 
by TfL and the LDA, who were tasked with delivery.
Signed by the mayor, the document was published in November 
2009. It committed the mayor to procuring good architects to design 
public-realm schemes and to continuing the East London Green Grid and 
the Street Tree programme. The mayor also publicly pledged to fund 
Figure 5.6 The Mayor’s Great Spaces programme. Source: DfL/GLA.
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public space over a three-year period. The new programme also gave 
DfL licence to work with the Olympics and Crossrail to create new 
opportunities to connect neighbourhoods. The document spelled out the 
mayor’s desire to invest in outer London boroughs and set out a series 
of criteria for determining investment priorities. These had been written 
by DfL (with the full agreement of Daniel Moylan) and were designed 
to change the budgetary allocation criteria of both the LDA and TfL to its 
advantage.
As a result, the importance of public space was re-established as a 
mayoral priority and this gave access to new funding, albeit through 
official channels and bidding processes. The Mayor’s Great Spaces 
programme was published in 2009 and identified a new list of 36 projects. 
Many of these were in outer London (Kingston, Bromley, Enfield, Barnet, 
Havering and Sutton), where DfL had not previously had access. The 
extension of the programme to outer London posed new challenges 
concerning low-density suburbs that often had failing local centres. In 
many respects the new direction of the programme suited the interests of 
the team. These were the difficult everyday places where many Londoners 
lived and worked. At this period the public spaces programme became 
part of the broader strategies to reinvigorate high streets and town 
centres (Chapter 3). Finally, it should be recognised that the change 
in emphasis to outer London did not preclude work and investment in 
central London or Labour-controlled areas. In this respect the mayor’s 
team were generally open to ideas rather than focused on pursuing an 
overtly political programme of investment redistribution. The single 
biggest change was that the programme was to be driven by opportunity 
(the leverage of funds and inward investment) rather than by need and 
indices of deprivation.
Peopled landscapes and green grids
London is unlike other European cities in the interrelationship between 
its built and unbuilt forms – its urban landscapes. This is a product of its 
history. The rapid growth of London, no longer bounded by defensive 
walls, incorporated open parklands and other hard-to-develop, leftover 
spaces. Its patterns of landownership and its postwar industrial decline 
also left industrial wastelands where nature could regain a foothold. 
Open space constitutes 40 per cent of London’s area (compared, for 
example, to 1.5 per cent of the area of Istanbul), and Londoners enjoy 
around 27 square metres of open space per person (in Buenos Aires it is 
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1.9 square metres). Adding in private spaces – mainly from residential 
gardens, agricultural land and other land such as allotments – shows that 
almost 80 per cent of London’s area is not built on. London is the true 
garden city (Figure 5.7).
Open space comes in many forms: the Royal Parks, football pitches 
on places such as Hackney Marshes, the great commons of south London 
and the many municipal parks. The nomenclature of London spaces 
explains the many subtle distinctions in their history and use. There are 
commons, greens, fields, downs, marshes, heaths, forests, gardens and 
squares. London’s open spaces form an open patchwork within the city. 
Added to this are London’s terrains vagues – the leftover areas of land 
under flyovers, along the sides of railway lines and in cemeteries, disused 
gravel and chalk pits and areas reclaimed by nature on industrial sites. 
This rich network offered an opportunity to restructure and tie back 
together parts of the city, in particular in east London.
The late nineteenth century saw the establishment of municipal 
parks for the urban population and the early twentieth century saw a 
new exploration of the relationship between the city and its landscape. 
Raymond Unwin had pioneered the concept of green belts and proposed 
a green girdle from the Chilterns to the North Downs, connected by 
Figure 5.7 London as a garden city. Source: London Plan, 2016, GLA.
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‘green spokes’ to central London. Abercrombie in the 1944 Greater 
London Plan proposed establishing a far wider green belt around London, 
designating the Lea Valley as a regional park and protecting London’s 
parks and metropolitan green spaces. However, Abercrombie’s plan also 
recognised that ‘little has, so far, been done to knit the whole together into 
a continuous system by footpaths, park strips, riverside walks, bridle-ways 
and green lanes’.21 The protection of the green belt and Metropolitan 
Open Land was incorporated within the Greater London Development 
Plan in the 1970s and in subsequent London Plans. Protection is one 
thing, but since the 1970s very little new open space had been formally 
planned in London despite its population growth.
Architects and urban planners were already exploring urban 
landscapes, partly in response to the decline, depopulation and deindus-
trialisation taking place in European and North American cities. In 1977, 
Oswald Mathias Ungers joined Rem Koolhaas at the Berlin Summer 
Academy for Architecture, and their collaboration led to the publication 
of The City Within the City: Berlin as Green Archipelago.22 This proposed 
reconfiguring Berlin as a set of ‘islands-in-the-city’. This idea of a green 
archipelago sought to exploit urban depopulation as an opportunity to 
rethink the nature of urban life. Ungers proposed a set of ‘urban islands’ 
in Berlin – centres where the urban character might be reinforced while 
the rest of the city returned to open nature, becoming a ‘natural lagoon’. 
The urban environment would thus become a series of interconnected 
fragments surrounded by open and accessible countryside.23
Interest in urban landscapes in London had been taken up by 
David Goode at the GLC, who in the early 1980s mapped the ecological 
significance of large areas of London. His work was continued by the 
London Ecology Unit (LEU), until it was incorporated into the GLA 
in 2000.24 The LEU developed the concept of ‘ecological deficiency 
units’ – areas of the city that were more than a kilometre from areas of 
ecological value. Ken Livingstone was personally interested in ecology 
and this became a theme within the 2004 London Plan. Others shared 
this interest in the strategic nature of public spaces in London. Mark 
Brearley had taught with Peter Beard and was part of a group of thinkers 
at the Architectural Association that included Liza Fior, Florian Beigel 
and Julian Lewis. They were interested in the ‘grittiness’ of urban 
landscapes, in leftover spaces – terrains vagues – that hosted the ordinary 
experiences of people’s everyday lives. The green belt and its associated 
metropolitan landscapes were ‘a great conceptual space without density’. 
These spaces were also a necessary counterpoint to Richard Rogers’ 
notion of the compact city. They were ‘places of slackness, wildness and 
DESIGN FOR LONDON158
escape’.25 This perspective encouraged them to explore these largely 
neglected urban spaces, and one outcome was the conceptual piece 
Picnics in the Green Belt by East with Marianne Christiansen.26 This saw 
the green belt as a neglected space, in many ways a void around the 
city. It postulated that access to, and use of, the green belt offered an 
opportunity to incorporate it into the spatial and social life of the city.
Alongside the thinking of Brearley, Beard and their circle, one of 
the early influences on the project was the work of Peter Latz in northern 
Germany. His strategic landscape plans for Duisburg-Nord and Emscher 
Park had transformed the postindustrial landscapes of the Ruhr into a 
regional park crisscrossed by walking and cycling routes. The land had 
been decontaminated and replanted to form a regional forest, but the 
blast furnaces and pit heads had been retained as colossal monuments 
to the industrial age, towering above the new forest like Mayan ruins. 
It was the incorporation and celebration of the area’s industrial past that 
attracted the DfL team.
The East London Green Grid
Jamie Dean at the A+UU developed these ideas into a major project, the 
East London Green Grid. The City East work (Chapter 1) had analysed 
the eastward growth of London and the opportunity for this area to 
accommodate a large percentage of London’s future growth. For this 
growth to be accommodated in the Thames Gateway and in order to 
attract the necessary inward investment, significant structural improve-
ments would be required. East London had few of the topographical 
advantages of other parts of the capital. It also lacked historic settlements 
– places like Harrow, Dulwich and Hampstead – and the well-heeled 
suburbs that nestle into the folds of the hills and ridges of the London 
basin. East London, by contrast, was mainly flat, much of it had been 
occupied by industry, and its extensive river network was polluted and 
had been largely culverted. Despite this it had some important open 
spaces, parks and rivers. To the north-east it adjoined areas of green belt 
like Epping Forest, while the lower reaches of the Thames had a unique 
landscape of tidal flats and marshes. The East London Green Grid (ELGG) 
was devised to map these landscapes, join them up, and enhance and 
manage them so that they might become a ‘dialogue between the city 
and its countryside’. In many ways it was the realisation of Unwin’s and 
Abercrombie’s visions of London being linked to its countryside by a 
network of publicly accessible green spaces (Figure 5.8).
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The ELGG also created a strong environmental and ecological framework 
that was based on detailed mapping and analysis for the densification of 
east London (Figure 5.9 and 5.10). It linked the spatial distribution 
of existing open space with policies for healthy living, ecology, walking 
and cycling. Green landscapes offered a way to ameliorate rising 
temperatures resulting from climate change. Another key driver, also 
arising from climate change, was flood risk in London. Significant new 
housing developments were planned in the Thames Gateway, many 
of which were on land susceptible to flooding. In the foreword to the 
East London Green Grid Primer, Clive Coley, the Thames area regional 
manager for the Environment Agency, wrote, ‘By opening up river 
corridors and creating green space in new developments the Green Grid 
will create a far more flexible and holistic approach to flood risk … there 
are also other advantages of opening up river corridors: increasing 
wildlife biodiversity, social benefits and improved aesthetics’.27 The 
objectives of the ELGG were to:
– change the identity of the area
– remove flood risk from residential areas through sustainable 
drainage measures
– create a joined-up network of recreational spaces
– celebrate the heritage and culture of the area, including the folklore 
of its landscapes
– ameliorate urban heat island effects.
Figure 5.8 Connecting landscapes in east London. Source: East London 
Green Grid Primer, DfL/GLA.
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The starting concept for a ‘grid’ came from the topography of east London. 
Rivers such as the Roding and Ravensbourne ran north to south. If their 
corridors were upgraded, they could link the green belt around London 
to the Thames. Missing from the jigsaw were east-to-west corridors. 
The open spaces were largely in place; they needed to be linked and 
upgraded. This would then create a functional and publicly accessible 
green belt within London. Small-scale interventions would link areas to 
create habitat corridors and walking and cycling routes (Figures 5.11 
and 5.12). The East London Green Grid Primer was published in 2006. 
It presented the results of a baseline study that had been commissioned 
by the LDA in 2003. This had mapped access to parks, open space 
deficiency areas, areas susceptible to flood risk (Figure 5.13) and areas 
with nature conservation value. The Primer set out policies for improving, 
upgrading and linking these ‘residual’ spaces. It divided east London 
into six local partnership bodies that were charged with implementation 
and management; this was later extended in 2011 to cover the whole 
of London in the All London Green Grid (Figure 5.14). Each area had 
a consultant architect, specific plans for each site, the interventions 
Figure 5.9 The East London Green Grid: a lattice of connected 

























































required to link them together and plans for their eventual management. 
The separately constituted partnership bodies gave the project ownership 
at local level and a resilience that could, if necessary, outlast DfL.
The second part of the Primer set out a series of essays that explored 
aspects of landscape and its importance as a resource within the urban 
area. Essayists included the photographer Jason Orton, the writers Ken 
Worpole and Bob Gilbert, the architect Peter Beard, the broadcaster 
Chris Baines, and Dave Wardle from the Environment Agency. Together 
this eclectic group of individuals set out the economic, environmental, 
ecological, and access and movement rationale for the Green Grid, while 
Jason Orton’s photographs presented a haunting picture of the places 
and landscapes of east London. This made the Primer more than just a 
policy document. It was an evocation of place – or what that place might 
become if nurtured carefully.
The delivery mechanism for the ELGG, devised by Jamie Dean, was 
one of its principal innovations. The project was ‘sold’ to powerful 
agencies including Thames Water, the Environment Agency, Natural 
England, the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) and the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs as a dispersed model for the 
realisation of their objectives. In Dean’s words, ‘we took their objectives 
and made them ours. This incorporated state agencies into a practical 
Figure 5.11 The East London Green Grid: a series of small projects. 
Source: East London Green Grid Primer, DfL/GLA.
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Figure 5.12 The East London Green Grid: small projects in south-east 
London. Source: Ladywell Fields and Waterlink Way: Feasibility Study 
Penultimate Report, East Architecture, Landscape Urban Design/DfL/GLA, 
May 2008.
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Figure 5.14 East London Green Grid partnership bodies. Source: East London 
Green Grid Primer, DfL/GLA.
Figure 5.13 East London, showing the correlation of flood risk, major 
development projects and the East London Green Grid. Source: East London Green 
Grid Primer, DfL/GLA.
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implementation model that would deliver their objectives at a fraction of 
the cost of alternative programmes.’28 These agencies each contributed 
to the introduction to the Primer and put their logos on the cover. Between 
them they made £30 million available for the first phases of the project.
One of the early projects was Rainham Marshes, which was 
designed by Peter Beard. Rainham Marshes is almost twice the size 
of Hampstead Heath. It was largely an artificial landscape, created after 
the seventeenth century, and had been used by the Port of London 
Authority as a dump for material dredged from the Thames, by the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) as a rifle range, and later as a landfill site. 
Plans for housing and industrial development in the 1960s and 1970s 
had never come to fruition, and in the 1980s large parts of it were then 
designated as a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) in recognition 
of its importance, particularly for migratory birds. Beard’s plans were 
sensitive to the marshes’ landscape history and did not seek to displace 
the grazing or remove the remnants of its industrial heritage. The 
marshes were reconnected to the village of Rainham (a link which had 
long since been lost) by constructing a pedestrian bridge over the A13 
and the high-speed rail lines. The plans for the marshes included paths 
connecting the bridge to the Thames, as well as boardwalks and pavilions 
for observing the birdlife. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB), which had purchased the land from the MOD in 2002, was a key 
partner in developing and managing the project.
Beard’s designs for the marshes were influenced by the work of 
Georges Descombes, whose Voie Suisse scheme on the edge of Lake Uri 
had created a path that was discreet and minimal. Irene Scalbert describes 
the approaches of Beard and Descombes as concentrating ‘on the most 
ordinary aspects that are commonly brushed aside’.29 The ELGG captures 
the essence of Descombes’s approach, using the found elements of the 
landscape and minimal intervention, rather than tidying up and sanitising 
the landscape. This fitted well with the DfL methodology and its aim to 
‘value what is there, define what is missing’.
In March 2012, the ELGG became part of the All London Green Grid 
and was incorporated into the London Plan. The idea was also taken up 
and developed by Terry Farrell in his work on the Thames Gateway 
Parklands (November 2009). This project, which involved DfL, was a rare 
collaboration between London, Essex and Kent, and extended the idea of 
the ELGG into the neglected and degraded landscapes of the Thames 
Estuary (Figure 5.15). It was also supported by the HCA as a mechanism 
to attract investment into the Thames Gateway and create a framework 
for sustainable growth. Terry Farrell championed the extension of the 
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ELGG into the Thames Estuary area, describing the proposed landscape 
network as ‘the picture on the jigsaw box’ that would create a regional 
landscape within which new settlements could be sited. In the Parklands 
document Farrell states, ‘A high quality of life is needed to attract people 
to want to live here, work here, visit here, and for existing residents to 
want to build their futures here.’30 The concept was that people would 
choose to move to the Thames Gateway. Although it was based on the 
ELGG, it effectively inverted the concept by seeing the regional landscape 
as a national park within which new high-quality residential settlements 
could be created and existing ones expanded. The HCA pledged £32 
million to the Parklands project, and 15 major growth sites were 
identified, from the Lea Valley to Canvey Island and the Isle of Sheppey. 
Using the ELGG methodology, each had a plan, a lead partner and an 
initial funding stream that would attract matching funding. A new 
Thames Estuary Path led by Sustrans linked the areas together.
Conclusions
The work of the A+UU and DfL on public space and urban landscapes 
borrowed heavily from the theoretical and practical work of others. 
Interest in public space had re-emerged in the 1970s, although it is true 
to say that cities like London, New York, Berlin, Barcelona and Paris had 
always valued their landscapes, parks and squares. The difference was 
that from the 1980s onwards new public space was not being created in 
London and some existing parks were falling into neglect. The Urban 
Task Force created a platform whereby design strategies for public space 
Figure 5.15 Thames Gateway Parklands: a regional green grid. Source: 
DfL/GLA/Terry Farrell.
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became an essential ingredient of the compact and human city and 
central to urban policy. The 100 Public Spaces programme had an impact 
on thinking and public perceptions, and demonstrated that London could 
do what Paris had been doing so much better for the previous 30 years. 
DfL broadened the agenda to encompass health, wellbeing and climate 
change.
The programme was not easy to run, and initially the team was 
inexperienced in dealing with highway engineers, in particular. Public 
space provision is resource-consuming, especially when the aim is to 
provide high-quality and lasting spaces. Whether New York’s ‘pop-up’ 
public space programmes could have been done in London is debatable, 
given the political risks and the fact that DfL never had the full clout of a 
transport commissioner behind it. However, such an approach could 
possibly have provided 100 public spaces quickly and at minimal cost. 
This might be a missed opportunity but in retrospect the 100 Public 
Spaces and subsequent programmes did produce a large number of well-
designed and durable new civic spaces in parts of London that were in 
great need. These have management regimes in place to look after them 
and they will become a lasting contribution to London’s urban fabric. 
This in itself is a very significant legacy. The work of the A+UU and DfL 
also introduced best practice to London, shifted the debate on public 
space and provided a firm footing for the many schemes that have been 
implemented in the city since. In 2020, London can boast a public realm 
that is commensurate with its status as a global city.
The ELGG and All London Green Grid project continues to this 
day, due principally to the tenacity of Jamie Dean, who is still associated 
with the project at the GLA. The urban landscape debate has matured, 
with a growing acceptance that cities need to adapt to catastrophic 
climate change and be resilient to events such as extreme summer tem-
peratures and flooding. The health agenda, from air quality to obesity, 
is now also central to urban policy-making. Both the ELGG and the 
100 Public Spaces/Great Outdoors programmes demonstrated a key 
move from planning as a regulatory function to protect open space, to a 
proactive design-led process that intervened to redress imbalances in 
provision, particularly in the poorer neighbourhoods. If cities are to adapt 
to climate change (and assist in slowing it), the relationship between 
built form and open space will remain at the centre of the agenda. 
Landscape urbanism will develop these programmes, conceptualising 
and planning the city and its hinterland as a single entity. Increasingly, 
considerations relating to food, resources, energy water and resilience 
will drive future thinking.
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Notes
 1 Urban Task Force 1999.
 2 UN-Habitat 2016, pp. iv–v.
 3 UN-Habitat 2016, p. 6.
 4 Urban Task Force 1999, pp. 57–9.
 5 Parts of the planned network are still visible today in Westway, Old Street roundabout, the 
Euston underpass and stretches of urban dual carriageway in Wandsworth. The plan had been 
to connect these elements into an inner ring, similar in function to Birmingham’s Bullring 
(now being dismantled). This in turn would have connected to the national motorway 
network, destroying any community in its path.
 6 Gehl 2010.
 7 Gehl and Gemzøe 2000.
 8 This is another example of the importance of empirical research in making the case for design, 
as was employed by DfL (see Chapters 1 and 2).
 9 Gehl and Gemzøe 2000.
10 Gehl 2010.
11 Term coined by John Worthington of DEGW.
12 Oldenburg 1999.
13 In fact this goes back to plans in the 1970s that also included the part-pedestrianisation 
of Piccadilly Circus. These plans, however, included the construction of new roads that would 
have diverted traffic around Leicester Square and Trafalgar Square, causing widespread 
damage to parts of Soho.
14 Leicester Square was redesigned by Westminster Council in time for the 2012 London 
Olympics as part of DfL’s Great Outdoors programme. Parliament Square was abandoned 
early in Johnson’s mayoralty and is covered later in this chapter.
15 Often referred to as ‘planning gain’, these were negotiated benefits in kind to offset negative 
impacts of development.
16 Peter Bishop was Director of Environmental Services at Camden, 2001–6.
17 The Regeneration team at the GLA have confirmed that 80 per cent of the identified projects 
have been implemented in one form or another.
18 As at 2019 more than 100 public spaces have been delivered under this and subsequent 
programmes across London.
19 Sadik-Khan carried out this programme using her powers to paint traffic control measures 
on the public highway (i.e. white lines). This is an excellent example of the ‘creative distortion’ 
of powers to achieve public benefit.
20 Livingstone’s main concerns were political. Proposals that would divert traffic across the 
Thames into Lambeth would have been a difficult sell before a mayoral election, creating 
opposition in addition to any reaction from Westminster, English Heritage and the Houses 
of Parliament. DfL recognised that this scheme would entail a fight. Livingstone’s political 
instinct told him that this was the wrong time.
21 Scalbert 2013.
22 Ungers and Koolhaas 2013 (originally published 1977).
23 Schrijver 2008.
24 Although disbanded in 2003, its work informed the 2004 and subsequent London Plans.
25 Scalbert 2013.
26 https://www.east.uk.com/projects/urban-design/london/picnics-in-the-green-belt-2/
27 Greater London Authority 2006.
28 Interview with Jamie Dean, February 2020.
29 Scalbert 2013.
30 Farrell 2010, p. 4.
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Opportunism on a grand scale:  
using the Olympics as a catalyst  
for change
Peter Bishop, Esther Everett and  
Eleanor fawcett
In the summer of 2005, just after the announcement that London had 
been awarded the 2012 Olympics, a delegation from London government 
visited Turin to study how that city was preparing for the 2006 Winter 
Games. The question that members of the delegation were asked several 
times was why London was interested in hosting the Olympics. For Turin 
the answer was simple. Turin was a medium-sized city that had restruc-
tured its industrial base after the demise of car manufacturing in the 1980s. 
Its new economy was based on high-tech industries, research, tourism and 
gastronomy. The Winter Olympics was an opportunity to promote Turin 
and establish it as a tourism and winter sports centre. But why did a city 
like London want the Olympics? It was already a successful global city with 
an established ‘brand’ that attracted investment, tourists and global talent.
Ken Livingstone described the purpose of bidding for the Olympics 
as follows:
The decision to bid for the 2012 Olympics was driven by a realisation 
that without a major project that could capture the imagination (and 
financial support) of Central Government, the deeply entrenched 
social and economic problems of east London would never be 
tackled. The Olympics locked in the Government to invest in the 
area, to help us acquire over 100 hectares of land, to decontaminate 
it, put in the infrastructure and improve transport in the area. It 
also was part of a wider strategy to promote London as the global 
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capital, a place that was welcoming and open to anyone to come 
and achieve their ambitions.1
The Olympic bid demonstrated how far London had come under mayoral 
government. There were three main reasons behind the bid. The first 
involved bolstering London’s claim to be the leading city in the world.2 
Mayor Livingstone’s strategy of promoting London had been clear since 
he took office in 2000. London’s bid was based on the idea that London 
was an open and cosmopolitan city that attracted the brightest and 
most ambitious people from around the globe to come and realise their 
ambitions – and London welcomed them. The final part of the bidding 
process allowed each city to submit a short film to support their case. 
Paris, the favourite to win, presented a portrait of the city with pictures 
of its parks, restaurants, galleries and sports facilities along with the 
lifestyle of its (beautiful) inhabitants. London, by contrast, did not show 
a single image of itself or its inhabitants. Instead it showed a montage 
of stories about children from around the world, many from poor 
backgrounds, becoming inspired by sport. The film then cut to the future 
where they were winning gold medals and ‘achieving their dreams and 
ambitions in London in 2012’.3 It was a brave and compelling piece 
of marketing that identified London as the city of dreams, everyone’s 
global capital city.
The second reason for the bid was to reinforce the strategic 
imperative to focus investment on brownfield land to the east of London in 
the Thames Gateway (Figure 6.1). The London Docklands Development 
Corporation had established a successful financial district at Canary 
Wharf, and other developments such as the London Exhibition Centre 
(ExCeL) and City Airport had ventured eastwards, but there was still a 
lack of appetite from the private sector to invest in the east. This was not 
surprising given levels of entrenched deprivation and low educational 
attainment in the area. The Lea Valley formed a barrier of local and 
low-grade industry, contaminated land and overhead power lines that 
severed communities and created a negative image for the whole area 
(Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
The third reason for the bid was a desire from Mayor Ken Livingstone 
to promote economic and social improvement in some of the poorest 
districts in the capital. Sir Robin Wales, the Leader of Newham Council, 
often stated that his ambition was for his borough to be ‘average’ in terms 
of London deprivation statistics. This, from the second-poorest borough, 
was a significant ambition. The Lea Valley needed to be tackled. In a 
rational world, government resources would have been made available 
Figure 6.1 The London Olympics as a catalyst to move the city 
eastwards into the Thames Gateway. Source: DfL Archive, DfL/GLA.
Figure 6.2 Aerial view (looking north) of the future Olympic site in the 
Lower Lea Valley in 2005. Source: photo LDA; owner GLA.
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long before 2005. But government does not work like this and Livingstone 
turned to the Olympics to lever in central government commitment to do 
something for east London.
The strategy was sound, but the construction of a specialist 
sporting campus based on an exhaustive and rigid specification from the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) was not necessarily the easiest 
way of triggering beneficial long-term regeneration. Yet it was the only 
option available. In 2006 the Dutch Planning Ministry established a team 
to consider a bid for the Amsterdam Olympics in 2028.4 Explaining the 
rationale for such a long lead-in, Henk Ovink, one of the senior ministry 
planners, stated that 20 years was the minimum amount of time required 
to assess how an Olympics could be fully compatible with long-term 
national planning strategies.5 The London bidding process had started in 
1997 and had received ministerial approval in December 2000. London’s 
12-year lead-in period was still longer than that of many cities, but short 
when considered against the ambition of using the Games to regenerate 
east London. The bidding process not only had to demonstrate to the 
IOC that London could put on ‘a great Games’; it also had to incorporate 
strategies for the transformation of the site into a working and sustainable 
piece of city.
Figure 6.3 London’s road network, showing the Lower Lea Valley as a 
‘tear’ in London’s fabric. Source: DfL Archive, DfL/GLA.
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The 2012 Games
The model for London’s bid had been based on the experience of 
Barcelona, where the city had used the Olympics as a catalyst for 
structural change in the city by reconnecting the central area to the 
Mediterranean and revamping public spaces across the city. For London 
the objective was the long-term improvement of some of its poorest 
areas. The delivery of the Games was to be the responsibility of the 
London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games 
(LOCOG), which was established in October 2005. The Olympic 
Development Authority (ODA) was established in April 2006 with the 
task of building the park and all the facilities and stadia. The strategy 
was to develop a Games masterplan for the main park (2012) and an 
interim masterplan for the adaptation of the park after the Games 
(2012–14). The final masterplan, for the legacy, would guide the regen-
eration of this area of east London (2014–40). The London Development 
Agency (LDA) was tasked with the job of acquiring the land and relocating 
the existing industry to new premises elsewhere in London. The problem 
was that the legacy masterplan was to be commissioned some time 
later in the process. The focus was on delivery and on trying to contain 
escalating costs. Another issue was the growing cynicism of many 
Londoners. The legacy, initially the rationale for the bid, quickly came to 
be seen as a distraction.
Alongside the preparation of the 2012 bid materials for the 
Olympics (and because there were low expectations that London’s bid 
would actually be successful), a parallel process had been underway. 
This was the process of corralling the four boroughs that overlapped in 
the proposed Olympic Park to work together to prepare the first-ever 
strategic plan for the Lower Lea Valley (LLV) as a whole. Within the 
Greater London Authority (GLA), the Architecture and Urbanism Unit 
(A+UU) led this process. A key component was to scope the opportunity 
that had been presented by the spotlight that had been turned on east 
London. In particular there was potential for serious investment in an 
area of London which had simply been the ‘edge’ since Saxon times. 
Ostensibly this was to be the document that would be published in July 
2005, immediately after London lost the Olympic bid, to demonstrate 
that there were a clear vision and detailed plans for the revitalisation 
of the LLV without the 2012 Olympics. In the event, the document was 
ready for this deadline, but when London won the bid, a further year’s 
work was then undertaken to incorporate the Olympic masterplan and 
update the strategy accordingly. It was finally adopted in 2007.
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This document was to have been given planning status as a mayoral 
‘Opportunity Area Planning Framework’ and was led by the GLA’s 
planning team with the A+UU carving out a central role in coordination 
and as the client for the spatial and place-making aspects of the work. 
The A+UU also used its developing skills to graphically communicate 
complex spatial strategies. EDAW (now AECOM) were appointed by the 
GLA to produce the strategy. The considerable expertise, local knowledge 
and stakeholder trust that had been built up over the two years of 
preparing this strategy proved to be fundamental to the future success 
of Design for London (DfL) in shaping and delivering change in the LLV 
over the following decade.
The LLV strategy established five key spatial ideas (Figure 6.4a–e). 
These have proven lasting and effective overarching principles to guide 
the developments and investments across the area, including the Olympic 
and legacy masterplans, for over a decade.
Many of these approaches that were innovative at the time are now 
mainstream and included as policy in the latest London Plan. They can be 
summarised as follows:
– Neighbourhoods and communities. To ensure that successful living 
environments were created in the harsh environment of the LLV 
(and that isolated ‘ghettos’, either for rich or for poor people, were 
avoided), rules were developed to establish suitable locations 
for new homes. These were to be linked to public transport and in 
close proximity to town centres. The quality of the environment 
was given a high priority. The strategy also acknowledged that 
significant numbers of new homes could and should be delivered 
by ad hoc intensification of existing neighbourhoods. Workspace 
and infrastructure were factored into this mix.
– The connected valley. The LLV was impressively well connected 
by road and public transport to the rest of London, but was itself 
virtually impossible to move around in. Thanks to meticulous on-the-
ground mapping by the newly established practice Witherford 
Watson Mann Architects, the strategy identified specific locations 
where dozens of new routes and bridges were required to ‘stitch’ 
from east to west across the valley and link the communities and 
town centres which bordered the area but were utterly cut off from 
one another by major infrastructure (Figure 6.5).
– The working valley. One of the most complex challenges was to 
establish a clear vision for the future of industry in the LLV. This had 
for centuries been a hugely important part of London’s industrial 
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Figure 6.4 The five key spatial strategies for the Lower Lea Valley: 
(a) Neighbourhoods and communities; (b) The connected valley; (c) The 
working valley; (d) Thriving centres; (e) Water city. Source: Lower Lea 
Valley, Opportunity Area Planning Framework (OAPF), 2007, DfL/GLA.
(e)
story. The policy of ‘industry + mix’ was developed by the A+UU 
working with the London Plan Team. Through this framework, 
non-industrial uses could be added to an area, including residential 
uses, providing that the total industrial floorspace in the new 
development did not reduce. This started to establish new typologies 
that mixed a range of uses with lighter forms of industry that could 
act as successful buffers between remaining strategic industrial 
locations and new residential neighbourhoods. This ensured that 
the LLV could continue to be a place of work.
– Thriving centres. Learning from the fragmented, introverted high-
density residential development starting to creep out from Canary 
Wharf, the LLV strategy strongly advocated the importance of 
‘proper’ town centres to support the creation of successful new 
neighbourhoods and districts which were in London’s DNA. This 
would require the expansion and strengthening of three existing 
but impoverished town centres at Stratford, Canning Town and 
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Leyton, and, ambitiously, the creation of three new town centres 
around the stations at Hackney Wick, Bromley-by-Bow and West 
Ham. Supporting the existing town centres was a priority for 
achieving a successful Olympic legacy (Figure 6.6).
– Water city. This involved creating a new ‘front’ to the LLV along the 
waterways that thread through the area from north to south, and 
creating a new continuous public route and network of parks from 
Hackney Marshes to the River Thames – completing Abercrombie’s 
1944 vision for the 26-mile Lea Valley Park. This vision was central 
to the layout of the Olympic Park and was also a way to highlight 
and celebrate the special qualities of the LLV landscapes at a time 
when most mainstream discussion of the area focused mainly on 
the need to ‘start again’.
The longevity and success of these principles provide a useful lesson for 
other major regeneration projects. Their effectiveness was partly due to a 
clear and compelling vision which was understood and endorsed by all 
involved. But they also provided a true blueprint for change because of 
the unusual level of specificity of the work. These were not sweeping 
Figure 6.5 Mapping the connectivity of the Lower Lea Valley. Source: 
Witherford Watson Mann Architects, 2005, DfL/GLA.
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aspirational statements. They were underpinned by joint working 
between the GLA and stakeholders and by robust spatial propositions 
that worked out what the principles could mean on the ground. There 
was enough detail in these principles for projects to be implemented 
piece by piece, as individual opportunities arose, while still allowing 
sufficient flexibility for the specifics to evolve over time.
Figure 6.6 Integration of the Olympic legacy vision with the existing 
and proposed town centres. Source: DfL/GLA.
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Working ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the park
It is fair to say that most Londoners were surprised when the decision 
to award London the Games was announced, and the initial euphoria 
dissolved into concern about whether London could really manage to 
gear up and host the Games in little over seven years. The task was 
immense. Almost 200 hectares of land had to be acquired; the River 
Lea and its tributaries had to be cleaned up; most of the land had to 
be decontaminated; low-grade industry had to be relocated; overhead 
power lines had to be rerouted and buried; and a whole platform of 
infrastructure, including power, water and drainage, had to be put in 
place. Only then could work start on building the Olympic Park, the 
stadia and all the supporting services to host an Olympics (Figure 6.7). 
To make the task even more difficult, London had based its bid on hosting 
the most sustainable Olympics ever and on using it as a stepping stone 
in the longer-term regeneration of east London. Arrangements were 
quickly begun to establish the Olympic Development Authority (ODA) 
and the many other organisations and teams responsible for the multitude 
of activities funded by the £9.3 billion Olympic budget.
While this singular, focused, well-resourced machine cranked into 
life and the bright blue hoardings started to go up around the Olympic 
precinct, there was an almost surreal contrast with what was happening 
in the rest of the LLV. This was a rich and multifaceted world involving 
Figure 6.7 Preparing the Olympic site, March 2008. Source: GLA.
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multiple authorities with overlapping areas of jurisdiction (Figure 6.8). 
These included the mayor, the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, the 
four adjoining boroughs and the newly established London Thames 
Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC). Alongside these were 
organisations ranging from Network Rail and utilities companies to 
developers wanting to benefit from the Olympic effect and a huge number 
of individual landowners surprised by their change in fortune. This free-
for-all was both an opportunity and a threat. The slightly anarchistic 
and freewheeling spirit of change was certainly in keeping with the 
ungoverned feel of the LLV and held the promise of creating a rich and 
layered piece of city, in contrast to fears about the homogenisation of 
the Olympic zone. However, this period also resulted in some very poor 
outcomes, in particular the march of third-rate tower blocks that shot 
up along Stratford High Street (Figure 6.9).
In practical spatial terms, it was particularly alarming that there 
was virtually no joining up between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the 
Olympic zone, despite the importance of the promised legacy for east 
London in the bid. This was the context when DfL was set up. The A+UU 
LLV team were working successfully outside the Olympic zone with 
partners at the boroughs and the LTGDC to commission a series of 
Figure 6.8 The multitude of overlapping boundaries and organisations 
operating across the Lower Lea Valley. Source: DfL Archive, DfL/GLA.
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‘Olympic Fringe’ masterplans, as well as providing design input to all the 
planning applications. With the advent of DfL, this changed dramatically. 
DfL was for several years the only team to have clear roles both inside and 
outside the Olympic zone. It was in a unique position to coordinate 
projects and provide an underlying design ethos.
Inside the park: infiltrating the ODA to improve the 
legacy and design quality
Given the huge pressure on delivery within the Olympic project, there 
was little appetite for the involvement of an agency such as DfL. Indeed, 
there was little appetite for any real discussion about design in general. 
The task dominated; ‘on time on budget’ was the all-too-familiar mantra 
as the ODA started to erect barriers to protect itself from any outside 
interference. The mayor’s office, worried by the spectre of late delivery, 
fully supported the ODA’s position. The first attempts at influencing 
the Games focused on the design quality of the stadia and especially the 
design competition for the aquatics centre. Both Richard Rogers and 
Ricky Burdett were closely involved, as were the A+UU, and Zaha Hadid’s 
iconic design was selected in 2004. Following criticism of their design 
and procurement strategies, not least by Richard Rogers, the ODA 
appointed Ricky Burdett as their design advisor in November 2006. This 
bolstered the day-to-day voice of design within the ODA, which had 
already appointed Nick Serota6 to its board earlier in 2006. Serota 
was a highly effective design champion and he helped to establish an 
independent design review panel, led by the Commission for Architecture 
and the Built Environment (CABE), that played a key role in guiding 
design processes within the Olympic Park.
An opportunity to really influence the ODA came when they 
eventually decided to strengthen their design team. DfL offered to second 
in a member of staff to work within the ODA – under the ODA’s full-time 
Figure 6.9 Composite of schemes developed along Stratford High 
Street following the success of the Olympic bid. Source: GLA.
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supervision. The idea of ‘infiltration’ was a strategy that DfL had always 
used but this had mainly been carried out by working through friendly 
proxies who could offer access to information about budgets and help 
in navigating internal decision-making arrangements. A secondment 
was a new departure, but an opportunity to plant a mole in the ODA. 
This might allow them to start to shape some aspects of the Olympic 
masterplan in order to ensure that the opportunities for the legacy were 
not compromised. Eleanor Fawcett, then an architect at DfL, duly started 
work at the ODA in early 2007 on a part-time basis.
Delivering real impact and influence in this role was far from 
easy, as the ODA was already quite advanced on key decisions about 
the layout of the Olympic precinct’s infrastructure. Part of the role was to 
attend formal internal ODA ‘gateway’ meetings to review proposals 
on the ‘legacy design’. Fawcett was the sole advocate of design among 
about 25 other heavyweight specialists in cost control, health and safety, 
and project delivery. In this type of setting, despite her best attempts, it 
proved impossible to influence some issues, such as the positioning of 
utilities buildings and road infrastructure around the edge of the park, 
especially at the southern edge. Fawcett argued that the impact of poor 
forward planning in these areas would seriously affect the ability of 
future strategies to successfully connect the communities along Stratford 
High Street into the park. She was right, but her voice was ignored and 
in consequence this problem remains today.
However, in terms of specific projects, the primary focus was on the 
design of the parklands. This was lagging behind schedule and a project 
sponsor had yet to be appointed for it. A key task became shaping 
the vision and approach that might be articulated in the brief for the 
landscape design consultants for the Olympic Park. The key contribution 
to this work was the introduction of a stronger appreciation of the Lower 
Lea Valley itself and the special qualities of its waterways and wild, 
intimate landscapes. This had been somewhat lacking from the more 
formalised proposals which EDAW had been working on, and indeed 
the vast majority of people who were involved in the Olympic project did 
not know the LLV beyond the tabula rasa Olympic construction site. For 
them the LLV was an empty and polluted wasteland (see Figure 6.10a–c, 
which offers differing perceptions of the area). A few months later, 
when John Hopkins was appointed as the park project sponsor and 
Hargreaves/LDA Design were appointed as the landscape consultants, 
this appreciation became far more integrated into the vision and future 
design of the park. The influence of the natural landscape on their work 
can be seen in the undulating, wilder northern part of the park today.
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Figure 6.10 Differing perceptions of the Lower Lea Valley (2006–7): 
(a) Hackney Marshes; (b) Canalside, Hackney Wick; (c) Low-grade 
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(c)
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Another real success resulting from the DfL secondment was the 
Greenway. This project was for the landscape improvement of the 
neglected and vandalised embankment above one of London’s main 
sewers. The embankment ran as a raised public pathway through the 
Olympic site. This was originally seen as a minor infrastructure project 
and had been passed to one of the big engineering firms to design and 
build a simple tidy-up scheme. However, following an initial review 
meeting Fawcett identified a missed design opportunity to create a 
2.5-kilometre-long linear park – a project sufficiently noncritical to the 
Games programme that there might be some willingness to adopt a 
different approach and appoint an emerging design practice. The 
ODA agreed to hold an open design competition, which received 
70 submissions. Adams and Sutherland won the competition with a 
proposal that was completely rooted in the LLV (Figure 6.11). It incorpo-
rated reused materials from the clearance of the old industrial buildings 
and planting that was deliberately drawn from the local postindustrial 
wild landscapes. Although initially somewhat nonplussed by this very 
Figure 6.11 Image from the Greenway competition. Source: Adams 
and Sutherland, DfL/GLA.
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different design approach, the ODA delivered this rich, complex scheme 
and it received wide critical acclaim (Figure 6.12). It has been hugely 
successful and it initiated the ODA’s understanding of how to celebrate 
the heritage of its site through design.
Appointing the legacy masterplanners
The process to finally appoint the masterplanners for the Olympic legacy 
was started in 2007 and was led by the LDA. This had been focused on 
the challenging tasks of acquiring the almost 200 landownerships 
within the Olympic site and relocating businesses and other groups, such 
as traveller communities and allotment holders. DfL had succeeded in 
becoming design advisors on a few of the Olympic relocation projects, 
which included a period where the team had to quickly develop skills 
in colourful decorative treatments for the many new industrial sheds 
that the LDA was constructing across the Thames Gateway, much to the 
bemusement of the relocated businesses.
Figure 6.12 The Greenway on completion. Source: DfL/GLA.
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As the plans for the Olympics quickly took shape, it was becoming 
increasingly pressing for the legacy plans to keep pace in order to 
ensure that decisions could be taken with the long term in mind. DfL 
were asked to lead the design aspects of the Olympic legacy masterplan-
ning, so in summer 2007 Eleanor Fawcett was seconded into the LDA’s 
Olympic legacy team. The first task was to bring the key stakeholders 
on board regarding the approach to the Olympic legacy masterplan. 
A series of major ‘place-making’ workshops were set up to explore 
priorities and establish shared objectives among the four host boroughs, 
the LTGDC, the GLA and central government. These essentially developed 
the discussions that had begun with partners through the LLV OAPF 
(Opportunity Area Planning Framework). The result was a 10-point set 
of objectives that formed part of the brief for the designers. A major open 
international design procurement for the legacy masterplanners was 
held in autumn 2007, and in January 2008 the shortlisted teams were 
interviewed by a panel including Peter Bishop and Nick Serota. The 
Dutch firm KCAP’s opening slide (Figure 6.13) captured the conundrum 
of the legacy brief – how to turn a purpose-built (and secure) sporting 
campus into a living and integrated piece of city. The jury declared them 
clear winners.
However, KCAP had not formed the team of supporting consultants 
necessary for the commission. The team placed second, was led by 
Allies and Morrison and their partner AECOM/EDAW, and included 
all the necessary disciplines. This was also the team that had led the 
masterplanning of the Olympic site from 2003 onwards and it had a huge 
Figure 6.13 The Olympic legacy conundrum: turning a sports campus 
into a piece of city. Source: KCAP Olympic Legacy Masterplan Vision, 
KCAP, December 2007.
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amount of technical knowledge about the complex site. It was considered 
a ‘safe pair of hands’ to complement and support the fresh approach of 
KCAP. The LDA asked KCAP to enter into dialogue with AECOM and 
Allies and Morrison to explore whether a joint team could be formed to 
take on the commission.7 KCAP reported back that an agreement had 
been reached and the joint team was appointed in January 2008.
The legacy process got under way quickly, with part of the KCAP 
team relocating to London. A packed programme of design workshops 
and stakeholder meetings began. The masterplan was beginning to 
address the problems of transforming a games campus into a new piece 
of city. This was no easy task. The Olympic Park was still a relatively 
isolated area that was not integrated with its surrounding neighbour-
hoods. It was severed by mainline railways to the south and had the 
overground line running through its centre. Moreover, although the 
ODA’s ‘transformation’ masterplan would remove many of the redundant 
sporting facilities and circulation spaces, the road network was still 
overscaled in many places, many of the public spaces were not going to 
be converted into usable park areas and there was considerable 
uncertainty concerning the long-term use of the main athletics stadium.
The legacy plan was based on a series of broad principles:
– Reconnect the surrounding neighbourhoods and connect into the 
surrounding existing and proposed town centres and stations.
– Retain, adapt and reuse four of the Olympic sports venues (the 
main stadium, the aquatics centre, the velodrome and the handball 
arena) and the huge media and press centre buildings.
– Consolidate the public realm to create a successful new park for 
east London and integrate the landscape with the existing rivers 
and canals.
– Build a series of mixed-income neighbourhoods to surround the 
park, with distinct characters, each with around 7,000 –10,000 
new homes.
Over the first year of work, the KCAP/Allies and Morrison masterplan 
elegantly incorporated these principles into a framework from which a 
new high-density piece of city might develop. This was supported by 
extensive engagement with local communities and stakeholders as part 
of the Legacy Now initiative. DfL’s LLV team was the client of this work 
through Eleanor Fawcett’s ongoing part-time secondment into the LDA’s 
Olympic legacy team. As part of this work, an independent design review 
panel run by CABE and DfL was established.
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Political leadership was shifting at this time and so too did the 
approach to the legacy. Shortly after the legacy masterplan was commis-
sioned, Boris Johnson was elected mayor (May 2008). Ken Livingstone’s 
Olympic advisor Neale Coleman was sacked, but then reinstated within 
the first week of the new mayoralty, so at least a degree of continuity 
was maintained. However, the Johnson administration decided to 
remove the responsibility for the legacy from the LDA and set up a new 
organisation to deliver the Olympic legacy. This would be under the 
direct control of the mayor. A limited company, the Olympic Park Legacy 
Company (OPLC), was set up in May 2009,8 just as the public consulta-
tion on the legacy masterplan was commencing.
In the summer of 2009 more formal consultation on the emerging 
KCAP/Allies and Morrison legacy masterplan began (Figure 6.14), 
and some unease about the plan emerged from the mayor’s advisor 
and key stakeholders, especially a sense that the residential densities 
were too high and that there were too many residential towers. There 
were suggestions from the Mayor of London that the legacy plan did 
not embody a ‘London vernacular’ approach to architectural design. 
To compound matters, the 2009 economic downturn had effectively 
scuppered the plan that the Treasury would recoup some of the £9.3 
billion that they had put into the Games. Even residential development 
looked unlikely in a market that was flatlining. The challenge of being 
asked to plan at lower densities did not help the situation.
Figure 6.14 Legacy masterplan framework proposals at summer 2009. 
Source: KCAP and Allies and Morrison, GLA.
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The lack of strong leadership within the newly established OPLC 
compounded the hiatus around the vision and proposals for the Olympic 
legacy throughout the second half of 2009. This continued until Andrew 
Altman began as the new CEO in December 2009. Altman arrived 
with hugely impressive credentials, having been the Deputy Mayor of 
Philadelphia and Planning Director for Washington DC, where he had led 
the delivery of the Anacostia riverfront transformation. Most importantly 
for DfL, Altman was a trained planner who understood the importance 
of place-making and design in urban regeneration and was familiar with 
the recent urban revitalisation of London through his participation in 
the London School of Economics’ Urban Age programme run by Ricky 
Burdett. Altman quickly connected with Peter Bishop and the team at 
DfL and enthusiastically agreed to continue with the secondment of DfL 
staff to lead the Olympic legacy design client role. He also valued their 
wider understanding of the LLV as a place and gradually got to know the 
area through bike rides around the valley. Having such a strong design 
champion leading the Olympic legacy project transformed DfL’s role and 
influence on the project. Ultimately in 2011, as DfL was being disbanded, 
it was a natural step for its LLV team to be transferred formally to the 
OPLC, along with all the Olympic Fringe projects and associated budgets. 
This led to the establishment of a new OPLC design team, which is still 
in existence.
Andrew Altman’s first task was to address the hiatus with the 
Olympic legacy masterplan and get it back on track, so that it could 
secure formal approval in time to influence the ODA’s post-Games ‘trans-
formation’ plans and start to secure developer partners. It was clear that 
a rethink was needed in order to demonstrate to stakeholders that 
their criticism of the first proposals had been heard and taken on board. 
So, with Ricky Burdett’s help, Altman bolstered the KCAP/Allies and 
Morrison design team with a new cohort of ‘up-and-coming’ architects, 
including Witherford Watson Mann, Caruso St John, Maccreanor 
Lavington, West 8, Panter Hudspith and Vogt Landscape Architects. This 
team was given 100 days to critique and refine the legacy vision and 
proposals. This process was ultimately a success and its thoughtful 
work started to get to grips with important questions about character, 
place and how the park should relate to the neighbourhoods around it. 
The overall densities were reduced and more recognisable typologies 
were introduced to differentiate neighbourhoods. Another outcome of 
this process was that KCAP stepped away from the team and Maccreanor 
Lavington and Witherford Watson Mann became part of the consultant 
team, led by Allies and Morrison.
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The masterplan secured outline planning consent just before the 
opening of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and is currently 
being built out on site. It has subsequently been linked to a range of other 
DfL projects, including High Street 2012 (Chapter 3) and Olympic Fringe 
masterplans (Figure 6.15). Subsequently, University College London was 
allocated a large site in the south of the park for a new campus, and plans 
are being developed for a new cultural centre, East Bank, that will house 
Figure 6.15 A composite suite of masterplans for east London. Source: 
DfL Archive, DfL/GLA.
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a new Victoria and Albert museum, the London School of Fashion, the 
BBC, the Smithsonian and Sadler’s Wells dance company. Loughborough 
University and University College London have set up teaching and 
research space in Here East, previously the Olympic media centre.
In spring 2012, the London Legacy Development Corporation 
(LLDC), a mayoral development corporation, was established under the 
powers of the 2011 Localism Act with full planning and regeneration 
powers and accountable directly to Londoners via the mayor.
Stitching the Fringe
Fundamental to the approach to the Olympic Fringe, and central to DfL’s 
role in its transformation, were the six Olympic Fringe masterplans that 
DfL commissioned with the boroughs and the LTGDC (Figure 6.16). These 
were based on previous research that the team had carried out in the LLV 
OAPF. Although they differed in terms of timescale, brief, consultant 
team and client group, by 2010 they were all nearing completion and 
together they formed a reasonably robust strategy for investment and 
change in the surrounding area. These masterplans continued the theme 
of ‘planning with plans’ – a favourite DfL saying – and ensured that the 
tools were in place for the many parties involved to choreograph the 
process of change across the LLV. The masterplans were both strategies to 
steer future development and action plans comprising dozens of scoped 
individual projects. Collectively all of these projects would make a 
difference to the lives of local people and would integrate their neighbour-
hoods with the Olympic Park. These interventions ranged from playful, 
light-touch, ‘quick-win’ projects to the delivery of major infrastructural 
components required to ‘stitch’ new movement networks and connections 
through these new neighbourhoods. These places had always been a 
visible ‘tear’ in London’s fabric but new bridges, new stations and the 
radical redesign of ‘hostile’ road arteries would make these neighbour-
hoods places fit for people to live in.
The area in question was covered by four different boroughs. 
DfL’s work drew together the disparate pieces of otherwise fragmented 
neighbourhoods through propositional mapping that revealed how the 
area worked both physically and socially. The resultant plans were built 
on a subtle understanding of the qualities of place and the everyday – 
those elements of the urban landscape often obliterated by planning’s 
constant desire to tidy things up into sanitised neighbourhoods. The 
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quagmire of political and administrative boundaries with agility. In both 
process and product, it was a task of invisible mending (Figure 6.17a–c).
The six Olympic Fringe masterplans were as follows:
1. Leyton. Here the emphasis was on strengthening and improving an 
area that already had a robust character but was a neglected part of 
the borough and had poor links into the Olympic Park. A number 
of projects were developed to strengthen the High Street, improve 
Figure 6.17c Leyton: public realm 
creating new thresholds and identity 
(East, 2012). Source: DfL/GLA.
Figure 6.17a Improving connections: floating towpath at Bromley-by-
Bow. Source: DfL/GLA.
Figure 6.17b Hackney Marshes 
Centre (Stanton Williams, 2012). 
Source: DfL/GLA.
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key underused sites and forge stronger links with the Olympic Park 
through identifying and opening up new routes.
2. Hackney Marshes. Extensive yet bleak, this is the home of Sunday 
league football, with more than a hundred matches played every 
weekend. There had historically been low levels of investment 
in the facilities for this. The landscape masterplan replanned the 
Marshes to encourage wider use, for example by introducing cricket 
facilities and improving amenity around the edge along the river 
and canal. The projects upgraded the sports facilities with two new 
major buildings, provided a new cafe, improved entrance points to 
the Marshes, introduced paths and benches and planted hundreds 
of trees and bulbs.
3. Hackney Wick and Fish Island. This gritty area was home to a high 
concentration of artists and creative enterprises as well as local 
industry. The projects sought to protect this area, improve the 
public realm and acquire one of the key buildings, the White 
Building, as a creative hub.
4. Bromley-by-Bow. The projects linked together a number of key 
development sites to forge a new centre for the area, enhance the 
setting of important historical sites and address the severance 
caused by the A12, a major urban motorway. A key challenge 
here was the fragmented ownership of land. Sites were brought 
together through a carefully brokered masterplan co-cliented with 
the landowners.
5. Stratford town centre. This was already emerging as a major shopping 
district on the eastern edge of the park with the construction of 
the Westfield shopping complex. The imperative in this area was to 
devise projects to revitalise the existing shopping centre and the 
‘old’ town centre, to mitigate the fear that Westfield would prompt 
their demise. The plan also sought ways to reduce the impact of 
traffic and improve the public realm.
6. Stratford High Street and Sugarhouse Lane. In the heady months 
following London’s Olympic win, local landowners were among the 
first to cash in. What ensued in the policy vacuum was a swathe 
of high-density, poor-quality residential towers along Stratford 
High Street. The challenge of retrofitting a strategy and coherent 
sense of place to this now dysfunctional corridor is an ongoing one. 
In contrast, the tightly knit industrial enclave of Sugarhouse Lane 
was the location for the first conservation area designation within 
the LLV. The masterplan principles continue to guide exemplary 
developments that have created a mixed new neighbourhood.
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While it was accepted that the legacy masterplan process was on track to 
produce a good new piece of city, there were concerns about whether 
enough was being done to bring about the fundamental changes in 
the area that would be required if the chronic deprivation in many of the 
adjoining areas was to be addressed by Olympic-related investment. 
These concerns were already being raised by the five host boroughs9 
who had signed up to the Olympics (and had accepted its short-term 
disruption) in the expectation of long-term benefits for their communities. 
By 2010 they were beginning to put pressure on government and had 
drawn up a ‘shopping list’ of projects totalling over £150 million – money 
that the government (the Department for Communities and Local 
Government) did not have. The pressure to show concrete improvements 
in the Olympic Fringe neighbourhoods was compounded by the lurking 
threat that within a couple of years east London would be in the 
global spotlight and overrun by journalists seeking fresh angles on 
London’s story. No one in government wanted to see striking examples of 
deprivation and degraded landscapes exposed just a stone’s throw from 
the Olympic site (Figure 6.18).
As with many of DfL’s initiatives, this presented an opportunity 
for involvement and to deliver benchmark projects on the ground. The 
Figure 6.18 Degraded environment adjacent to the Olympic Park. 
Source: DfL/GLA.
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political pressure from the host boroughs for funding to deliver capital 
improvements was reaching a stalemate. The boroughs’ vast shopping 
list of disparate projects was too expensive and too fragmented for 
central government to fund. At the GLA’s request, DfL began to work with 
the host boroughs to filter and coordinate the projects into prioritised, 
costed project packages, each of which had a clear rationale. The Olympic 
Fringe masterplans provided a ready scoped framework for these to 
slot into. This approach was agile and embedded in the governance 
structures of the area. Long-established working relationships initiated 
in the pre-Olympic period made it easy to sell the idea and harness 
enthusiastic support.
Ultimately over £100 million was secured from a range of different 
funds (Figure 6.19) to deliver a major programme of capital investments 
across the Fringe before the start of the Olympics in 2012. DfL played a 
central role in coordinating and providing design sign-off across these 
projects, including the management of a coordination group chaired 
by Peter Bishop. Most of this funding came from existing budgets or 
from generic programmes where there was underspend or where the 
allocation had yet to be agreed. The trick was to know where the money 
was located and to have a series of simple, low-risk, ready-to-go projects 
to soak it up. Accountancy was one of the essential urban planning skills 
that the team had acquired.
The projects were a typical example of the ‘catch and steer’ approach: 
a series of phased incremental interventions that are practical and 
realistic, and provide local solutions to local problems. The approach 
was well suited to DfL’s work, inasmuch as it was participatory, immediate 
and low-risk and could yield high political rewards. As a technique it could, 
if handled well, leave behind more confident and resilient communities 
and increase social capital. This approach involved a form of curated 
change in neighbourhoods using a large number of small spatial interven-
tions that individually might be insignificant, but collectively would help 
to stitch together the area. The benefit of this approach was that it was 
open-ended: the projects could emerge from community consultation and 
be realised through a wide range of different actors and budgets.
Making seemingly small project interventions actually happen on 
the ground played a powerful role in seeding and testing strategic visions, 
such as the proposed new town centres. It established benchmarks and a 
design ethos that influenced the projects and developments which would 
follow. In a context where there was a real risk that the Olympic Fringe 
masterplans would simply gather dust and be forgotten, this opportunity 
delivered a first phase of creative, ambitious projects utilising £12.5 
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Figure 6.19 Mapping of Olympic Fringe public realm projects, showing 
coordination of seven different funding streams to create an integrated, 
strategic intervention, 2012. Source: DfL/GLA.
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million secured by DfL from the LDA. These projects, and the careful 
approach to managing change, have profoundly influenced the areas that 
surround the Olympic Park, most notably Hackney Wick and Fish Island.
A key part of DfL’s influence on this work was to ensure that the 
strategies and projects were based on an appreciation of the places 
and people of the LLV. The Fringe masterplans were fundamentally a 
celebration of the Lea Valley – an urban edge with an enduring spirit of 
wildness and anarchy. Here, many communities marginalised from 
‘mainstream’ London could feel at home. The challenge was to reconcile 
the tabula rasa approach to planning unleashed on the area by the 
Olympic project with the LLV’s fragile, special qualities. At the heart of 
DfL’s work was a desire to understand in practical, deliverable terms how 
these qualities could continue to permeate the character of the future 
places. Accordingly, the first phase of publicly funded projects focused on 
protecting industrial heritage and waterway landscapes, and building 
new pieces of movement infrastructure.
Even to talk about ‘heritage’ in the LLV in the early days of 
the regeneration project was considered laughable. Other than hidden 
gems such as Bazalgette’s pumping station at Abbey Mills, there was no 
acknowledgement of the importance of the remaining few pockets 
of industrial buildings and yards from the LLV’s heyday as a hive of 
industrial innovation. DfL’s emphasis on valuing the overlooked but 
special qualities of the areas where they worked underpinned an 
ambitious use of conservation area designations for these vulnerable 
areas. This recognised that conservation area legislation, while more 
typically associated with preserving ‘traditional’ heritage areas, was a 
powerful tool to control demolition and secure high-quality design. Some 
carefully managed change was also encouraged. Conservation areas 
were designated just in time to control new development and protect 
the quality of place. The result is that Sugarhouse Lane, Hackney Wick 
and Fish Island have been retained as quirky pieces of city that house a 
vibrant, creative local economy. The unbroken lineage of creative manu-
facturing which had taken place in these buildings and yards was integral 
to the heritage value of the area. Conservation area designation has 
ensured that ‘making’ activities still take place in the identified heritage 
buildings. These have been preserved against speculative residential 
developments that would have obliterated the character of the area.
DfL also commissioned a number of radical and creative park and 
public realm projects. These aimed to use the opportunities presented 
by landscapes that are malleable and ecologically rich, and to embody 
the essential qualities of the area’s industrial past. They form part of a far 
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wider network of open spaces within east London. The East London 
Green Grid, devised by DfL (Chapter 5), provided a framework to 
integrate and upgrade disparate landscapes into a model for growth and 
regeneration. The Fringe plans and projects used this concept of 
connected landscapes to form a linear park that connects the Olympic 
Park to the Thames (Figure 6.20).
Hackney Wick and Fish Island (HWFI) form the western flank 
of the Olympic Park. This is a special area of old industrial buildings, many 
of which are occupied by the creative sector. The area benefited greatly 
from the five-year pause in development activity that was triggered by the 
global financial crash of 2008. This created a window of opportunity 
for DfL to work with the boroughs and those living and working in the 
area, in order to understand how to support positive change once 
development pressure resumed. The process of familiarisation had been 
Figure 6.20 A linear park for the Lower Lea Valley (5th Studio). Source: 
DfL archive, DfL/GLA.
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developed in other successful DfL initiatives at Barking, Bankside and 
Dalston. It was characteristically granular and entailed spending a great 
deal of time on the ground exploring and talking to local residents. 
DfL appointed muf architecture/art (who became integral to the team’s 
work in the area over the years) to undertake the first-ever audit and 
mapping of artists and businesses within the area. This revealed a huge 
concentration of artists. It identified 610 studios with up to five artists per 
studio, making it possibly the highest density of artists in Europe. This 
survey represented a watershed moment for the future of HWFI. Almost 
overnight it transformed the attitude of public-sector partners towards 
the area. A shared appreciation of its distinctive qualities began to emerge. 
To flesh this out, DfL commissioned a local architecture student, Richard 
Brown, to document the local vernacular of informal live–work studios 
which had emerged in converted industrial sheds. Typically, these were 
small studios clustered around large central shared spaces that hosted 
circus and theatre performances, radio stations, pop-up restaurants, 
sculptors’ workshops and film festivals. Brown’s resulting book, Creative 
Factories (2013), included photographs, interviews and scale drawings 
as well as details of rents and leases. This became a portal for local stake-
holders to peek into an otherwise mysterious, hidden world (Figures 6.21 
and 6.22).
The real challenge was to find the right way for DfL and the public 
sector to respond, to be helpful rather than inadvertently undermine the 
very characteristics that were being uncovered. Working with muf, DfL 
Figure 6.21 Hackney Wick and Fish Island’s creative communities. 
Source: DfL/GLA.
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was developing an approach of ‘temporary moves to influence what 
comes next’: ‘in this reversed form of masterplanning, strategy begins 
with the detail’.10 DfL opened the discussions with key individuals from 
the HWFI creative community by asking, ‘How can we help?’. Three 
strands of activity emerged:
– Improve the condition of streets and pavements (which was woeful 
at the time).
– Find ways for the creative businesses and activities to have more 
visibility, status and public presence, so that they would be less 
vulnerable when development did commence.
– Support the evolution of the creative sector in HWFI, and build its 
capacity to engage positively with the opportunities of the Olympic 
Park next door, and with future developers.
The public-realm projects that were delivered in HWFI were consciously 
conceived by muf architecture/art and J & L Gibbons landscape architects 
as a series of benchmark projects. It was an opportunity to set the tone 
and ethos to influence projects by others in the future. The public realm 
projects were ‘locally sourced’ in a variety of ways. These ranged from 
using terrazzo made from aggregate from the McGrath Bros. waste depot 
in Hackney Wick, to using local apprentices to build benches and walls, 
Figure 6.22 Extract from Creative Factories by Richard Brown, 2013. 
Source: London Legacy Development Corporation.
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to commissioning a local metal workshop to fabricate a copy of a 
Hollywood-style ‘HACKNEY WICK’ sign (which a local artist had made 
from card and erected on a local studio building). In addition to these 
characterful physical projects, careful attention was given to nurturing 
the use of these spaces through curated programming. For example, the 
Street Interrupted project – which created a new public space by planting 
a mature tree in the middle of the road outside the Pearl cafe and 
See Studio gallery (the first of each to open in HWFI) – was activated by 
funded outdoor play sessions (Figure 6.23). This aimed to ensure that 
residents from the nearby housing estates felt that this new space was 
as much for them as for the hipsters beginning to congregate in HWFI. 
Similarly, the provision of new fruit- and vegetable-growing spaces, 
which the project delivered for Gainsborough Primary School in Hackney 
Wick, included funding for the chef at the Pearl cafe to run cooking 
sessions with the schoolchildren.
The White Building was another important DfL-led project that 
established a true ‘hub’ for the area where the many groups with local 
connections could meet and engage with the processes of change. These 
included local artists, residents from the wider area, developers scoping 
out the area and factory workers. The project took a lease on a derelict 
two-storey print workshop located on the canal at one of the future 
entrances to the Olympic Park. This location was significant as the project 
sought to act as a ‘stepping stone’ and ultimately to encourage local 
communities to connect with the legacy parklands and facilities in the 
Olympic Park. It also opened up the first public space on the canal. DfL 
Figure 6.23 The Street Interrupted project, Hackney Wick (muf 
architecture/art with J & L Gibbons, 2012). Source: London Legacy 
Development Corporation.
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ran a design competition and David Kohn Architects (shortlisted for the 
2009 Young Architect of the Year award) was appointed. The project 
created space for the creative sector to deliver more public activities, 
including a studio for international artist residencies, an event space, and 
a cafe (including an on-site brewery). Space Studios was appointed to 
run the project, with the fit-out and the first five years’ rent funded by the 
DfL Olympic Fringe budgets.
The White Building and Street Interrupted were projects that 
piloted and tested what the character of the proposed new town centre at 
Hackney Wick might be and how it could be rooted in the distinctiveness 
of the place. Building on the success of the White Building, further 
community-based pilot projects were delivered by the DfL team within 
the Hackney Wick town centre, for example:
– Frontside Gardens skateboard and BMX park – a ‘meanwhile’ project 
occupying a publicly owned site from 2012 to 2016. This hugely 
successful outdoor park was built by the local community, with 
some help and supervision, using leftover materials from the 2012 
Olympics construction. The project held training sessions for girls 
and under-10s, as well as training local young people to help 
manage the park.
– Hub 67 – a vibrant and well-used community centre built from 
cabins salvaged from the Olympic media centre (Figure 6.24).
Figure 6.24 Hub 67 and Frontside Gardens in the heart of Hackney 
Wick, 2014 (David Kohn Architects with muf architecture/art, 2012). 
Source: London Legacy Development Corporation.
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This phase of delivering creative and experimental projects and 
initiatives ‘on the ground’ with local communities was completed with 
the opening of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012. The 
next phase was to put in place the infrastructure and statutory planning 
framework needed to ensure that the rapidly approaching wave of 
development would be of the highest calibre and would strengthen 
rather than diminish the qualities of HWFI. The body of work that had 
already been completed gave all the organisations involved, led by the 
LLDC, a clear vision and the confidence to be bold in setting stringent 
rules and demanding the best. A significant swathe of HWFI was 
designated as a conservation area (Figure 6.25). Planning policies set out 
rules regarding the replacement of all affordable workspace and height 
limits for new buildings, and gave guidance on the design of the public 
realm, including incorporating working yards into schemes. The LLDC 
took a lead on masterplanning and facilitating the coordinated delivery 
of the proposed new town centre at Hackney Wick (Figure 6.26). This 
included securing the funding and delivery of a new station building 
that was integrated into new pedestrian routes (Figure 6.27). The 
transformation of HWFI is now well underway, with developments at 
Figure 6.25 Heritage buildings within the HWFI conservation areas, 
2013. Source: London Legacy Development Corporation.
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Figure 6.26 Masterplan for Hackney Wick town centre (Witherford 
Watson Mann and KCAP, 2017). Source: London Legacy Development 
Corporation.
Figure 6.27 Hackney Wick station (Landolt + Brown Architects, 
2018). Source: London Legacy Development Corporation.
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various stages across 22 sites. The LLDC has already approved 2,500 new 
homes and over 61,000 square metres of studio/workspace for the area.
The Olympic legacy has established new town centres around 
the Olympic Park that anchor the existing and new communities into the 
park. Here East, the former Olympic media and press centre, has been 
repurposed as a buzzing centre of academic institutions in media and 
design, as well as incubator spaces. East Bank will be a new cultural 
quarter for London, housing several internationally renowned museums 
and institutions. HWFI has been designated as a Creative Enterprise Zone 
by the Mayor of London and the workspaces and creative industries are 
seen as integral to its identity and value. Inevitably, a new generation of 
artists and businesses is now moving into the new workshops and the area 
is evolving. While it feels very different in places, HWFI is widely recognised 
as providing a benchmark of city-making with integrity and coherence.
Stretching the Fringe: strategies for the Royal Docks
Persuading developers to invest in east London was a problem that had 
bedevilled numerous attempts over the years to shift development 
eastwards where there was a surplus of brownfield land and areas of 
social deprivation. The Olympics provided a major new plank in this 
strategy and there was little doubt that it would regenerate the Lea Valley 
around Stratford. The LLDC was charged with spreading benefits out 
into the immediate surroundings including Hackney Wick, Leyton and 
the Lower Lea Valley. The Fringe masterplans were a vehicle to achieve 
this. However, the central problem remained: why was the market not 
responding to development opportunities on sites that were close to the 
financial centres of the City and Canary Wharf, were in public ownership 
and well served by public transport? Part of the problem was branding, 
and the concept of the Green Enterprise Zone (Chapter 2) had been used, 
with some success, to address this. The east London Green Enterprise 
District was not a plan, but a conceptual narrative that sought to answer 
Boris Johnson’s questions about a wider Olympic legacy and the need to 
regenerate the Royal Docks, respond to the near-collapse of the financial 
sector after the Lehman Brothers crash and establish some environmen-
tal credentials for the mayor. The idea of a loose and extensive zone for 
the low-carbon economy was easy to grasp and within two weeks an 
enthusiastic mayor was presenting it to the prime minister.11
The next stage was to detail it for the Royal Docks. Clive Dutton had 
just been appointed as Director of Regeneration at Newham.12 He knew 
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Peter Bishop and they shared a common approach to regeneration. They 
agreed that the current regeneration strategy needed to be rethought. 
First, they concluded that Newham’s planning powers and the LDA’s land 
effectively made them a two-man development corporation. Second, 
they counted more than 70 plans that had been drawn up for the area 
since the 1970s. What was not needed was another plan! Third, none of 
the plans had succeeded in articulating the area’s unique characteristics. 
Promoting opportunities for ‘mixed-use development’ just did not capture 
the public imagination. Fourth, Dutton worked for a Labour mayor, 
Sir Robin Wales, and Bishop worked for a Conservative mayor, Boris 
Johnson. Although the mayors were not that far apart in their approaches 
to regeneration, for investors it represented a potential political minefield 
that was best avoided. The final problem was one of momentum. East 
London had always developed through a series of eastward ‘lurches’. 
Canary Wharf, ExCeL London13 and London City Airport had all been 
successful but had not triggered further development. The concern was 
that the Olympics would be the same.
A compelling narrative was required – one that would bridge 
the divide between residents’ and developers’ interests as well as the 
perceived political divide. A new narrative was brainstormed over a (very 
extended) Friday lunch with Isabel Allen (DfL’s press and publications 
manager). As Peter Bishop and Philip Singleton (Clive Dutton’s deputy) 
discussed the issues and a way forward, Allen took notes. By Monday she 
had worked these up into a strategy document that was presented to 
Robin Wales and Simon Milton (Boris Johnson’s chief of staff at the GLA) 
the following week. The strategy set out a simple, clear vision for the area 
as a business logistics support area for London based on City Airport and 
ExCeL. One could fly in and out for business from almost any major 
European city. The Royal Docks would provide a location for headquarters 
and regional offices, logistics centres and hotels (Figure 6.28). There 
would be local jobs and a range of housing, including affordable units, 
and a high-quality and environmentally sustainable environment. Both 
mayors were convinced by the vision14 and signed the foreword, thus 
giving it the instant seal of approval. The entire process took less than a 
month15 and the strategy was launched in March 2010 at the MIPIM 
international property conference in Cannes. A joint delivery board was 
set up between the GLA and Newham to detail a programme of action 
and a site was found for Siemens to build a new European research and 
development centre.16 Momentum was maintained through a series of 
temporary projects: Meanwhile London (Figure 6.29). Other projects 
included the London cable car17 and a major new business centre 
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Figure 6.28 Central London and the Royal Docks: strategy context. 
Source: Royal Docks Strategy, February 2010. DfL/GLA.
Figure 6.29 Temporary use proposals for Silvertown Quay. Source: 
Meanwhile Uses in the Royal Docks, March 2010, DfL/GLA.
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developed by ABP of Beijing.18 This was the first major move into the 
London market by a Chinese developer. The two-man development 
corporation model had achieved results.
Conclusions and lessons
The period of the run-up to the London Olympics was extraordinary. 
From 2000, London had a mayoral government that was capable of 
fashioning a global vision for the metropolis, and there was a national 
government that was forward-looking and ambitious for the UK to punch 
above its weight on the global stage. London government had been 
re-established, was becoming operationally mature and had developed 
influence with central government. The economy was booming and this 
seemed destined to continue into the far-distant future. The award of the 
Olympic Games to London in July 2005 perhaps marked the high point of 
the period. DfL was very much a product of this period.
Later came the 2008 Lehman Brothers crash, recession in the 
London economy, a change of mayor, a national government that imposed 
austerity measures, and street riots in London in 2011. London did, 
however, put on an Olympics that many would recognise as one of the 
most successful ever. London had proved its resilience. Notwithstanding a 
set of false starts, there is no doubt that the legacy is being delivered 
in a way that no other city has yet managed. Whether it is meeting the 
original aspirations is debatable. A new district is emerging in east 
London, fulfilling the overall promise of the original bid, but many of the 
elements, such as high streets, town centres and a wide mix of different 
housing tenures and workplaces, have not yet been delivered.
From a design perspective, one of the lessons is that projects of this 
size and scale do represent unique opportunities to reshape cities. The 
problem is that the stakes are so high that operational conservatism 
is likely to take hold early on. The mantra ‘on time and on budget’ might 
sound compelling when repeated often enough, but it ignores the 
obvious question, ‘Is it any good?’ More often than not, it is an excuse for 
sloppy thinking and lazy mediocrity. Good design is often seen as largely 
irrelevant by those in power; promoting it therefore requires a degree of 
political acumen and stubbornness. It also requires guile and stamina.
DfL could be described as the ‘guerrilla warfare’ wing of London 
architecture. In its role on the Olympics, it operated behind the scenes to 
shape some of the key components of the project and round off many of 
the blunt edges of the original Olympic masterplan. By encouraging an 
appreciation of the special qualities of existing places, DfL promoted a 
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richer design approach. This has ultimately added value to the schemes 
and created places with real character and integrity. DfL worked within 
the political and institutional context of London to exert influence, 
assemble alliances of like-minded individuals and agencies, and ensure 
that good design and sophisticated urban strategies were embedded in 
the process. In doing this it used strategies of infiltration, alliance-
building and incremental urbanism to improve the outcomes.
The regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley grappled with many issues 
common to other major urban redevelopments: integrating new with 
existing communities; delivering the right infrastructure, amenity and 
connectivity; and ensuring that private schemes deliver the big vision. 
But, due to the 2012 Olympics, it did so at a vastly accelerated pace. The 
changes that occurred in just a decade in the LLV would ordinarily take a 
generation or more to unfold. The strategies and projects that have now 
been delivered in the LLV therefore provide an excellent opportunity 
for learning. It was a time of ambition and experimentation, where DfL 
played a central role. The projects are showing all kinds of outcomes – 
good and bad, expected and unexpected. The evolution of the LLV 
continues, and the regeneration is far from ‘finished’. However, the 
projects and initiatives now underway have learned from the earlier phase 
of projects and noted where opportunities were missed. The planning 
policies – in particular, the strategic vision and five key spatial principles 
Figure 6.30 The Lower Lea Valley (KCAP, 2008). Source: DfL/GLA.
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established in the LLV OAPF – have proved to be remarkably resilient and 
continue to act as a kind of bedrock. They still enable the many processes 
of change that are underway to be delivered by a multitude of actors, to 
create integrated and coherent places (Figure 6.30).
Notes
 1 See Ken Livingstone’s Introduction to this book.
 2 In 2011 London overtook New York to become the top city in the global city rankings (Mori 
Foundation 2012).
 3 Inspiration, the 2012 London Olympics bid film, Miros Films International, 2005.
 4 Amsterdam’s 2028 bid was later abandoned.
 5 Conversation with Peter Bishop and Ricky Burdett in 2009.
 6 Art historian and curator, who served as the Director of the Tate from 1988 to 2017. He is 
currently Chair of Arts Council England.
 7 The panel who had interviewed all of the architects was not consulted on this change in 
decision.
 8 In 2012 this became a mayoral development corporation, the London Legacy Development 
Corporation.
 9 The main Olympic Park was shared by the four boroughs of Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney, 
and Waltham Forest, while the fifth borough was Greenwich, where equestrian events were 
held.
10 muf architecture/art, 2009.
11 The concept led to Siemens investing in their European research centre (the Crystal) and 
ultimately to investment from Chinese firms in a business park.
12 Clive Dutton had been Director of Regeneration in Birmingham, where he had been 
instrumental in some of the projects that had transformed the city.
13 The London Exhibition Centre.
14 The compromise was an interesting one. Both supported the idea of employment, and the role 
of the area did not threaten any established business areas. For Newham it removed the risk of 
extensive housing development, much of which would be private, and which could have the 
potential to change the political composition of the (Labour-voting) south of the borough.
15 A statutory Local Plan would have taken three years.
16 From first meeting with Siemens to the start on site took 10 months, including site acquisition, 
planning approval, procurement, design and construction contracts.
17 The cable car (Emirates Air Line) has been criticised as a Johnson ‘vanity project’. Its purpose 
was to act as a giant billboard to advertise the opportunities in the Royal Docks on the back of 
the Olympics. It also has a carrying capacity that is the equivalent of 40 buses an hour. The 
majority of funding came from the EU and from sponsorship (naming) rights. All developers 
under the ‘flight path’ donated their air rights free of charge.
18 The ABP Albert Dock business centre was on an LDA site that was sold to them following an 
open tender. The new centre will be occupied by a large number of Chinese firms operating out 
of self-contained small offices. This could be one of the most significant new commercial 
developments in London. According to Peter Bishop, ‘this is China’s version of what Hong Kong 
was for the British in the nineteenth century’.
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Selling the story: promotion,  
publicity and procurement
isabel allen, Peter Bishop and Eva herr
Good design is never a given. Many of the people who are involved in city 
planning, politics or development are not trained in any of the design 
disciplines and are likely to see architecture as either an impenetrable 
(and elitist) discipline or worse, a purely subjective field where their 
personal opinions are worthy contributions to the debate. It is surprising 
how many politicians deduce that because they may not like a building, it 
is per se a bad piece of architecture. The same individuals would probably 
not apply the same logic to the work of an artist or musician – whether 
one likes or dislikes Wagner, for instance, has no bearing on his standing 
as a composer. In addition, there are people who view architects with 
active suspicion – as a group of impractical individuals who are likely to 
cost the public purse a great deal of extra money.
Design for London (DfL) was fortunate to be working in a period 
when there was an interest in design quality. The Blair government 
had set up the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment 
(CABE) and was promoting a forward-looking vision of Britain that 
embraced the creative sector. The National Lottery had funded major 
Millennium projects that included the Great Court at the British 
Museum and the new Tate Modern. These important new buildings were 
undoubtedly popular with the public. Finally, a buoyant economy had 
fuelled a mood of optimism in a development sector that was conse-
quently more likely to take a degree of risk with contemporary design. 
The mood spilled over into society and many more people were spending 
their rising incomes on fashion, music, entertainment and consumer 
products. Design was cool and it was arriving in the city.
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The political context
The two London mayors who covered the period of the Architecture 
and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) and DfL had contrasting approaches to 
design. Whether Ken Livingstone had any deep interest in architecture is 
debatable, but he did appreciate its role in a wider vision for London 
on the world stage. He also recognised that London had lagged behind 
cities like Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam in terms of the public realm and 
public spaces. His appointment of Richard Rogers as architectural advisor 
was as much a political act as an appreciation of his architectural skills.1 
Consequently, the A+UU was seen as a vehicle to push an urban agenda 
based on the recommendations of the Urban Task Force.2 Livingstone 
rarely expressed any views about architecture or design. When he made 
interventions, it was from a political perspective. He was generally 
supportive, but if he saw adverse political consequences, he would stamp 
down hard.
In contrast, Boris Johnson expressed some interest in architecture 
and design, but from a perspective that was largely based on personal 
preferences. He was interested in grand gestures3 and ‘vernacular’ styles 
of design, and viewed ‘ornamentation’ as a desirable attribute of any new 
building. This meant that his relationship with Richard Rogers, whom he 
inherited from the Livingstone administration, was destined to be short. 
Planning matters were largely left in the hands of his main advisor, 
Sir Simon Milton, an experienced politician and ex-leader of Westminster 
Council. He was brought into the Greater London Authority (GLA) as a 
‘safe pair of hands’. He showed little interest in design but understood 
that good design was worth promoting and that the abolition of DfL 
would send the wrong message. He was therefore prepared to tolerate 
the team, even agreeing to set up a Mayoral Design Advisory Group.
Creating a profile
The essential difference between the A+UU and DfL was their profiles. 
The A+UU worked within the GLA to produce ideas and influence 
programmes and policy. Although it did not seek publicity, it had in fact 
been targeted by Building Design magazine and accused of manipulating 
public procurement in favour of a small coterie of favoured practices. 
Although this was not correct, it was a damaging campaign; it is covered 
in greater detail in the section on procurement later in this chapter. 
The creation of DfL featured prominently in the architectural press with 
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much speculation as to who would be appointed to lead the team. As a 
profile had been created, DfL decided from the outset to exploit this.
A high-press profile is a dangerous strategy for any public body, 
particularly as bad news has greater currency than positive stories. The 
reasoning, however, was that for a team with no defined role within 
the structure of London government, no budgets and no powers, profile 
would be a positive asset. This would allow it to deploy the soft power 
that it had by virtue of its (perceived) direct access to the mayor in order 
to influence and persuade those in the public and private sectors to 
divert resources to support its own agenda. It is very unusual for an 
institution within government to be allowed a public profile and to use 
this to campaign. It is interesting to note that CABE took a similar 
approach. This is possibly a reflection of the unique times in which both 
organisations operated. A second reason for a high profile was that 
DfL intended to be propositional and not to become an institutionalised 
part of government. It was given considerable licence by Livingstone to 
challenge existing practices and promote new ideas. In exercising this 
role DfL was operating within a broad political context that had been set 
by the mayor and reasoned that a positive press could be a conduit for 
disseminating new ideas, engendering public debate and building new 
alliances. A high press profile would make it easier to promote big ideas 
for London and to influence others to carry them through. A high profile, 
however, is always likely to create enemies and at times this turned out to 
be the case for DfL.
One of DfL’s first actions was to create an International Advisory 
Group. This was loosely based on the experience of Barcelona. With 
Richard Rogers as the mayoral advisor, it was easy to attract a high-profile 
group that included Spencer de Grey, Peter St John, Hanif Kara, Martha 
Schwartz and Kees Christiaanse. Other members brought in expertise 
from housing, property and environmental sustainability. The creation 
of the group coincided with DfL’s official launch party and attracted 
considerable press interest, thus maintaining momentum behind the 
new team. The advisory group’s purpose was to extend DfL’s networks 
and to use them as a conduit to find new ideas and approaches that 
could be applied to London. The team met four times a year and many 
members put in a considerable amount of their own time to champion 
individual projects and act as expert advisors in their own fields. At times 
when DfL’s future was in the balance, they acted as powerful advocates 
in its support.
The consequence of a high-profile strategy was that the team 
was constantly exposed to media scrutiny. The stories of the A+UU’s 
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alleged bias against certain architectural practices continued to circulate, 
particularly in Building Design magazine. Isabel Allen, who had just 
stepped down as editor of The Architects’ Journal, was taken on as 
Communications Director with a brief to manage the press and promote 
the work of the team through publications, events and exhibitions. In the 
paragraphs below Isabel reflects on her experience in this role.
The communications game – by Isabel Allen
As DfL’s Communications Director I was faced with a conundrum. The 
work, by its very nature, was tricky to capture, let alone to communicate. 
We were operating in the run-up to the Olympics and the press was 
awash with controversial soundbites about bold, expensive buildings, 
along with an endless stream of glossy, computer-generated images. DfL 
was developing and implementing strategies that were long-term, subtle 
and rather more elusive. It was concerned with routes and connections 
and patterns of use, with spaces that were underused or overlooked or 
impossible to define. Its drawings were often at district or city scale and, 
however thoughtful the content, however beautiful the execution, it is 
hard to get people excited about a map. It is harder still to create any kind 
of stir around the intricacies of policy or procurement, however crucial 
they may be to the city.
Yet DfL’s Director, Peter Bishop, was absolutely clear about the 
responsibilities of running an organisation that was funded by taxpayers’ 
money and whose very existence was dependent on the mayor’s personal 
support. We had an obligation not just to our city, but to our citizens. 
Our job was not simply to guide and prompt and nudge our way towards 
a better city, but to explain ourselves as well – to make it plain to the 
electorate that the city was in good hands. ‘You are only as good as what 
you communicate’ was a recurring refrain.
So, we set about the task of finding ways to make our work engaging 
and exciting not just to the architectural and political cognoscenti but 
to a wider audience. Our first major exhibition, London: Open City, at 
London’s Somerset House (Figure 7.1), sought to communicate both the 
range and diversity of London’s public spaces and the complexity of its 
governance.4
The mood was set by a series of tourist telescopes in the entrance 
hall. Instead of offering a magnified view of the prospect immediately 
across the Thames, they revealed film footage of unexpected and little- 
known corners of the city: a riding school underneath the Westway, 
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Hackney Marshes – where teams from a wide range of ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds gather to play football against each other at weekends – 
and panoramas of the Thames at Rainham. An entire wall of the first 
exhibition room was given over to a complex diagram charting the 
countless organisations and interest groups involved in shaping London’s 
public realm (see Figure 0.1 on p. 1). The idea was not to explain how the 
city was designed but to communicate the complexity of the process – 
that design was rooted in political brokerage. Another room was 
wallpapered in life-size photographs of trees in Epping Forest, as a reminder 
of the extraordinary diversity of London’s public spaces. It was also 
furnished with a giant postcard rack offering free postcards of each of the 
spaces included in London’s Green Grid and a stack of maps showing how 
to find each space. The hope was that visitors would be inspired to see 
London from a different perspective and explore corners of the city they 
had never visited before. The exhibition proved both popular and surpris-
ingly adaptable. London: Open City was quickly followed by Open City 
Bucharest, where we reworked the content for an international audience, 
and Open City in the Park,5 where we reworked the content to be weath-
er-proof, vandal-proof and entirely devoid of walls.
While the exhibitions worked hard to communicate the breadth 
and depth of DfL’s work, their primary aim was to engage and entertain. 
Figure 7.1 London: Open City at Somerset House, 2008. Source: Isabel 
Allen/DfL/GLA.
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Our next exhibition at Somerset House, ‘If I Could …’, was more direct in 
its intent. DfL had been accused by its detractors of being opaque in its 
dealings, particularly with regard to the way architects were commis-
sioned for public-sector projects.6 The response was to face this criticism 
head on and to establish a new Architectural and Design Framework 
Panel for London government to use.7 In addition to standard questions 
about their financial resilience and experience, applicants for the panel 
were posed an additional question that had been devised to explore 
their creativity and design ability. The question was: ‘If I could design 
London I would … ’. Applicants were asked to submit a single A1 board to 
illustrate their idea and this was given a weighting of 50 per cent of the 
total points in the appointment process (Figures 7.2 and 7.3). This was 
an entirely legitimate way of selecting architects’ practices, but no one 
had ever done this before. After much internal debate, the London 
Development Agency (LDA) agreed to proceed. In the spirit of transpar-
ency, open advertisements were placed in the architectural press 
(including Building Design) and we took the decision to make all of the 
responses part of an exhibition, inviting visitors to make up their own 
minds as to the relative merits of the entries and to add their own ideas 
to the mix.
The response from the public was overwhelming. People came, not 
only to the exhibitions, but also to the accompanying programme of 
lectures and debates. They signed up for our newsletters and read our 
publications. It seemed that we had tapped into a genuine enthusiasm for 
architecture’s more prosaic allies: urban design, planning, development 
and public space. More wonderful still, it seemed that the public shared 
our conviction that spaces shape our culture, that buildings can soothe 
our souls – that we could design our way to prosperity, to stability, to 
radical social change.
It was too good to last. It is possible to pinpoint the beginning of the 
end to one particular day: Friday, 20 June 2008 – the launch of London’s 
Architecture Week. We had been working round the clock to transform 
the courtyard of Somerset House into a fitting backdrop for the launch 
party. The installation aimed to reflect the Livingstone agenda loud and 
clear and give the message that London’s most hallowed public spaces 
were being reclaimed by Londoners – that informality and accessibility 
were the order of the day. We had decked out the courtyard as London’s 
Largest Living Room: a place for lounging on the sofa, an invitation to 
ordinary people – ‘whole new audiences’ – to linger in the courtyard, curl 
up on a sofa, eat a takeaway and feel at home. This being a civic gesture, 
a celebration of the civic realm, we had gone for civic scale. Everything 
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Figure 7.2 Images from ‘If I could design London I would … ’: a series 
of design propositions for London. Source: Isabel Allen/DfL/GLA.
was outsize. We had installed a chequered rug of car-park-like proportions, 
and gargantuan chairs and sofas. There was space to clamber, climb and 
party (Figure 7.4). This was a cheery domestic counterpart to Sir William 
Chambers’ classical façades – a sign that standing-up-and-making-
stilted-conversation had been consigned to history. It was photogenic, 
punchy, populist: the kind of quick-hit one-liner that Livingstone excelled 
at, that politicians like.
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But Ken was out, Boris was in. Boris would now launch the exhibition 
and make the opening speech. Suddenly the installation did not seem 
so clever after all. I was due to meet him at the entrance and brief him 
on the event. We did not know his views on architecture, or on the 
democratisation of public space. But I had a pretty shrewd idea he’d take 
Figure 7.3 ‘If I could design London I would … ’: Trumpets on the 
Thames. Source: Design for London archive, DfL/GLA.
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the view that rarefied classical courtyards were best left just the way they 
were. I did my best to brief him. He looked bemused, questioning, mildly 
appalled. The lines I had prepared for Livingstone felt puerile, adolescent. 
Clearly he was unconvinced.
As it happened, there was to be one final ‘last huzzah’ – the London 
exhibition at Shanghai Expo 2010. Plans for the exhibition had been 
rumbling along for years. The LDA had reviewed a succession of pitches 
and proposals from high-tech, high-profile, high-budget consultants. 
But nothing seemed to stick. Nobody could agree. There was too much 
bling, too little content; too many ideas, too little clarity. Time was 
running out. More to the point, times had changed. With the Olympics 
around the corner, the emphasis was on delivery, not vision – on tracking 
costs, cutting back, reining in, tightening belts. There were concerns 
about recession, unemployment and crime. The electorate (according to 
the media, at least) was after reassurance.
In this project, as with so many others, the LDA was failing to deliver 
and had blown most of the budget with nothing to show for it. Ideas that 
had looked ambitious and impressive now seemed leaden and mundane.8 
There was a general consensus that the emphasis should be on content as 
opposed to showmanship, that we should view this as an opportunity not 
Figure 7.4 London’s ‘Living Room’: exhibition for the London Festival 
of Architecture, 2008. Source: Isabel Allen/DfL/GLA.
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to dazzle and compete but to communicate London’s priorities and 
direction on an international stage – except that nobody was quite sure 
what they were. The transition from a Livingstone to a Johnson adminis-
tration had brought a degree of confusion. No one really knew which 
messages or policy strands were likely to be dropped or revised. And 
there was a shortage of cash. The budget had been eroded by long-since-
aborted schemes. The budget for packaging, transport, insurance – and a 
world-class exhibition – was a little over £100,000. By the time DfL was 
drafted in to organise the exhibition, it was starting to look like an 
impossible task. To compound matters, the expo was due to open in less 
than 11 months and London did not even have a venue.
By chance we had met Bill Dunster of ZEDfactory, who also had a 
problem. He had designed and built a venue but had no content. This was 
a marriage made in heaven. We adopted a strategy that killed two birds 
with one stone. The exhibition was conceived as a series of self-contained 
mini-exhibits, each dealing with a single message or policy issue, each 
contained in its own suitcase. The great British suitcase brand Globetrotter 
was persuaded to donate the cases at cost and we started to beg, borrow, 
steal and commission a series of exhibits to bring the narrative to life 
(Figure 7.5). Each suitcase had an airline baggage tag on it, LHR to PVG. 
The suitcase strategy meant that every element could be constructed in 
London. Each item was potentially dispensable. Concerns about sign-off 
and approval were brushed aside with the airy reassurance ‘we can 
always drop it later’. In the event, all the suitcases made the final cut. 
Figure 7.5 Shanghai Expo 2010: an exhibition in a suitcase. Source: 
Isabel Allen/DfL/GLA.
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And there wasn’t any need for packaging. We simply locked each suitcase 
as we finished it and shipped it to Shanghai.9
Exhibitions, promotion and campaigns
London is often described as a ‘city of villages’. Although there is an 
element of truth in this cliché, the reality is more complex and more 
urban. The village is a form of settlement and social organisation that is 
distinct, bounded, inward-looking and often conservative in outlook. 
London is actually a city of unexpected juxtapositions, a patchwork of 
neighbourhoods, districts and places, each with its own characteristics 
and particular qualities. Although the historical form of parts of the 
metropolitan area might outwardly resemble the traditional village, in 
reality it is a series of urban fragments that are diverse, cosmopolitan and 
tied together through the connective tissue of the city and its complex 
economic and social structures.
One of the early debates at DfL concerned the nature of London. 
The team defined London as an ‘Open City’.10 This captured the essence 
of London and the fact that one could come to London and call oneself 
a Londoner, as with New York, but in stark contrast to cities like Paris 
or Rome, where citizenship implied birth or at least long residence. 
An early attempt to bring in consultants to define a comprehensive 
design philosophy and methodology for London failed. After much 
abortive drafting, it was agreed that a design philosophy could not be 
simply defined. In any case, the thinking of the A+UU that underpinned 
DfL’s work was far more advanced than that of the consultants who 
had been brought in.
As well as the major exhibitions outlined above, DfL collaborated 
with other cities, including Berlin, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Paris and 
Chicago, to explore similarities and differences in the approach that each 
was taking on similar issues. This was fertile ground for exchanging 
ideas. DfL exhibited work at the Rotterdam Biennale in 2007 and then in 
2009 at the Pompidou Centre in Paris (as part of the Richard Rogers 
retrospective), and at the Bucharest Festival of Architecture in 2008. 
It was also one of the main participants in the London Festival of 
Architecture in 2008 and 2010.
The City Visions 1910–2010 exhibition was work that the team 
jointly carried out with their counterparts in Paris, Berlin and Chicago. 
The exhibition was a celebration of the 100 years since the 1909 Burnham 
Plan for Chicago had toured each of these cities. It was looking at a 
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century of planning and at ways in which each of the participating cities 
was tackling the same pressing problems of housing, transportation, 
open space, urban renewal and neighbourhood centres. This was the 
result of the international networks that were being built, networks that 
allowed for an exchange of ideas and best practice.
The annual property event, MIPIM, gave DfL the opportunity to 
open up new dialogues with architects and developers. The New Urban 
Agenda which was launched at a series of events was a simple repackaging 
of London’s urban priorities. The events were all designed to engage a 
wider audience and included a breakfast ‘Pecha Kucha’11 where invited 
participants from London and other European cities were asked to 
present an idea for the future of London in two minutes. It engaged and 
amused the audience from the property industry over breakfast, but its 
intent was serious. It was an open dialogue about the possibilities of a 
city and how they might be realised.
From the outset DfL sought to build a set of loose networks across 
London. These were designed partly to infiltrate other parts of London 
government and create points of influence, and partly to seek out and 
support individuals in the boroughs who were also trying (often under 
very difficult circumstances) to carry out their own design initiatives. 
Initiatives like the 100 Public Spaces and the East London Green Grid 
were designed to co-opt the boroughs into strategic projects, to educate 
and to extend DfL’s reach and influence. Projects developed in partnership 
with other agencies were also likely to bring direct support and new 
funding sources, and to build the political capital of the team. London 
has 33 units of local government and a decision was made early on to 
work only with those boroughs that wanted to engage. Some boroughs 
remained hostile to collaboration and that was fine – there were plenty of 
places that wanted to work with DfL.
Along with the boroughs, there were also a number of architect 
practices keen to work with the team both in paid commissions and on an 
informal basis. Many of the team members taught part-time or held 
academic posts, and the debate with practitioners was mirrored by a 
similar dialogue with academia. The importance of these exchanges 
cannot be overemphasised. They refreshed both the team and the practices 
concerned and opened up a channel between academic research and 
government.
DfL’s high profile allowed it to build a positive set of networks with 
most of the architectural press, particularly The Architects’ Journal (AJ). 
The editor, Kieran Long, was a keen supporter and understood DfL’s 
objective of nurturing new talent. London was full of young practices, but 
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many were finding it almost impossible to break into the public sector 
due to over-complex commissioning procedures. The opening up of the 
Architectural and Design Framework Panel, described above, was one 
way to nurture and develop new talent. Another was to encourage them 
to work directly with the team. The AJ/RPS scholarship emerged from the 
relationship between the team and Long. This was an open competition 
run by the AJ to find three young emerging architects who would be paid 
to work for six months in DfL on a propositional project of their choice. 
The AJ would then feature their work. This project was designed to build 
a bridge with practice and to help to develop a wave of new London-based 
talent (the Richard Rogers and Norman Fosters of the future). The three 
‘scholars’ were Fiona Scott (Gort Scott Architects), Joe Morris (Duggan 
Morris Architects) and Alicia Pivaro. The bursaries injected new ideas and 
energy into DfL, maintained positive press coverage, diversified expertise 
in practices and produced a set of radical ideas that could push the 
boundaries of thinking without the team necessarily taking ownership. 
One of these pieces of work was Fiona Scott’s High Street London project 
(see Chapter 3).
The architectural press also helped to promote some of the team’s 
key initiatives. DfL had worked with the London Borough of Barking 
and Dagenham and had completed major projects in Barking town 
centre. The AJ, under both Isabel Allen and Kieran Long, and the Evening 
Standard, under Rowan Moore, were strong supporters. Moore12 
commented as follows on the work in Barking town centre: ‘A make 
believe ruin,13 an arcade with chandeliers and a grove of trees – these are 
the ways to bring new life and homes to the Thames Gateway.’ He 
concluded by saying: ‘[N]o one has tried this hard since the Second 
World War to bring real architectural quality to this place or to revive the 
old idea of civic pride.’ Even Building Design magazine concluded: ‘That 
a public space might accommodate such a lavish provision of bespoke 
design is pretty unprecedented.’14 The Barking Abbey Green project 
came out of this working relationship. The final piece of the jigsaw was a 
joint project between the council, DfL and the AJ which selected Lynch 
Architects to redesign the 6.5-hectare Abbey Green and connect the town 
centre with the River Roding.
The theme of ‘ideas without responsibility’ was developed further 
with the annual student project. Each year an architectural graduate was 
invited to join DfL and carry out a project of their choice. The project was 
theirs, not the team’s, and it was an opportunity to push the boundaries 
of the politically possible. One of the students, Oliver Wainwright,15 
produced a project that looked at the London Plan viewing corridors to St 
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Paul’s Cathedral. It concluded that the statutory protected views 
correlated closely with areas of the city with high property values 
(Richmond, Blackheath and Hampstead). He identified a series of other 
viewpoints from poorer neighbourhoods, such as Norwood, Forest 
Hill and Fairlop, that had no protection. The conclusion that planning 
policy was being distorted for the amenity of wealthy neighbourhoods 
was obvious. The final aspect of this broad approach of using advocacy 
and debate to raise the profile of architecture and design was active 
engagement with existing festivals. For the London Festival of Architecture, 
DfL sponsored a programme to bring in international speakers, including 
Pasqual Maragall, Jaime Lerner, Majora Carter, Torange Khonsari, Lotte 
Child and Ruth Padel. This programme complemented the team’s 
extensive international speaking programme as part of the promotion 
of London on the international stage.
Polemical debate was part of the team’s approach to opening up 
wider dialogue on issues across London. It was relatively easy to organise, 
cheap and fun. Furthermore, the association with some of the world’s 
great urban thinkers added to the profile of the team. Advocacy from 
within government is rare outside the circle of elected politicians. It was 
only possible because the team was trusted by the mayor and had the 
operational independence to take a position. The approach continued 
when the team was absorbed within the LDA. It was more dangerous to 
take a public position on policy matters, but as long as this was dressed 
up in the guise of an architectural debate, it was unlikely that anyone 
would notice. Like much of DfL’s work, it was a case of ‘continue until 
someone stops you’.
DfL always realised that it would be a time-limited body. It was just 
too different (and difficult to control) to last. At critical times, press 
support proved crucial to its chameleon-like transformations. It might 
have been abolished with the election of Boris Johnson as mayor in 2008, 
but instead it was allowed to move into the LDA due to its profile and a 
sense that it might be useful to a new administration. Many similar 
agencies and departments did not survive this political transition. When 
the LDA was itself facing abolition in 2011, it was the press that created a 
campaign to save it, partly orchestrated by its national and international 
networks. The Architecture Foundation wrote to the mayor,16 arguing 
that it would be ‘short sighted and detrimental’ to disband DfL, and 
Ellis Woodman wrote a leader in Building Design magazine17 entitled 
‘An Agency to be Cherished’, stating that ‘the potential abolition of this 
team is an extraordinarily bleak prospect not just for London but the 
country as a whole’. The AJ ran a campaign to ‘Save DfL’ that was endorsed 
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by the Royal Institute of British Architects.18 Building Design published a 
letter in February 2011 from an international group of architects that 
included Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Renzo Piano, Daniel Libeskind and 
Rafael Viñoly. The letter pressed the mayor to ‘secure the survival of this 
remarkable team. We hope that he is aware of how widely admired the 
efforts are of this small group of talented designers.’19 It is difficult to 
assess the impact of this level of support on the decision-making within 
London government, but the team did survive, at least in part, with Mark 
Brearley taking it into the GLA to work with the mayor’s new design 
champion, Daniel Moylan.
Narratives, not plans
Mark Brearley summarised part of the approach of the team as follows: 
‘do the drawings, win the argument’. He had also coined pithy phrases 
that described both opportunity and context, such as ‘London is a city 
of trees’, ‘slack spaces’ and ‘small things everywhere’, as part of his 
approach to communicate design to a wider audience.20 To this DfL 
added the concept of the design narrative. This was a technique for 
consensus building. Design narratives were propositional frameworks 
within which more formal planning exercises might fit. They gave 
individual projects both context and rationale. Planning had become 
enmeshed in technicalities and legal frameworks, and, although it 
purported to want to engage with the public, it was largely incapable 
of doing so. Consulting on a set of regulatory rules is never likely to 
get much of a response beyond those who find rules and their infinite 
nuances fascinating. Although DfL was an architecture team, most of 
what it did was, in fact, planning. The difference was that simple, easy-to-
read drawings and engaging narratives could be used to depict imagined 
futures that neighbourhoods could relate to, get excited by or reject if 
they did not like them. DfL took responsibility for defining future states 
that the planning process was all too willing to leave to chance and 
market forces.
A design narrative is essentially a description: an aspiration that 
stakeholders and the community can evaluate and, with negotiation, 
adopt. Making Space for Dalston21 was an example of a narrative driving 
local area regeneration and the East London Green Grid22 of a landscape 
narrative. The Green Enterprise District and the Royal Docks Strategy23 
were examples of regional strategies that combined spatial, economic 
and environmental ideas into a simple compelling story.
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The working methodologies around incremental urbanism lend 
themselves very well to techniques that foster public involvement through 
collaborative design. As DfL gained confidence in area-based initiatives, 
it honed its skills and those of its collaborating practices to embrace 
participatory planning. Participatory planning was not new; a number of 
practitioners had become very skilled at opening up dialogue with local 
communities and then developing proposals that had broad support. 
The Making Space for Dalston project covered in Chapter 3 is a good 
example of this approach.
Another example of participatory planning is the Deptford 
Creekside Charrette. The Borough of Lewisham had been an active 
partner of DfL and invited the team’s involvement in Deptford, a historic 
but poor riverside area that was becoming the subject of intense 
development pressure. A six-day charrette was held – a collaborative 
event part-funded by the private sector. A local shop unit was taken 
for the event and was open to anyone in the community. The objective 
was to harness the local knowledge, creative talent and energy of the 
community and produce feasible design options for the area (Figure 7.6). 
These would be a set of drawn proposals – not a final plan, but rather a 
starting point for further discussion with the community, landowners 
and the council to develop ideas further, within a spatial context. Over 
Figure 7.6 Deptford design charrette. Source: DfL/GLA.
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the six-day period a multidisciplinary team of 26 architects and planners 
worked with more than 350 local stakeholders. The resulting proposals 
were grouped into ‘layers, projects and rooms’. Layers (Figure 7.7) 
included themed strategies, for example for people and communities, 
routes and transport, and public art. These themes were then considered 
against a series of ‘rooms’ that represented distinct areas of Deptford 
such as the Creek Walk and Waterworks Park (Figure 7.8). Finally, all of 
the ideas were combined into an area plan (Figure 7.9).
Figure 7.7 Deptford as a series of layers. Source: Deptford Creekside 
document, DfL/GLA.
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Figure 7.8 Deptford as a series of rooms. Source: Deptford Creekside 
document, DfL/GLA.
Procurement systems
Public expenditure is rightly carefully regulated in the UK. The notion 
of responsible stewardship of taxpayers’ money is essential to any 
functioning democracy. Public contracts are often large and can be 
profitable, and there are too many examples from across the world 
where bribery and graft syphon off large sums of money. The notion that 
public spending needs to be transparent, fair and subject to scrutiny 
is essential. As a result, public procurement is a strongly regulated, 
stringently documented process. If appointment to public contracts is 
perceived to be unfair or biased, it fuels cynicism and a lack of trust in 
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public authorities. Furthermore, if procurement decisions are success-
fully challenged, this can have a profound and negative impact on a 
project’s finances and delivery timescale, and the reputation of the 
organisation and individuals concerned.
One way to manage these risks is to systemise the process into 
complex sets of procedures. The risk is that the driver of the process 
inexorably moves from outcome to audit. As procurement processes 
become more elaborate and risk-averse, any focus on qualitative rather 
than quantitative selection criteria, such as a practice’s design ability, 
Figure 7.9 Deptford: area plan. Source: Deptford Creekside document, 
DfL/GLA.
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is viewed as suspect and open to challenge. Until the end of the 1980s 
there had been considerable in-house architectural expertise in the 
public sector. As capital expenditure decreased, so did the work and 
effectiveness of in-house client organisations. Open competitions were 
rarely attempted, and most design firms were selected from a limited 
approved list of contractors – a list that had in itself been procured along 
risk-averse lines. Approved lists were often used out of laziness or under 
the pretext of time constraints. In fact, open procurement rarely entails 
more than an additional three months, which is purely a matter of good 
project management.
Rigorous procurement may make sense for large-scale, high-risk, 
high-value construction and infrastructure projects that cost tens or even 
hundreds of millions of pounds. The costs of running such processes are 
small compared to the final project cost, and the costs of participating are 
offset against the huge fees that can result from winning the contract. 
However, this approach has permeated the public sector to such an 
extent that even small-scale or low-risk projects go through relatively 
bureaucratic selection processes. Large firms have the in-house capacity 
to navigate the public procurement process. They have dedicated teams, 
standardised documentation and access to legal advice. Small firms 
without these advantages find participation in these processes risky, 
expensive and disproportionally time-consuming. For those that are 
seeking to build up their reputation through design excellence rather 
than a rigorous health and safety policy, a certified quality management 
system or knowledge of procurement legalities, the public sector is not 
always an obvious place to look for commissions.
A practice’s turnover, risk exposure ratios or internal human 
resource policies can all be quantified. But design quality is a lot more 
difficult to assess. Accountants and procurement managers can rarely 
make value judgements on quality (and many would see this as too 
dangerous to entertain). The evaluation of design quality is, after all, 
difficult to do objectively. Consequently, a successful procurement 
process is more often than not judged by the fact that there was no 
challenge. The fact that a second-rate architect’s firm was awarded 
the contract is rarely seen as an issue (and this is in any case a purely 
subjective view). As a result, public procurement has become ever more 
cumbersome over the past 20 years. The EU requirements under 
OJEU24 need not necessarily be a problem, as they can be applied with a 
relatively light touch. The problem is that often they are not. A whole 
procurement industry has sprung up, run by ‘procurement professionals’. 
While they might understand the process, they know little or nothing 
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about architecture and design. For them a successful procurement is 
one that cannot be challenged, regardless of whether the firm chosen 
is any good.
In addition, other questions have crept into the process, such as data 
security systems (relevant on government defence contracts but hardly 
important when designing a park). More recently, local authorities have 
been asking firms to pay a fee to join a tendering process, or to offer social 
kickbacks, including the employment of local people as apprentices. These 
act as a form of disqualification for small firms operating on tight budgets. 
Similarly, requirements for excessive insurance liability (sometimes set 
at the capital value of the project) are in effect anti-competitive; and 
insistence that firms should be able to demonstrate that they have 
worked on similar projects in the past three years shrinks the pool of those 
able to compete.25 What is essential for firms is that the client should 
be experienced and understand the commercial realities of bidding.26 
Most experienced firms will not bid if there are more than six firms on 
the tender list, and good practices will be put off if design quality is only a 
small part of the assessment process.
The UK system is similar to that in Canada and Australia, but as 
always it is the interpretation that is important. In New South Wales, 
for example, it is typical for government competitions to weight cost 
(fee proposal) at 60 per cent and quality at 40 per cent. This is not 
conducive to the promotion of design quality. Consequently, fees for 
public contracts have been driven down to very low levels. Current fee 
levels for government projects are often around 2–2.5 per cent. This 
is half the rate that is likely to produce good design thinking and 
execution.27 In other places, especially in the Middle East, procurement 
processes can be extremely complicated, costly to take part in and opaque 
in their decision-making. In theory, procurement processes should be 
the same across Europe, but in reality, the interpretation of EU rules 
differs. France tends to be very procedural, while systems vary from state 
to state in Germany. The German process is generally design-led and 
offers interesting lessons that were studied by the DfL team. Eva Herr, 
who worked at DfL from 2007 to 2010, and later worked for the cities of 
Bremen and Hamburg, has continued to champion the procurement 
of good architects on city-led projects using many of the methodologies 
from DfL.
Germany has several mechanisms for including design quality 
as a key procurement criterion. More recently, the call for greater 
transparency and community participation has also enabled a degree of 
public involvement, in particular in urban projects and masterplans. 
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Well-organised public involvement has strengthened design quality and 
the public debate on design. Germany has a strong system of competitions, 
as well as regulations to ensure that independent design expertise 
forms a prominent part of procurement and competition juries. If 
competitions are held under official guidelines, architects’ chambers 
sign off the process. Regulations state that the jury must include more 
qualified independent members with design expertise than members 
who represent the client side, cost control and so on. The jury’s chair is 
always an independent design expert. This is a relatively established 
process and, while costs, deliverability and durability are taken very 
seriously, it is design excellence that makes the difference as to whether 
a project is chosen or not.
Germany makes extensive use of design advisory panels, such 
as the Gestaltungsbeirat or Baukollegium in Berlin. Cities including 
Hamburg, Berlin, Bremen and Munich have a high-ranking chief architect 
(Oberbaudirektor or Senatsbaudirektor) who is involved in major design 
decisions. Recently there has been a tendency to ensure public scrutiny 
and even public participation in competitions and design decisions. 
There are various ways of doing this. For example, members of the public 
may form part of the jury, either as guests or participants. The presenta-
tion of design options can be public and there may be public feedback 
on competition entries prior to the jury’s decision. The most radical 
approach is to involve members of the public in the jury and ensure a 
public discussion and decision. Involving the public does not replace the 
role of independent architects. The idea is to broaden the scope of the 
design decision by including a wider range of viewpoints.
Using procurement as a design and publicity tool
One of the roles of government is, arguably, that of sponsor and patron. 
London had the ability to use its purchasing clout to provide market 
access to small and medium-size enterprises, and indeed the LDA saw 
this as one of its stated objectives. DfL sought to put this into practice and 
provide access for small, local and design-focused firms, where public 
commissions were suitable. From the outset DfL set out to influence the 
procurement of architects working on programmes that were managed 
or funded by London government, the boroughs and other public 
bodies. Control the procurement, be an active client and good design just 
might occur. This meant influencing the lottery of public procurement 
in order to appoint good practices that would be curious, engaged and 
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ambitious in their work. This would greatly improve architectural quality 
on publicly funded projects in London. There was a mantra in the team: 
‘Good architects can design good buildings, poor architects never will.’ 
There are good and bad teachers, doctors, builders and car mechanics. 
The architectural profession is no different. There are many good 
practices staffed by individuals with flair and talent. There are also 
many that are mediocre and cynical. In addition, many architects believe 
that they can design at the city level, but few can. Lee Mallett, writing in 
Planning, expanded this truism: ‘Many clients seem happy with poor 
design. Many poor architects seem only too happy to supply it. Many 
local authorities seem happy to live with it.’28
The use of procurement as a tool to improve design quality is a 
completely reasonable approach. After all, why would one willingly 
select second-rate architectural practices to work on schemes? However, 
this raises the problem of transparency. Poor architects’ practices are 
rarely self-aware enough to recognise their mediocrity and are ready to 
call foul when they are not selected for projects. Moreover, their 
discontent was aggravated when they saw a few relatively small and 
unknown practices getting the commissions that they were not. The 
A+UU was already viewed by some as being a small and elite unit with 
close links to Richard Rogers and a small coterie of practitioners.29 It 
was tempting to make the leap to assume that there was a ‘black list’ of 
practices that were being deliberately excluded from public contracts. 
This was never the case,30 but the rumours continued. This was a toxic 
and distracting news story, and when DfL was set up, a decision was 
taken to address it. There were two parts to the strategy. The first was to 
ensure that the new Advisory Board was advertised and openly recruited; 
the second was to revamp its whole commissioning process and to use 
the press to assist in this task.
Underpinning this was a belief that, although there were many 
excellent large practices operating in London, some of the smaller ones 
were hungrier and more innovative in their approach. With a smaller 
practice it was clear who would be doing the actual work on the project. 
From a project perspective, small firms were also easier to manage 
and more likely to produce a good scheme; they had more at stake and 
their reputation depended on delivering a good project. The idea was to 
broaden the range of potential bidders, lower the threshold for access to 
public commissions and help smaller firms gain knowledge of how to bid 
for public projects. And most importantly, the aim was to reintroduce 
design quality as an important procurement criterion in the selection 
of firms.
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Influencing the selection of architects was seen as an important 
way to improve the quality of design projects. A number of large firms 
had cornered the market and were not being scrutinised hard by the 
client bodies. Managers took the attitude that they had been used 
before and, as long as there had been no problems, could be used again. 
Public procurement is actually quite flexible. It can occur through open 
competition, through design contest (open or invited), from preselected 
framework agreements or, on small projects, through three to six quotes 
against a project brief. For most projects the framework agreement was 
the best way of operating – but only if the framework contained a range 
of talented firms. Most of the existing frameworks that were being used 
had not tapped into the vast array of diverse talent that was available in 
London, the UK and the EU.
The A+UU had managed to influence procurement of design teams 
on LDA projects. It had already produced a best practice guide in which 
it stated:
An open, transparent, competitive selection process is one of the 
best ways of delivering quality in design. It is not only a legal 
requirement when public funds are involved, it is also an effective 
way of getting the best for our built environment. Some of the most 
successful buildings and urban projects of recent years are the 
result of competitive selection. The award-winning Laban Centre in 
Deptford, the Baltic Flour Mills in Gateshead and the masterplan 
for the Lower Lea Valley at the centre of the Mayor’s vision for the 
London 2012 Olympic Bid are the products of design competitions. 
The same is true of many of Europe’s most attractive and sustainable 
urban developments in Barcelona, Amsterdam and Berlin.31
This practical guide set out the principles of good, open procurement. 
Architects were included on the selection panels. Ricky Burdett and 
Richard MacCormac acted as external advisors on some of the larger 
projects. The A+UU had also persuaded some managers to increase the 
weighting given to design ability in the assessments. In 2007, on a large 
housing scheme in Bromley-by-Bow, DfL had persuaded the LDA to 
award the development to the highest bidder (Barratt), but only if they 
were willing to change their architects on the scheme.32 The LDA had 
already agreed to allow DfL to write the briefs, sit on selection panels and 
include clauses in procurement documents that the LDA could request 
changes to the design team when awarding contracts. As DfL was an 
amalgamation of design teams from the GLA, the LDA and Transport for 
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London (TfL), it was able to extend its influence to the appointment of 
designers on transport projects as well.
The opportunity for change arose when the LDA’s approved list 
came up for renewal. Under London government procedures, any of the 
mayor’s agencies (as well as boroughs and the Homes and Communities 
Agency) could access firms from each other’s approved lists, which 
provided an opportunity to introduce new firms. Understanding the 
Byzantine processes of public procurement might not be interesting, but 
it was essential if design quality was to be raised across London. The task 
of understanding and restructuring the process fell to Eva Herr, an 
architect in DfL, who later stated:
When the LDA’s architecture, landscape und urban design 
framework agreement panel was procured, there was a strong 
internal debate as to whether design quality could or should 
form part of the selection process. This was partly due to intense 
public criticism and accusations of favouritism ahead of the 
procurement process. A lot of effort went into dissolving these 
accusations and demonstrating that design quality could be 
evaluated in a fair and transparent way that was up for scrutiny. 
The panel’s EU-procurement was announced widely, not only in 
specialist publications, as is usually the case. The selection process 
for design quality was carried out with external independent 
advisors,33 helping to dissolve the accusation that internal DfL staff 
picked firms of personal preference.34
The real success was to persuade the LDA to place design ability at the 
centre of the process and give it a weight of 60 per cent in the evaluation 
scoring. So that design quality and creative thinking could be evaluated, 
firms were required not only to submit references, but also to submit a 
single panel to answer the question ‘If I could design London I would … ’. 
This aimed to test their ability to think conceptually and imaginatively. 
All submissions were published and the panels were used to provide an 
instant exhibition at Somerset House (as described earlier in the chapter) 
that coincided with a series of international talks and the announcement 
of the procurement decision. The process attracted the participation 
of many firms that had previously doubted that public procurement 
processes were worth the effort and cost. They trusted that design ability 
would be taken seriously in the selection process. Part of the selection 
process, which was initially perceived as being ‘secretive’, became public. 
In the end, the decision was not challenged, and nor did it receive 
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negative publicity. On the contrary, it was noted that the LDA had 
appointed young and small firms alongside some of the UK’s most reputed 
design practices. Procurement, for once, became interesting and relevant 
to a wider audience. The press, for its part, covered the process and 
considered that the ghost of bias had been laid to rest.
Conclusions
Having a high profile can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
allows access to the press to promote ideas and help to recruit like-minded 
partners. On the other, it can open up a team to criticism. There are 
only so many good stories that the press will cover before it seeks to find 
fault. Critical stories and scandal sell more newspapers. DfL took a 
conscious decision to break away from the low-profile approach that the 
A+UU had adopted. It was created in a blaze of publicity and saw profile 
as a means to develop a debate around how London could be shaped. 
The employment of a press insider, Isabel Allen, allowed it to keep a high 
profile with relatively little collateral damage. The campaigns, launches, 
exhibitions and publications were all part of this strategy, as was the 
content. If the design ideas were edgy and innovative, these had to be 
portrayed in the images and exhibitions. They were deliberately designed 
to provoke a reaction and were all written and presented in a style that 
kicked hard against the dull approach of public-sector PR departments. 
The communications strategy was designed from the outset to create a 
new culture of interest in design, and to launch different approaches that 
would engage with government, practice and the general public.
The procurement of good architects to work on public projects is 
one of the keys to raising design quality in a city. Practice in Germany 
shows that when decisions are made in an open manner, with inputs 
from both practitioners and the public, then good design is likely to 
ensue. The experience from New South Wales is that processes that 
seek value for money purely through reducing fee levels are unlikely 
to produce anything worthwhile. By playing an active role in the 
procurement process, DfL was able to exert considerable influence and 
raise the profile of design across London.35 The panel was able to nurture 
a new generation of practices and develop wider and more diverse 
expertise, particularly in urban design. One of these firms was Karakusevic 
Carson Architects. It was successful in joining the new LDA panel (its 
exhibit was a series of tape measures that recorded the ever-reducing 
floor-to-ceiling heights in London residential properties). Because the 
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panel was used by the boroughs, the firm was subsequently awarded 
contracts in Hackney, Havering, Lewisham and Brent. Paul Karakusevic 
of this firm is a strong supporter of the panel system and has stated that 
it was a lot fairer than basing decisions on ‘who you played golf with’.36 
The panel enabled many practices to grow and to become a pool of 
mature talent that is still shaping London. Perhaps this is one of DfL’s 
most important legacies.
Notes
 1 Rogers was a Labour peer and had been one of the participants in the 1996 London debate that 
had led to the establishment of the GLA and a London mayor.
 2 Set up by the Blair government in 1997 and chaired by Rogers; see Chapter 1.
 3 Such as the Garden Bridge (subsequently abandoned) and the ArcelorMittal Orbit at the 
Olympic Park. 
 4 London: Open City was curated and designed with Gerrard O’Carroll, Morag Myerscough, 
Luke Morgan, Jake Moulson and Lucy Sollitt.
 5 An installation on the Greenwich Peninsula that was part of the London Festival of Architecture.
 6 This is covered in more detail in the later section in this chapter on procurement.
 7 A framework panel is an openly advertised and vetted panel of approved contractors. Once 
set up, it is standard practice for practices to be selected from this panel without the need for 
preselection. This speeds up the process considerably. Obviously, a panel is only as good as 
those on it, but a well-selected panel will improve design quality significantly.
 8 The centrepiece would have been an interactive map of London where, as one of the 
consultants proudly explained, a ballet dancer would pop up when you pushed a button for 
Sadler’s Wells. Uninspiring as this idea was, it was irrelevant as the funding had been spent on 
‘creative content’ and there was not even a map, let alone an interactive one.
 9 The exhibition was a critical success and was visited by a large number of people, including the 
architect Thomas Heatherwick and the chair of CABE, John Sorrell. Both left very flattering 
comments. After the expo closed, the suitcases disappeared, but Peter Bishop later came across 
them in a university near to Chongqing where a museum had been built to exhibit them!
10 This is now often used in urban parlance and an early example is the Rotterdam Biennale in 
2007. Although it cannot be proved, DfL would claim to have first used the phrase, basing it on 
the title of the Rossellini film Rome, Open City. 
11 This is a Japanese presentation technique where 20 images have to be presented in 6 minutes, 
with the presenter not being able to control the timing of the slides.
12 Moore 2007.
13 Reference to muf’s folly on Town Square and AHMM’s housing and library arcade.
14 Woodman 2009.
15 Now architecture correspondent for the Guardian newspaper.
16 17 November 2010.
17 Woodman 2010.
18 Fulcher 2010.
19 Building Design, February 2011.
20 Interview with Mark Brearley, January 2020.
21 See Chapter 3.
22 See Chapter 4.
23 See Chapter 6.
24 The Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) requires all contracts above certain limits 
to be openly advertised.
25 Interview with Helen Logan, partner at Allies and Morrison, March 2019.
26 Typically, a medium-to-large firm will have a standing team and this will account for around 
3 per cent of turnover. The cost of the average bid is likely to be around £2,500–10,000 and a 
successful firm would expect at least a 25 per cent success rate.
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27 Bishop 2017.
28 Quoted in Bishop 2011.
29 For the record, Richard Rogers’ practice never bid for, or was awarded, projects from the 
A+UU or the mayor.
30 In 2006 the GLA carried out an internal inquiry into alleged bias in the A+UU and concluded 
that there was no evidence of bias or malpractice. 
31 Greater London Authority 2005.
32 Allies and Morrison, Glenn Howells and Maccreanor Lavington were subsequently selected 
by Barratt and approved by DfL. This was a turning point for Barratt (London) as it proved 
to be one of the most successful projects that they had built. They went on to do other schemes 
on LDA sites, including Barrier Park and Dalston Junction, always seeking DfL advice on their 
choice of architects.
33 This included Hanif Kara from the DfL Advisory Group.
34 Interview with Eva Herr, December 2019.
35 The GLA still operates the panel and the processes that underpin it. The typical selection 
criteria are now 70 per cent design quality, 20 per cent price and 5 per cent social value.
36 Interview with Paul Karakusevic, October 2019.
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The immediate postwar period in the UK was dominated by the need for 
reconstruction. This required the creation of powerful state agencies, and 
architecture and planning were viewed as the realm of the professional 
expert. In the immediate aftermath of a war-time economy, their visions 
for the future were rarely debated, let alone challenged. Despite real 
postwar austerity, the concept of state expenditure to redress social and 
economic issues was broadly accepted within the political mainstream. 
The state had land and funds and believed it knew best how to use them. 
There was limited interest in preserving heritage (and the definition 
excluded much of the nineteenth-century fabric of cities). It was widely 
believed that ‘slums’ should be cleared and that the motor car was the 
future for transportation. An extended middle class that was embracing 
modernism and consumerism saw itself as the vanguard for a better future. 
In the words of Harold Macmillan, Britain had ‘never had it so good’.1
By the 1960s a new awareness was emerging concerning the 
relationship between urban form and civic life that was fundamentally 
challenging the worst excesses of the modernist movement. Urban 
thinkers such as Jane Jacobs had begun to question the impact of the 
wholesale restructuring of cities driven by neighbourhood clearance 
and the construction of urban motorways. Implicit in her arguments was 
that ‘strips of chaos’ were worth valuing over the excessive ordering 
principles of urban planners. Jacobs established a set of principles that 
might have been radical at the time but have since become enshrined 
as some of the founding principles of present-day urban planning. 
These included the primacy of the street as a social place, mixed-use 
neighbourhoods and the notion of social capital. Through her grassroots 
campaigning she also established the principle of practitioner as activist. 
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This was carried forward by a new generation of urban planners and 
architects, including Design for London (DfL).
The Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) and DfL inherited a 
rich vein of late twentieth-century thinking about the city. Their design 
methodologies reflected ‘careful urban renewal’ and ‘critical reconstruc-
tion’ and incorporated principles of community participation and 
engagement. The city was no longer a place to be planned and rational-
ised. It was a complex, collaged and untidy place that was in a process 
of continuous adaptation and change. Its ‘found’ elements, its sheds, 
industry, wastelands and leftover spaces were parts of the richness of 
the city. To the designer these places offered material that could be 
refashioned into new urban forms and configurations. The fine-grained, 
mixed-use nature of the mature late-twentieth-century city provided a 
fertile laboratory for experimentation.
It is extremely difficult to assess good design objectively. Highway 
design can be measured through accident statistics, but how can the 
quality of urban spaces be assessed? Certain measures such as footfall, 
safety and crime statistics and the economic turnover of local businesses 
may all point to good design, but they miss those intangible elements 
that delight and enchant. We know good design when we see it but have 
difficulty in defining why we like it, or even how we could replicate it in 
other contexts.
The barriers to good design are complex and deeply embedded in 
the culture of government at all levels in the UK. Design considerations 
are often overtaken by operational requirements. The readiness of the 
media to seize on delay and overspend as examples of public-sector 
incompetence can turn public projects into damage limitation exercises. 
In addition, the experience and design expertise of public-sector architec-
ture and planning departments has largely been lost through expenditure 
cuts. Subjective opinions and personal taste can often dominate the 
design debate, and these can be hard to resist. Local government is 
political by nature and its perspectives are often framed by the electoral 
cycle. Architectural and urban design projects might be seen as desirable 
but, against demands for education, housing and social care, they are 
rarely of high priority. The problems are compounded by the lack 
of design training in planning and engineering courses and the lack of 
planning and contextual education in architecture courses. Recent 
national reviews on design in the built environment have all identified 
shortcomings in design education, lack of local leadership, low levels of 
design training among politicians and the lack of resources at local level 
as contributory factors behind poor-quality place-making.2
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Each chapter of this book has set out its main conclusions and there 
is no need to repeat them in detail here. Some broad points are worth 
summarising:
 1. Good design is not a given. Some cities might be fortunate enough 
to have elected representatives who are passionate about design 
(and understand what it is and how to realise it), but these are 
exceptions. For most senior politicians, design is at best peripheral 
to their thinking. It does not win votes. Or does it? The key challenge 
is to demonstrate that good design is about doing things well and 
that if it can be grounded in a broad agenda of urban and social 
improvement then it can win votes.
 2. The business of thinking and delivery in government is largely 
entrusted to a cadre of senior professionals who understand their 
area of expertise. They might not always be creative, but they do get 
things done. Educating, infiltrating and cooperating with them will 
move the agenda in the right direction and achieve better results.
 3. Good design needs advocates who have real influence at the 
city level. Mayoral government has worked well in London so 
far (although, as power is so concentrated into the hands of a 
single politician, it does depend on the electorate recognising 
the qualitative difference between candidates’ capabilities to 
responsibly run what is in effect a multi-million-pound institution). 
Good design also needs managers and fixers who understand the 
organisational and political environment and can shield others to 
produce good and thoughtful work.
 4. Building networks across agencies is perhaps the most effective way 
to influence government. This creates allies at points of influence 
and allows debates to take place. These debates will eventually be 
manifest through better things happening on the ground.
 5. Agency is essential. Designing at the city or neighbourhood level is 
not a neutral activity. Urban design has multiple clients and it 
changes the relative balance of benefits within an area. There are 
winners and losers in the process; architecture and planning have 
political outcomes. This applies to the issue of where resources 
are deployed in the city. Wealthy areas are usually well enough 
organised to protect their interests, while poorer areas are not.
 6. Understanding the city is an essential component of good design. 
The extensive mapping and analysis that was undertaken in London 
set a foundation for thoughtful interventions and careful strategies. 
It also proved critical in winning arguments. For design teams to be 
DESIGN FOR LONDON246
effective, it is essential they have detailed local knowledge. Local 
politicians and communities see through ‘technical experts’ pretty 
quickly. Positive change has to be grounded in local knowledge 
and understanding, in the history, culture and everyday experience 
of the neighbourhood. Empathy, which develops understanding, 
grows with exposure to the locality, its issues and the lives of 
its people.
 7. The issues that are important in determining the quality of urban 
living are widely applicable. They are shared by most cities. In 
London, projects to provide public space (100 Public Spaces), 
policies to improve housing (London Housing Design Guide), 
programmes to improve town centres (High Street Places), plans to 
regenerate areas (Olympic Fringe and Royal Docks frameworks) 
and initiatives to address climate change (East London Green Grid) 
have all been resilient enough to withstand political change and are 
all still operating in one form or another. These pieces of work have 
had a very significant impact on making London a better place.
 8. Urban design uses many of the tools of the planner. These include 
an understanding of how policy works to shape the city. Policy is 
not abstract. Good policy-making starts from a clearly imagined 
outcome and works backwards to create the framework to bring it 
to fruition.
 9. Unlike planning (as presently practised in the UK), urban design is 
able to do the drawings. Plans, drawings, narratives and ‘minted 
phrases’ are more effective in fashioning change than regulatory 
planning frameworks.
10. An incremental, or tactical, approach to shaping the city is more 
likely to work in an uncertain age. There will rarely be opportunities 
to plan on a grand scale, so design needs to be opportunistic 
and agile. A design team will never be able to control a city’s 
development, but it can shape it through ‘catching and steering’. 
Incremental urbanism is spontaneous. Getting started on projects is 
important to establish momentum and demonstrate commitment. 
Incremental urbanism also allows networks to be formed and 
nurtured. It allows experimentation, feedback and adjustment. In 
many ways the networks formed through good interdisciplinary 
working at a local level can be as important as the project itself. 
Capacity building increases resilience.
11. Designers need to understand budgets, processes and regulations. 
These are the factors that make things happen. Ignore or fail to 
understand them and very little will ever happen.
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12. Design is part of a process. It needs an understanding of how the 
city is managed, how space is used and how activity can be curated. 
Good design crosses boundaries between disciplines, and good 
practitioners also engage with and learn from their clients, 
especially the communities they work with.
13. Effective urban design works at different and contrasting scales – 
from the city region to the street corner. It is the intelligent 
interrelationship between these different scales that gives policy, 
programmes and projects their coherence.
14. There is a difficult choice between aiming for a high or low profile 
as a design team. The A+UU and DfL experimented with both 
approaches. Ultimately this is a matter of tactics and dependent on 
the circumstances of the time. Sometimes it is useful to infiltrate 
and give others credit; at other times it is important to be clear who 
did the thinking and the work. In a mature and stable environment 
(as certainly exists at the GLA today), campaigning is less important 
than in the early days of London government, when the case for 
design had to be made.
15. Publications, events and exhibitions are important instruments in 
communicating design ideas. The presentation of many public-
sector documents is dull. Crisp graphics and clear writing are vital 
tools to engage with the public and stakeholders.
16. Good architects design good buildings; bad architects never 
will. Procurement and the client role are crucial tools in ensuring 
that good designers are given the opportunity to produce good 
outcomes. City government also has an important role as patron 
and design champion.
17. Design review is a tool that might improve particular schemes, but 
it will not in itself make fundamental changes to the city. It is not a 
substitute for proactive design agency that gets ‘stuck in’ to tackle 
the underlying issues of the city.
18. Finally, a design team is not a luxury. It can be embedded in the 
structure of city government or it can be given the freedom to 
operate outside formal structures. This will depend on the state and 
nature of a city’s government. The use of ‘soft power’ can be a very 
effective methodology, but only for as long as political patronage 
exists. A licence to think, to question, to debate and challenge are 
essential attributes for any city that is ambitious for a better future.
Although DfL made a significant impact during its short life (and most of 
its projects came to fruition), there is inevitably regret about a number 
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of high-profile projects that were not implemented. Some of the ‘ones 
that got away’ include the partial pedestrianisation of Parliament Square 
(Chapter 2), major projects that would have redesigned Marble Arch to 
connect Oxford Street to Hyde Park (by John McAslan) and the closure 
of part of Sloane Square (Stanton Williams; Figure 8.1). One of the first 
proposals in the 100 Public Spaces programme was Richard MacCormac’s 
scheme to redesign the Victoria Embankment and create a ‘Northbank’ 
to complement London’s South Bank. The scheme would have doubled 
the width of the walkway along the Thames and replanted a double 
avenue of trees, creating a riverside boulevard along which art would 
have been exhibited in a curated outdoor gallery. Sadly, the only 
intervention to date has been to paint part of the carriageway blue as part 
of the London cycle network. Perhaps a future generation of planners, 
designers and politicians will resuscitate some of these schemes and 
adapt them to present circumstances.
It is interesting to consider the design agenda for London now. In 
many ways it remains the same as it was 20 years ago: public space, 
responses to climate change, regional landscapes, high streets and town 
centres, streetscapes and housing standards. Indeed, all of these areas 
are part of the work of the present team in the GLA under the Good 
Growth by Design programme. The working methodology would still be 
similar. Design ideas would still be multi-scaled, from the city to the 
Figure 8.1 Proposals for Sloane Square (by Stanton Williams) as part 
of the Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces programme. Source: ‘Civilising Spaces’, 
DfL/GLA.
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street corner. Hands-on design charrettes would still be central to all 
local work, as would the methodology of research, mapping and 
incremental urbanism. Influence would still be exercised through a 
complex network of partnership arrangements.
There would still be a search for the ‘next big thing for London’, but 
in reality the next big thing will be ‘lots of little things’. In his foreword to 
this volume, Ken Livingstone proposes that the ‘next Olympics’ should be 
a programme of measures to reduce carbon emissions and create new 
jobs and that this should be at the heart of urban policy. Another fertile 
area for design thinking would be the places where we all live. On a 
day-to-day basis, many people rarely leave their neighbourhood, but 
almost everyone leaves their house to experience the spaces outside their 
front door. For some, this is an elevating experience, but for many it is 
not. Drab suburban streets, roads cluttered with parking, estates that 
are poorly maintained (or are just bleak areas of grass or tarmac) – these 
could all be so much better. We all know that space is a valuable 
commodity in the city, so why are we so unimaginative in how we use it? 
Why do we allow empty cars to occupy it and municipal authorities to 
manage it according to the lowest common denominator?
The East London Green Grid programme explored the importance 
of landscapes in the city and extended the concept beyond London into 
the Thames Gateway. This raises issues about the metropolitan limits of 
London and the green belt. The flaw of Mayor Johnson’s Outer London 
Commission was that it defined outer London only in terms of its 
relationship with inner London. A far more interesting exploration would 
focus on outer London’s relationship with the South East region. This 
would open up critical design issues such as access to the countryside, 
environmental resilience, resource management, and settlement and 
work patterns. The future extent and shape of London would be 
considered in such a work theme. A study of the Thames would similarly 
be rewarding. The A+UU carried out some initial work that looked at 
green spaces along the river and ways in which they might be connected 
together. But what if radical policy shifts could be considered? Should 
the Thames be designated as a conservation area3 in order to exert 
greater design control over the buildings along its length (and the 
detritus of wharves, landing stages and run-down ships that form such 
an eyesore in central London)? Would changing navigation arrangements 
for the Port of London Authority allow the building of bridges in east 
London without the need for excessive clearances, costs and land take?
There are also many possibilities for subtle pieces of work that 
might allow the city to be seen through other lenses. Fenna Wagenaar4 
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has suggested mapping sunshine and light across public spaces in the 
city, including church interiors, terraces, pavements, street corners, 
gardens, playgrounds and parks. Such a map would ensure that future 
development would not compromise this precious but under-documented 
feature. Lara Kinneir5 has suggested that a model of computer-generated 
images could be produced to demonstrate how new development 
proposals will look in five or ten years, or when the sun is not shining on 
a wet February afternoon. If we are serious about building for life, 
addressing climate change and creating places that are qualitatively 
sustainable, we must include new measures to engage with these agendas 
through the planning process. The above are just a few of the ideas that 
might be developed in a city such as London, but without a dedicated 
design team with the licence to think and imagine, the urban debate will 
be the poorer.
DfL spanned an extraordinary period in both the history of London 
and the development of urban thinking. The case for good design, public 
space, city-wide landscape and proactive local renewal strategies still 
had to be made. The built environment professions were on a steep 
learning curve and so were politicians and city managers. Thinking of 
the city as a collage of fragments and valuing the everyday suited the 
condition of London. London is after all a city of fragments and its 
in-between spaces offered a rich canvas of possibilities for imagination 
and intervention (Figure 8.2). The scepticism inherent in mainstream 
political thinking in the UK and the lack of dedicated large-scale funding 
for major projects opened up ‘tactical’ urbanism as a clear strategy 
for change. This in turn forced DfL to work deep within the political 
structures of city government, to seek allies and alliances and to find 
ways of persuading other agencies to steer their programmes towards 
broader and more imaginative outcomes.
When the GLA was re-established in 2000, the model of a decoupled 
design agency was probably the only way in which a design agenda 
could have been incorporated into London government. DfL was more 
than a design agency. It was given a licence to think conceptually about 
the city, to be its conscience and act as a positive irritant to stimulate 
debate within government. This book throws some light on how it 




































































1 Harold Macmillan’s famous declaration that ‘most of our people have never had it so good’ 
came in July 1957, at a time when the country was riding high on the postwar economic boom. 
Two years later, the country was hit by inflation and recession, and this, along with internal 
scandals, paved the way for a Labour government in 1964.
2 The Bishop Review 2011 for the Design Council/the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, the Farrell Review 2014 and the House of Lords Select Committee 2016.
3 An idea that has been mooted by the architect Graham Morrison.
4 Formerly of Design for London.
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Peter Bishop and Lesley Williams
Design for London was a unique experiment in urban planning, design and strategic 
thinking. Set up in 2006 by Mayor Ken Livingstone and his Architectural Advisor,  
Richard Rogers, the brief for the team was ‘to think about London, what made London 
unique and how it could be made better’. Sitting within London government but outside  
its formal statutory responsibilities, it was given freedom to question and challenge.  
The team had no power or money, but it did have the licence to operate without the  
usual constraints of government.
With introductions from Ken Livingstone and Richard Rogers, Design for London covers  
the tumultuous and heady period of the first decade of this century when London was a  
test bed for new ideas. It outlines how key projects such as the London Olympics, public 
space programmes, high street regeneration and greening programmes were managed, 
critically examines the lessons that might be learnt in strategic urban design and considers 
how a design agenda for London could be developed in the future.
By providing an engaging account of the strategic approaches and work of Design for 
London, and documenting the particular methodology and approach to urban theory  
it developed, Design for London will appeal to undergraduate and postgraduate students 
of planning, urban design and architecture, and to current practitioners from the public, 
private and community sectors who are struggling to achieve regeneration through  
poorly understood ‘placemaking’ concepts.
Peter Bishop is Professor of Urban Design at The Bartlett School of Architecture, London 
and the founding partner of Bishop & Williams Ltd. 
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